A BINATIONAL STATE IN PALESTINE

             THE RATIONAL CHOICE FOR PALESTINIANS

               AND THE MORAL CHOICE FOR ISRAELIS

 

 

               by Jenab Tutunji and Kamal Khaldi

 

 

The creation of an independent state will not satisfy the Palestinian people's dream of freedom, equality and political normalcy, and is a remote probability at best. The Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza face a choice between living in a bantustan or transforming limited autonomy into a component of a binational state in which the Jewish and Palestinian ethnonational communities will be able to coexist while each preserves its own cultural identity. The Palestinians need to reorient their struggle accordingly. This rational choice for Palestinians is also the moral choice for Israelis and Palestinians alike because it transcends particularism and the confines of narrow nationalism through the redemptive power of coexistence and the embrace of universal human values without surrendering one's heritage.

 

 

     The purpose of this article is to invite Palestinians and Israelis to reconsider the basis for the resolution of the conflict between them. The Palestinians are driven by the quest for an independent state of their own on any part of the land of Palestine that cam be liberated (through negotiations in the context of the peace process, as it happens). The Israeli public is split into two principal groups: those who cherish the principle of democracy, and would much rather not continue in the role of occupiers of another people, and those whose foremost priority is annexing the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) to the state of Israel, even if democratic principles have to be sacrificed to attain this end. The first Israeli group generally believes that peace can come about through accommodation and territorial concessions; the second group either believes in peace through strength, or does not believe that peace is a viable possibility at this time. In addition both Israeli groups would prefer the Jewish character of the state not to be diluted by a sizable non-Jewish community in their midst, and the Israeli population in general is highly concerned with the issues of national and personal security.

     Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel found itself occupying territories with a sizable Palestinian population; at present there are over three million Palestinians living under Israeli control or Israeli sovereignty: 1.32 million in the West Bank, 813,000 in the Gaza Strip and 918,000 in Israel proper within the pre-1967 borders (the Green Line).

     The formula that Israel and the Palestinians have agreed to for dealing with this problem, the peace agreement embodied in Oslo I and Oslo II, represents the vector sum of the preferences outlined in the first paragraph: the drive for a Palestinian mini-state and the Israeli attachment to the land, religious purity, democracy and security, to which must be added the pursuit of peace as a goal in itself. As usual, a vector sum of preferences does not reflect the wishes of any one group or faction, but is a compromise among these preferences which also reflects the political power supporting each preference.[1] The resultant force, a vector represented by a single arrow, assumes a direction which none of the parties would have chosen of their own free will. The outcome is not the result of rational choice by any one of the parties concerned. However, each of the parties can push the resultant closer to the direction it wants by increasing the force behind its preference.

     Given this situation, one can arrive at the surprising conclusion that it is not unlikely that the outcome of this process may be a binational state. If those Israelis whose first priority is attachment to the land can veto the establishment of a Palestinian state, which appears quite likely, then the Palestinians will be left with no option but to fight for equality with Israelis at the individual level, and to transform limited autonomy into a more meaningful formula for the representation of their ethnonational community. If they succeed, then a binational state will emerge at the end of the process, although it may take a long time, and despite the absence of a significant constituency among either Palestinians or Israelis for a binational state. Israel has, for the first time, recognized the existence of a Palestinian people. The Palestinians in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza Strip are already organized along national lines, in a linguistic, religious, cultural, and territorial sense. They have been granted a limited measure of autonomy and local representation; there is an elected body representing Palestinians, and an executive in charge of police, educational and public health matters, with jurisdiction over most of the Gaza Strip and the main cities in the West Bank. Jerusalem and Hebron are notable exceptions.[2]  As matters progress to the final status negotiations (if they ever get beyond the present impasse), the intractable problems of Jerusalem and the settlements will emerge, not to mention the question of sharing water resources and whether scarce land is to be allocated to the already suffocating Palestinian population or to expanding Israeli settlements. It is extremely unlikely that a politically feasible solution will be found to these problems.

     Yet these problems are intractable only in so far as there is an attempt to divide control or sovereignty over the territory of the West Bank. One way to solve these problems is to remove the contentious issue of dividing sovereignty, that is to say, for Israel to annex the West Bank (perhaps setting up an independent ministate in most of Gaza). In that event, three alternatives present themselves: 1) expelling the Arab population, 2) establishing a bantustan type of arrangement for the Palestinians in some form of apartheid state, or 3) going forward to a binational state. A bantustan arrangement is unstable in the long run, and will degenerate into one of the other two alternatives. Therefore, the enduring alternatives are expelling the Arab population from the West Bank (and perhaps even) Israel or establishing a binational state. We shall examine this argument at some length below.

     Ever since Israel won what seemed a miraculous victory against the Arabs in 1967, it gained control over the Palestinians, in what came to be an indefinite occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Since then Israel has been binational, in the sense of a state that contains -- directly and through occupation -- two national or ethnic groups, with different albeit related religions and languages. We shall refer to this situation, along with Ofira Seliktar, as 'extrastatutory binationalism'[3], a deficient or incomplete form of binationalism, which fails to recognize individual or group political rights, and in which authority over the occupied territories is extraneous to the constitutional-parliamentary process.

     This situation is to be contrasted with binationalism in the full or healthy sense, an arrangement whereby members of both ethnonational communities would enjoy full political rights, and the communities themselves as well as individuals within them would be granted prerogatives typical of a pluralist society and based on nonexcludability and joint supply and allocation of goods and resources[4]. The theme of this article is that a transition from the first form of binationalism to the second is imperative.  

     More explicitly, by 'binational state' we mean a polity in which two national groups or communities coexist and participate in government (not necessarily on a basis of equality). Each community is given constitutional or other legal and practical guarantees of the freedom to practice their religion, speak their language and observe their customs and traditions. Probably the best arrangement would be a consociational democracy,[5] i.e., one in which minority rights could not be transgressed by majoritarian decisions and communal prerogatives are woven into the fabric of the law and the institutions of the state. Such a state would be a national home for Jews as well as the homeland of the Palestinians. As opposed to a democratic secular state (as once advocated by Marxist organizations within the PLO), a binational state would have a Jewish character as well as a Palestinian Muslim and Christian character, however, neither group would be able to impose its culture or values on the other. There would be no official state religion, but Jews, Christians and Muslims would be able to practice their religion freely. There would be two official languages: Hebrew and Arabic. Members of both communities would owe allegiance to one state, and would have representatives in the  parliament and the executive branch of government. Jerusalem would be the common capital. It would truly be the holy land.

     Several variants of binationalism are possible; it can be based on a territorial arrangement, such as the division of the country into cantons, as in Switzerland, or it can be accomplished through a power sharing formula at the national level while allowing each ethnic community a great deal of autonomy in regulating its members' personal affairs, particularly concerning religious observance, marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.

     State power would need to be circumscribed, and the scope of government authority limited so as to allow the greatest possible opportunity for ethnonational autonomy and self-governance in social and cultural matters. A social and economic council could be established at the national level, in which Jews, Muslims and Christians would be represented according to certain ratios. The council would be assigned the task of drafting the broad lines of the government's domestic policy, ensuring that each community gets its fair share. The system would require a coalition of elites representing the ethnonational communities and the subgroups within them who are committed to the preservation of the system. Interelite competition within each ethnonational community should be characterized by elite restraint. However, every opportunity must be provided for the proper articulation of ethnonational interests.

     Perhaps a mixed presidential-parliamentary system would provide for the possibility of greater balancing and make it more difficult for one community to force its will on the other. The division of seats in parliament could be prescribed by law, assigning a fixed number of seats to each ethnonational community. Seats on the cabinet could also be apportioned to establish some kind of fair mix between the communities. In other words, everything should be done to promote the politics of accommodation.

     The electoral system could be changed from proportional representation to a single member plurality system which will not only prevent the proliferation of political parties, but also restore direct links between the voters and their representatives who would be more concerned with local affairs. Alternatively, each electoral district would be assigned a mix of seats according to religious affiliation, for example, three Jews, two Muslims and one Christian (reflecting the actual population mix), Jewish candidates would run against Jewish candidates, Muslims against Muslims and Christians against Christians so as to prevent candidates from exploiting religious differences for personal electoral gain. This would help institutionalize elite restraint in national competition. In addition, it may be desireable to increase the number of ethnic categories, so that Oriental Jews and Western Jews may have separate representation. This would promote a multiple balance of power and help prevent hegemony.

     How could something so divorced from the dominant discourse in either community be entertained seriously? How can binationalism become part of the dominant discourse? Not directly, in that neither Palestinians nor Israelis are likely to embrace the concept at this point. However, once one eliminates the impossible, the remaining alternatives are the ones likely to be adopted, no matter how improbable they may seem.

     Another point that merits serious consideration is that even if the Palestinians in the West Bank are expelled and those in Gaza given a separate state, the more than 900,000 Palestinians in Israel are in a position to agitate for ethnonational rights, which could in the long run transform Israel into a binational state, as will be discussed below.[6]

 

The Rational Choice for Palestinians[7]:

 

     What are the alternatives we face today? We can narrow them down to the following:

 

1) The continuation of the status quo indefinitely; i.e., autonomy for the Palestinians, at best extending to the entire territory of the West Bank, except for Jerusalem and its environs and the Jewish settlements, or at worst restricted to Area A and possibly Area B under Oslo II. This is an unstable solution, i.e., the probability that it will endure is fairly low, and its benefit to the Palestinians is low, as it will not satisfy the need for political rights or the improvement of the quality of their lives. It is likely to degenerate into a violent outburst, which will motivate Israel to move its troops back into the areas of Palestinian autonomy, and perhaps to disarm the Palestinian police, in which case both autonomy and the peace process will be dead. Regrettably, it has a significant probability of realization in the near future. Thus one would have a situation of occupation without autonomy, which may lead to the annexation of the West Bank by Israel and probably the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in most of Gaza. The benefit of this outcome for the Palestinians will be quite low, and will be the starting point of a struggle leading in the long run to a binational state if, as is probable, Israel finds it impossible and undesirable to suppress two or three million Palestinians indefinitely. Or this could lead to the expulsion of most of the Palestinian population of the West Bank, a nightmare for the Palestinians. In brief, this alternative is unstable and will lead to either expulsion or a binational state in the long run.

     Abba Eban, Israel's veteran foreign minister under Labor, commented on Oslo I:

 

...retention of military rule has had zero success. The areas [West Bank and Gaza] are still predominantly Arab in their demography and their national passions. Not for a single minute in a day do the 1.8 million Palestinians and the Israelis share a common memory, sentiment, experience or aspiration. Every day the gulf becomes wider.                                                       ... The total absence of harmony, equality and coherence makes this one of the most volcanic, hate-ridden and monstrously unbalanced "societies" on the world map.                                                 The fact that the 1.8 million have neither the human rights of Israeli citizens nor the ability to establish a separate political identity violates our nation's democratic structure.[8]

 

2) Annexation of the West Bank (but probably not the Gaza Strip), which yields two principal variants:

a) Annexation with expulsion of the Palestinian population. This is unlikely to come about through Israeli government policy under normal conditions because of the anticipated international reaction, because it would renew and exacerbate animosities with Israel's  Arab neighbors, and because there is only minority support for it among the Israeli public -- a survey by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in 1995 found only 15% support for the idea.[9] However, the probability of such an outcome would become much higher in the event of clashes resembling a civil war between Israelis and Palestinians, which could come about under certain circumstances. In the midst of violence and anarchy, the Palestinians may be forcibly expelled in the name of Israeli security. Needless to say, this would be the worst possible outcome for the Palestinians.

b) Annexation of the territory of the West Bank to Israel while granting its Palestinian population the status of resident aliens, i.e., allowing Palestinians to live and work in the West Bank and extending the protection of civil and criminal law to them, but denying them political rights, notably denying them the franchise.  This is closest to the preferences of the Likud and its allies.  The probability that this outcome will endure is low, as the Socialist Zionist camp would oppose it strongly, since it violates the principle of democracy, while the New Zionists, including Gush Emunim, would generally welcome it. Still, the division it would create in Israeli society makes the cost of this alternative high for Israel, therefore making the outcome not likely to endure. This would probably result in a binational state in the long run.

     Variants of this version of annexation are possible, Netanyahu would probably like to grant the Palestinian population the rights pertaining to resident aliens (ger toshav), while entering into some kind of arrangement with Jordan under which those Palestinians holding Jordanian passports could vote for the Jordanian parliament and others could vote for the Palestinian government in Gaza, where a Palestinian mini-state could be established. This arrangement is unlikely to work because the Palestinians would fight it bitterly and Jordan is unlikely to cooperate. The Palestinian Arabs who are citizens of Israel and have the right to vote would oppose either annexation scenario very strenuously. In any case, this variant would rob Palestinians of political rights in any meaningful sense, and would be the third worst outcome for them after 'transfer' (the euphemism for expulsion) and continuation of the occupation.

 

3) An independent Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip. This possibility can of course be combined with several others. It does not in itself constitute a meaningful solution, but it should not be too difficult to get Israel to agree to such a state with jurisdiction over most of the territory of the Gaza Strip. Such a mini-state would, among other things, be isolated from the other Palestinian concentrations and would be desperately poor and underprivileged. An independent Palestinian state in Gaza combined with a continuation of the status quo in the West Bank is an outcome with fairly high probability, but minimal benefit for the Palestinians. It does not satisfy the yearning for a Palestinian state in any meaningful way, and it would not lead to the acquisition of political rights or freedom for the Palestinians, but may still be regarded as a security threat for Israel, as a hotbed of terrorism if discontent should fester. It is not a stable outcome, as the presence of over 1.3 million Palestinians under continued occupation will degenerate either into expulsion or lead to binationalism in the long run.

 

4)   An independent Palestinian state in the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip, with Jerusalem as its capital, simply cannot be realized. Even Security Council Resolution 242 which calls for withdrawal from occupied territories does not -- in the English version -- require the return of all the territories acquired by Israel in 1967.

     The creation of a truncated but independent Palestinian state is a poor variant of the partition of Palestine which the Palestinians had long fought against. It became orthodox PLO policy in 1974 when the Palestine National Council, overturning a venerable tradition, called for the creation of an independent Palestinian authority in any part of Palestine that could be liberated. It was a concession, a measure of pragmatism by the powerless, no more. There was nothing noble about it. It is based on Security Council resolution 242 and the principle of trading land for peace; an acknowledgement of the crushing defeat of 1967. What is noble about the idea of an independent state for the Palestinians is that it will allow them to secure what is lacking in their lives: freedom, dignity, a passport, the ability to finally enjoy political and civil rights like a normal people, under a government which will protect their interests. In the late sixties and early seventies, there was a transformation in the Palestinian identity, a people who were ashamed of the lowly status of refugees assumed the identity of freedom fighters, of a people shaped by the struggle in which they were engaged, even if their aspirations had been reduced by 1974 to a ministate.  Born in the midst of defeat, the idea of an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza was transformed into a symbol of hope. It is time to realize that these noble values are not inseparably  attached to the idea of a rump state.

     It is questionable whether an independent Palestinian state would satisfy the need for a positive Palestinian identity as the state would not enjoy true sovereignty over its territory and would constantly be under Israeli hegemony. Palestinians in this state would be denied access to the majority of the territory of Palestine, including Jerusalem. If Israel retains about half the territory of the West Bank for the sake of the settlements, then such a Palestinian state would consist primarily of population clusters with hardly any land resources and without control over its water resources. The Palestinian population would have nowhere to expand, and precious few resources to exploit for business. The benefits of an independent Palestinian state under the circumstances will be significantly more limited than those of a binational state.

     The probability of this outcome is low, in that it requires Israelis who are deeply attached to the land of Judea and Samaria to surrender it to the Palestinians, even if the settlements remain under Israeli jurisdiction. Gush Emunim and the religious parties, which are a very important constituency for Likud, can be expected to oppose it extremely strenuously, even to resort to terrorism.

a) Israel has already annexed East Jerusalem, and any serious attempt by any Israeli government in the foreseeable future to give up the old city is sure to lead to the downfall of that government. The issue of Jerusalem has been left to the final status negotiations, but only a tiny minority of between 13 and 17 per cent of the Israeli public supported discussing the fate of East Jerusalem with the Palestinians according to polls conducted in 1990, 1993, 1994 and 1995 (JCSS memorandum no. 45). There were indications of some flexibility during the Labor government in 1995; according to reports in the Hebrew press, a government commissioned study recommended granting the Palestinian Authority municipal responsibilities in East Jerusalem's Arab neighborhoods, and allowing some form of functional delegation of civil authority along religious lines; but not in a manner that would permit East Jerusalem to become the capital of a Palestinian state; the plan would give rise to 'a scattered and disabled Arab Jerusalem.' [10] Even so, this report never became government policy under Labor and it is inconsistent with policy statements by the Likud government.

b) No serious observer of the political scene believes that any Israeli government would dismantle the Jewish settlements in the West Bank or allow them to come under Palestinian authority. According to opinion polls conducted annually between 1992 and 1995, between 71 and 76 per cent of the Israeli public supported the settlements, either for ideological reasons or for security reasons. Up to February 1995, the public was evenly divided into those who were willing to remove settlements in a permanent agreement with the Palestinians and those who opposed removing them. Looking only at those who had a strong position on this issue, 32 per cent were very opposed and 19 per cent very much in favor of relinquishing the settlements[11]. Since them, a Likud government which sees eye to eye with Gush Emunim has been elected. However, the most important factor in this issue is that even if a majority of the Israeli public were to shift to the view of compromising on the issue of settlements, diehard settlers and Jewish religious fundamentalists have demonstrated a willingness to resort to terrorism to prevent returning Judea and Samaria, to the extent of deliberately initiating a chain of violence to disrupt the peace process and murdering the prime minister of Israel. This gives extremists a veto power in this issue.

     The Israeli Labor Party and the Meretz Party (Citizens Rights Movement, Mapam and Shinui) are more likely to support an independent state than a binational one. Meretz actually supports two sovereign states, one Israeli and the other Palestinian, coexisting in peace alongside each other. It advocates separation to ensure personal security of Israeli citizens [12]. The Likud Party and the National Religious Party insist that there is no room for a Palestinian state in the occupied territories, the 'Third Way' Party advocates intensified settlement along the entire length of 'Israel's eastern backbone', securing Israel's 'vital interests' in terms of the resources of the West Bank and Gaza, while permitting a 'demilitarized, independent Palestinian autonomy' in the areas of Arab population density to 'function according to terms necessitated by considerations of Israel's future and security.'[13]

     Several Israeli proposals have been advanced for the final status of the Palestinian territories,  ranging from the Allon Plan (which would retain a broad area running west of and parallel to the Jordan Valley, as well as Jerusalem, and the southern part of the Gaza Strip for Israel), various 'enclave plans' put forward by Israeli academicians and researchers in the course of the 1980s, Ariel Sharon's plan (which would yield only a very small portion of the West Bank, making a caricature of the idea of a Palestinian state), a proposal by the Jaffee Center, which is the most generous to the Palestinians in the lot, and would return 89 per cent of the occupied territories, except for East Jerusalem and important settlements in its neighborhood, and the proposal by 'The Third Way' Party (whose slogan is Zionism, security and peace) which represents a sort of reduced Allon Plan (except for the Gaza Strip), containing more territorial discontinuities, and which could be viewed as a the most that could have gained majority support for from the Israeli public in September 1995, when the plan was published.[14]  Many of these plans merely envision areas of autonomy, not necessarily an independent Palestinian state.

     Between 1977 and 1992, Likud governments built Jewish settlements around an in between Palestinian cities and towns in the West Bank with the intention of making withdrawal from the area impossible. Subsequent Labor governments under Rabin and Peres constructed a network of roads and highways joining the settlements to one another and connecting them to Israel. The Palestinian Authority at this writing controls Area A minus Hebron. The handing over of Area B has been delayed by the Netanyahu cabinet. Even if that takes place, this 'leopard skin' pattern of authority forces Palestinians to cross Palestinian highways and pass through Israeli checkpoints in moving from one city to another. Assuming, as we have been led to believe, that Israel is not prepared to relinquish control over the highways to the Palestinian Authority, then the pattern of parcellized sovereignty will undoubtedly detract from the viability of a Palestinian state in the West Bank.

     Jan de Jong, an urban planner based at the St. Yves Legal Resource and Development Center in Jerusalem, has put together a map based on 'conjunctive elements that dominate and unite' the above proposals, while also making allowance for areas that Israel has declared to be state land, which settlements can claim  during the remainder of the interim period under Article XVI (3) of the Oslo II accord. The result is a slightly more reduced version of the 'Third Way' plan. De Jong projects to the year 2010, and remarks that:

 

the map illustrates how the Palestinian territories ... would be dismembered into five cantonal clusters with a distinctive pattern. It shows a larger cluster emerging in the north around the city of Nablus, followed by three smaller ones in the center around the cities of Ramallah, Bethlehem and Jericho, and another larger cluster located in the south around the city of Hebron. These clusters might be linked by a Palestinian corridor to a last, relatively small-sized cluster situated between Gaza and Rafah. Plans have been proposed for an elevated rail-and motorway.[15]

 

     De Jong then notes that some of the most significant aspects of this map is that crucial natural resources are alienated from the Palestinian population clusters, including arable land, water resources, and degraded lands that can be reclaimed for agricultural use. In addition, the areas that hold the greatest economic promise and resources -- the Palestinian metropolitan area of Jerusalem, and Gaza -- would be most affected by the fragmentation. Loss of metropolitan city functionality is a serious blow to the economic viability of a Palestinian state in such a plan.

     In December 1994, there were 14 urban settlements and 82 rural settlements, with a total population of about 128,000 in the West Bank and Gaza. That is not counting the 200,000 Jewish settlers in and around East Jerusalem. Recently, Amana, an organ of the Council of Jewish Settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip announced a $4 billion construction plan to raise the Jewish population of the occupied territories to half a million by the turn of the century.[16]

     This option further requires those Israelis who are concerned about security to convert to the view that security is best achieved through political means or contractual arrangement with Arabs states, based on the understanding that peace goes far beyond the termination of the state of war. Rabin and the Israeli defense establishment were prepared to surrender territories which they had hitherto deemed essential for Israel's defense because of a changing conception of Israel's security needs.[17] Although Prime Ministers Rabin and Peres were convinced of this, they found it difficult to sell to the Israeli public except during periods of war weariness or despair caused by a backlash to having to put down the intifada. An independent Palestinian state offers a solution to the security concerns of Israelis through physical separation from the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, the length of the borders between the two states in any of the scenarios considered above (except for the Sharon plan) is considerable, and the possibility of infiltration by determined saboteurs will remain high, even if Israel were build an electric fence.

     From the Palestinian perspective, a Palestinian state along the lines considered above is short on equity. If Jews are going to settle Palestinian areas for ideological reasons, and they or other Jews insist on the need for separation from the Palestinian population for security reasons, the effect is to dispossess Palestinians of their lands and to compact and isolate the Palestinians in population concentrations outside the Jewish areas.

 

The economy:

 

     The result of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza has been non only a proliferation of Jewish settlement, but a gradual transfer of the area's natural resources for use by the settlers, at the expense of the Palestinian inhabitants. According to Meron Benvenisti, founder of the West Bank data project, by 1989 the situation could be described in the following fashion: '"Jews and Arabs are living in the same area, but 90 per cent of the cultivable land, 75 per cent of the water, and all the infrastructure is geared to support one of these two peoples," the Jews.'[18] The New York Times observed during an interview with him: 'Without access to the Jews' land, water and infrastructure, he argues, no Arab nation could survive -- unless it started life with grants in aid amounting to tens of billions of dollars.'[19]

     According to the World Bank,in 1991 agriculture accounted for 35 per cent of the gross domestic product of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as compared to 6 per cent for Jordan, 2 per cent for Israel, 7 per cent for Lebanon, 30 per cent for Syria and 18 per cent for Egypt; industry contributed only 8 per cent as compared to 17 per cent for Jordan, 22 per cent for Israel, 14 per cent for Lebanon, 23 per cent for Syria and 30 per cent for Egypt.[20] In 1993 agriculture, forestry and fishing were responsible for 28.2 per cent of the GDP of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; transport, trade and services were responsible for another 36.9 per cent, construction accounted for a further 15 per cent, public and community services amounted to 11.7 per cent, and industry contributed a mere 8.2 per cent.[21] The dependence of the economy of the West Bank and Gaza on agriculture is abundantly clear, as is the severely underdeveloped industrial sector. The services sector is dominated by trade and transport, not exactly high technology services which would give a Palestinian state a comparative advantage in international competition. In 1990, 34.5 per cent of the Arab labor force in the occupied territories was working in Israel, this figure declined to 30 per cent in 1991, rose again to 34.4 per cent in 1992, and fell to an estimated 23 per cent in 1993[22] and has fallen significantly due to the frequent closure of the territories and a deliberate Israeli policy of relying on non-Palestinian labor. At the moment the West Bank relies on the Israeli electric grid, it is also dependent on Israel for telecommunications services, and a Palestinian wishing to dig a well has to apply to Tel Aviv for permission. For this and other reasons, the Palestinian economy is dependent on Israel, and the dependence is not a healthy one; for example, the Palestinians from the occupied territories who commute to work in Israel are predominantly manual laborers. Perhaps the most significant measure of the weakness of the West Bank and Gaza economies is the lack of investment in infrastructure; for the period from 1970 to 1993, annual per capita investment in infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza averaged $15 as compared to $1000 in Israel and $400 in Jordan.[23] To be brief, one can put forward the following list of structural problems distorting the Palestinian economy:

 

- massive underinvestment in infrastructure            - a forcibly imposed customs union with Israel          - heavy dependence on the Israeli and other labor markets  - a hostile legal and regulatory framework              - relatively low domestic demand                        - extremely limited trade and export opportunities      - a disproportionally low level of industrialization[24]

 

     In fact, the work of Meron Benvenisti and the West Bank Data Project is a testimony to the integration of the economies of the occupied territories with that of Israel.[25] Oslo I and II can be viewed as an attempt by the Labor government at a radical solution or a divorce. It is not going too far to say, along with Benvenisti, that such an economy is not viable unless there is a massive infusion of funds in the billions of dollars. For the singularly pathetic case of the economy of the Gaza Strip, it is recommended that the reader consult Sara Roy's study.[26]

 

Can Singapore serve as a model?

 

     One position remains to be considered in this regard. It has been suggested that a truncated Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza could replicate the success story of one Singapore, one of the Four East Asian Tigers, or what the World Bank calls the high-performing Asian economies. After all, Singapore has roughly the same population and about half the area; could it serve as a model for a Palestinian state?

     The short answer is that this is far fetched. At a simplistic level, Singapore's remarkable growth was achieved through the development of an educated labor force and massive infusions of capital. It is pointed out that the Palestinians in the occupied territories -- despite the large numbers involved in manual labor in Israel -- represent a relatively well educated work force, with a high percentage of college graduates. There are many local colleges and community colleges, and many of their graduates go on to earn Ph.D.s in universities in the United States and Europe. Gradually, the entire labor force could be endowed with the requisite skills to compete successfully in the international market. Labor may be available, but there is a severe shortage of capital. Singapore's remarkable growth was achieved through an astonishing mobilization of resources or an extraordinary growth in inputs. The successful formula was to combine efficiency with high levels of human and physical capital. In addition to educated Palestinians, one still needs the tens of billions of dollars that Benvenisti was talking about. Another major problem is that in order to achieve sustained growth in per capita income, one must realize an increase in efficiency, or a rise in output per unit of input. John Page, the principal author of the World Bank's well known study The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, points out that Singapore's growth is based on productivity driven growth, which has 'bypassed the Middle East and North Africa.'[27] In fact, the Middle East is experiencing a crisis of productivity. 'Countries of the region lack the software of economic development in the form of productivity-enhancing policies.[28] In order for a Palestinian state to copy the example of the high-performing Asian economies, it must deviate significantly from the pattern in other Middle Eastern countries.

     Singapore began its climb to prosperity as a regional financial and marketing center, then went on to develop a healthy manufacturing export industry. Manufactured exports are the engine of increased productivity, yet manufactured exports in the Middle East have not grown on a per capita basis in thirty years.[29] Manufactured exports usually require an adequate supply of water for industrial use, which the West Bank lacks precisely due to the need to supply Jewish settlements, although Gaza may be able to use desalination techniques for that purpose.

     A high ratio of savings to consumption is required, as a lot of the capital is generated locally in Singapore, in fact, Singapore has become an exporter of capital. Advanced managerial techniques and the use of high technology, the development of an appropriate infrastructure, and successful integration into the world economy are required.

     The trick is to attract foreign investors, who will bring with them new technology, a package of services, access to markets, am understanding of the world market and an ability to adapt, from which local entrepreneurs can learn.[30] Yet to do this, the Palestinian state will have to compete with Israel on this very score, and we know that the Israeli economy is more efficient and attractive to investors. Singapore's growth relied on foreign direct investment. To attract FDI, Singapore went so far as to favor foreign companies over local ones. One has to offer legal incentives, special concessions, a developed infrastructure in communications, transportation and other services. One has to offer a low risk environment for investors. A Palestinian state has a very long way to go to develop its infrastructure, even compared to its Arab neighbors. It may also be a long time before foreign investors, including Palestinians living abroad, will have sufficient confidence in the stability of a Palestinian state to risk investing their money there.

     A Palestinian state cannot depend on trade with the Arab world to achieve growth, although that may come later: i.e., it must first achieve the level of efficiency and competitiveness that will allow it to compete successfully in the world market, 'the lesson of Asia is that regional integration follows integration with the rest of the world. It does not work the other way round.'[31]

     In fact, the example of Singapore may be misleading; according to Paul Krugman[32], Singapore's success was not due to an increase in efficiency at all, since it was an efficient economy to begin with -- although not comparable to the Western industrialized economies in this regard. He points out that a formal exercise in growth accounting yields astonishing results:

 

But it is only when one actually does the quantitative accounting that the astonishing result emerges: all of Singapore's growth can be explained by increases in measured inputs. there is no sign at all of increased efficiency. In this sense, the growth of Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore is an economic twin of the growth of Stalin's Soviet Union -- growth achieved purely through mobilization of resources. Of course ... Singapore is closer to, though still below, the efficiency of Western economies. The point, however, is that Singapore's economy has always been relatively efficient; it just used to be starved of capital and educated workers.[33]

 

     Indeed the point, if this is the case, is that Singapore's growth was due to a one-time change in behavior which cannot be sustained in the long run because one cannot keep on doubling inputs or turn all the population of a country into Ph.D. holders. The fact that Singapore has become an exporter of capital is interpreted by Krugman to mean that capital is beginning to yield diminishing returns locally. So even if a Palestinian state were to succeed in following Singapore's example, the process would lead to growth but does not represent a formula for long term success -- unless the Palestinians can achieve what Singapore has not, an actual improvement in efficiency.

     One has to conclude that in order for a Palestinian state to turn itself into a high performing economy on the Singapore model, it will have to buck the trend in the Middle East and find a way to increase productivity, it will have to develop its physical infrastructure starting from a position of extreme disadvantage , it will have to develop a manufacturing industry while lacking adequate water resources, or it will have to develop a high tech services industry in direct competition with Israel, it will have to attract massive amounts of capital at which the Palestinian Authority has been singularly unsuccessful up to this point, and it will not be able to rely on Arab markets as the principal outlet for its products before it acquires the efficiency to compete in international markets. It will have to give such concessions to foreign investors over local firms as to create political problems for a Palestinian government. It will have to integrate its economy into the world market, at which task some countries in the region are making headway. It will also have to further develop the skills of its labor force, the only area in which it appears to have some kind of advantage to begin with. That is a tall order. And why does it have to pull off this miracle? Because Jewish settlers want the agricultural and water resources the Palestinians used to depend on, given which the Palestinians could have continued to eke out a normal and unspectacular existence. They have been called on to do Singapore one better. One could say they have been called on to achieve greatness.

     The pursuit of an independent Palestinian state is not a rational strategy for the Palestinians because the probability of securing a viable state that maximizes advantage for them is very low for the reasons explained above. (That is not to deny that it can be pursued as a means which could lead to a binational state). Its attainment in place of a binational state will bring limited benefits except for those who place independence and sovereignty above all else. A binational state will bring greater benefits to the Palestinians. It will help them achieve political rights, including freedom, a better standard of living, dignity, the ability to practice their own culture and celebrate their identity as Palestinians, and allow them the right to continue to live in their ancestral homeland. It will end the occupation and allow them to live in security and look forward to a better future.

 

5) A binational state: This alternative has the advantage of being consistent with the New Zionist preference for not giving up any of the land of Judea and Samaria, it is also consistent with the principle of democracy cherished by Socialist Zionism. It will furthermore satisfy the Palestinians' need for individual and group political rights as well as afford them access to the whole land of Palestine, including Jerusalem. Last but not least, it would earn them recognition of a Palestinian cultural identity. It clearly has many advantages.

     A binational state also overcomes the central objection to the concept of a democratic secular state in Israel or Palestine, which many Arab intellectuals and Marxist organizations within the PLO advocated at one time. While a secular state allows Arabs and Jews to share the land of Palestine, it denies each group what it most ardently desires: an expression of its identity. This is a major failing of the democratic secular state concept, and the virtue of the binational idea.

     The main objections to a binational state is that it is inconsistent with the maintenance of the uncontested Jewish character of state and the yearning for a separate and independent Palestinian state. Due to the higher birthrate among Palestinians than Israelis, it may contribute to the erosion of the Jewish character of the state unless explicit measures are adopted to deal with this. One can anticipate Jewish objections to sharing political self-determination. For the most security conscious Israelis, this might seem to be tantamount to embracing a potential fifth column within the body of the Jewish state. In addition, the coincidence of socio-economic and ethnonational cleavages, placing the Jews in a privileged position in relation to the Palestinians, threatens to make this alternative unstable.

     The argument that each of the Jewish and Palestinian communities in exercising self-determination must make room for the other side to do so as well ultimately rests on a moral argument which forms the last section of this article. Let us here address the other issues, starting with the security question. Terrorism has been used by Arabs and Jews against each other, the 'armed struggle' embraced by the PLO often degenerated into attacks against civilians instead of military targets, on the other side there have been right-wing terrorist groups such as the Irgun Zvai Leumi and Lehi, which were responsible for the notorious Deir Yassin massacre. The PLO embraced violence because it saw no other way to achieve its goals. But the PLO is now Israel's partner in the peace process and the Palestinian National Charter has ben amended to assuage Israeli fears. On the other hand, Hamas and Islamic Jihad have emerged. We are all too familiar with the work of the Hamas suicide bombers. There is a Palestinian generation which made the intifada possible and which is known as 'the generation of the stone', a bitter generation driven by resentment and hopelessness and often by desperate poverty.

     But resentment has a cause. In a revealing outburst, one young man who supports the use of violence against Israelis is quoted as saying: 'The Jews kill us and beat us. They don't treat us like human beings.'[34] The implication to be drawn from this is that Palestinian violence cannot be understood in isolation, and is in fact perceived to be a response to Israeli violence against Palestinians. How far can this be generalized? Polls conducted by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies in Nablus indicate that there is overwhelming support (almost 90 per cent) among Palestinians for a mutual end to violence between Palestinians and Israelis -- the emphasis is on a willingness to halt violence if Israel agrees to do the same. Only 7 per cent opposed an end to mutual violence in March 1996; even 78 per cent of those who support armed attacks and 80 per cent of those who oppose the current peace process still support a mutual end to violence[35]. Support for Hamas dropped from 16.6 per cent in December 1994 to 9.7 per cent in December 1995 and to 5.8 per cent in March 1996.[36] In June 1996, support for Hamas stood at 7.8 per cent and for Islamic Jihad at 1.9 per cent; 69 per cent of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip still supported the peace process, 11.6 opposed it, and 19.4 per cent were uncertain. Despite the disappointment with the peace process, 81.1 per cent supported its continuation, only 12.5 per cent opposed it.[37]

     Both Jews and Palestinians have been traumatized by violence. In the case of the Jews, the reaction to the Holocaust must not be underestimated. The need for Jewish control of a state of their own is not to be belittled. However, it must be remembered that Palestinians in large numbers have been living among the Jews since the foundation of the state of Israel, almost a million of them are Israeli citizens today. A binational state will allow Israeli police and security forces to enforce security in Palestinian as well as Jewish areas; meaning that Israeli security personnel will have the opportunity to detect and prevent violence against Jews before it occurs. One has to balance this against the benefit of keeping Palestinians from the occupied territories and Gaza at arms length, but then one has to worry about the very real possibility of infiltration across lengthy mutual borders by saboteurs.

     Initially, limitations can be placed on the mobility of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians in the Jewish areas, but these will eventually have to be lifted. Yet a transition period should be used to ease adjustment, allow mutual confidence building measures to work and to introduce educational programs promoting tolerance and mutual understanding. Palestinian police can be expected to collaborate with Israeli security officials during this period to compile dossiers on organizations advocating violence against Jews and Jewish organizations (such as the Kahane founded and supposedly defunct Kach movement) advocating violence against Arabs. We are assuming of course that neither Palestinians nor Jews -- apart from some sociopaths -- have an innate or irrevocable desire to kill each other; we believe that once the causes of resentment are removed and something resembling an equitable solution emerges, the motive for violence will dissipate. A redress of legitimate grievances, combined with programs designed to inculcate tolerance should achieve a great deal. Diehard extremists will remain, and it will be the responsibility of security forces to root them out. As the security atmosphere improves, further moves towards integration can be made.

     For the Israelis who are concerned that disparities in birthrates could lead to demographic changes that will overwhelm the Jewish community, turning it into a minority, there are practical solutions. This problem can be offset by Jewish immigration. There will have to be an agreement between Jews and Palestinians to control and manage immigration. The Palestinians expect at least those refugees from the West Bank who were driven out by the 1967 war to return. The Israelis would like to keep the door to Jewish immigration open. However that issue is decided, agreement can be reached between the two sides that Arab demographic growth that threatens to seriously disrupt the demographic balance can be compensated for by increasing the number of Jewish immigrants.

     If one can convince the security conscious Israelis that peace with the Palestinians and the Israel's Arab neighbors will best guarantee security, then one may obtain a winning alliance with those who are committed to the principle of democracy.[38] One cannot expect to get a majority in Israel favoring a binational state at this time, but in the foreseeable future a majority might crystallize in support of the extension of individual rights and citizenship to the Palestinians in return for the annexation of the West Bank. Nevertheless, the Palestinians are not going to be handed a binational state on a silver platter; they will have to struggle for it, to effect a change in their status from the situation of non-citizens with no political rights to a status similar to that of Palestinian citizens of Israel [39], (enjoying civic rights, while certain other rights are reserved for Israeli Jews). The Palestinians will then have to carry on the struggle to gain rights as an ethnonational community. To achieve this they will have to satisfy the vast majority of Israelis that a binational state will not prevent Israeli Jews from expressing and celebrating their identity.

     Since it is not part of the dominant discourse in either community, the probability for the realization of this option would not seem to be high, despite the forces favoring it. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, it may have a high likelihood of realization if understood as the resultant of the various contradictory forces at work, and if it is understood to be the alternative to a general Palestinian-Israeli conflict that will result in the expulsion of he Palestinians.

     The probability that one would assign to a binational state as a viable alternative that Palestinians and Israelis might voluntarily select in an act of choice at this point in time is virtually nil. One must emphasize, however, that the final outcome will not be determined through rational choice as though a unitary decision maker were to sit down, weigh the possible alternatives, and decide on the best alternative through an act of choice.[40] (That does not prevent us, for the sake of analysis, from arguing that a binational state is the rational choice, i.e., will maximize benefit, for the Palestinians, which simply means that the Palestinians will be better off with that outcome.)

     We agree that a binational state represents an outcome that would not be ratified by domestic constituencies as things now stand (it either does not enjoy the level of support required to pass through the legislature or is incapable of enlisting sufficient political support to endure in the event that the ratification process does not involve the legislature directly). It is not ratifiable either in the Jewish or the Palestinian communities. However, we are projecting that it will acquire enough political support to endure in both communities as events unfold. In other words, the sets of ratifiable outcomes for Israel and the Palestinians will expand as a result of the impasses caused by the  bargaining power of the three parties: Likud and its supporters, Labor and its supporters, and the Palestinians.

     Likud's intransigence, by blocking an independent Palestinian

state, creates a possibility for outcomes ranging from continued occupation, a Palestinian bantustan, or a Jewish state in which Palestinians from the West Bank (and possibly Gaza) will be resident aliens. None of these outcomes is ratifiable in Israel in the long run, because Labor and its allies, including Peace Now, will not endorse such eventualities due to the conflict it causes to their value system. Palestinian determination to resist these outcomes will give rise to the possibility of a democratic Jewish state, which may become a ratifiable outcome because it gets around Labor's objection and also satisfies Likud's determination to hold on to the territory of the West Bank while allowing a way out of the impasse. This result will be a vector sum of conflicting preferences as explained earlier. However, this outcome is not ratifiable in the Palestinian community because it grants Palestinians individual rights but denies them group rights; i.e., the opportunity to express their identity. With time, and with the help of Palestinians who are Israeli citizens, the Palestinians will gradually fight for and acquire group rights. Since each step of this process will itself be a vector sum, and has to be ratified; i.e., has to enlist sufficient support within Israel to come about in the first place, it is a logical supposition that the chain of ratifiable outcomes is itself a ratifiable outcome. By the same logic, the Palestinians having fought for and gained individual and group rights in a state grouping Jews and Palestinians, will accept a binational state; i.e., a binational state will become a ratifiable outcome in the Palestinian community.

[delete?] A binational state would arise as the culmination of a sequence of steps; at the beginning of the process the government of Israel would refuse to surrender the territory of the West Bank (although there may be more flexibility in relation to the Gaza Strip). The Palestinians will agitate for greater self-determination and try to bring about a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem. The Israeli government will encourage the Palestinians to exercise their political rights in Jordan or in a ministate in the Gaza Strip -- but voting for the Jordanian parliament (even if the Jordanians agree to it) or in the Gaza Strip will not allow the Palestinians in the West Bank to bring about any change in the conditions governing their daily lives. The government of Israel may even annex the West Bank and grant the Palestinians the status of alien residents. This solution would directly conflict with democratic values. Labor and its allies, including Peace Now, would rather solve the conflict to their democratic and liberal values posed by the need to oppress the Palestinian people. They will choose the expedient of granting the Palestinians a small state of their own. If the Israeli public seeks a way out by returning Labor to power, Labor will try to annul the annexation.  But Likud and its allies, including Gush Emunim, can veto the return of the West Bank or any significant portion of it to Arab sovereignty; they would prefer a state in which Palestinians will be a politically passive minority with little in the way of rights. When Likud stymies Labor's preferred strategy, Labor will be faced with a choice between bantustans for the Palestinians or a binational state. The latter is consistent with Labor's values, the first is not. [end delete?]

     The Palestinians already enjoy a measure of autonomy; if the West Bank is annexed they will struggle for equal rights, first on an individual level, then on a group level. They will ally themselves with those forces in Israel which still believe in democracy. There will result a tug of war. It will only be possible to separate the Palestinians from the Israeli body politic either by expelling them or by granting them a state of their own. Assuming that expulsion is not feasible, then the Palestinians will have no option but to work for equal rights and democracy, both at the individual and collective level. Assuming that a bantustan arrangement cannot last, Israel will gradually make concessions to the Palestinians leading to a binational state. The result will be different from what any of the parties desired, and will be a compromise among the different contradictory forces at work. This is an example of the vector sum of conflicting preferences producing a result neither intended on its own, a binational state in which Palestinians can enjoy democratic rights. Yet Palestinians will also have to bring their full weight to bear to help move things in this direction.

     The only escape from this logic is either for Israel to expel the Palestinians or to curb Jewish extremists and make significant territorial concessions. Struggle seems to be the lot of the Palestinians. Our recommendation is that instead of struggling for an independent state they should instead struggle to bring about a binational one. If the Israeli public comes to the conclusion that a binational state is unacceptable to them, they may grant the Palestinians an independent state just to put off the possibility of a binational state. So a struggle for a binational state, if unsuccessful, may lead to an independent state. Nevertheless, this does not alter our argument that the Palestinians will be better off in a binational state.

     A binational state is the rational choice for Palestinians in the sense that it will maximize advantage or utility for them. In the long run it will allow the Palestinians access to all the land of Palestine, and the anomalous condition of parcellized sovereignty will cease. Palestinians will have access to and between their metropolitan areas which are centers for economic and social public services, parcellized sovereignty will disrupt life and force Palestinians to duplicate services. The Palestinians will also have access to the Israeli labor and retail markets, Israeli technology and know-how, and can attract private and public Israeli investment. This will take a long time, since Palestinians will be second class citizens for an extended period. Palestinians who are citizens of Israel only began to receive something remotely resembling an equitable share of state expenditures under the Rabin government coinciding with the Oslo agreements. An independent state solution will deny Palestinians access to Arab towns and villages inside Israel proper. Bilateral agreements may promote labor mobility and private investment, but Israel would retain the right in that case to keep Palestinian labor out and there would be no public Israeli investment in a Palestinian state.

     Once Palestinians gain equal rights, Israel will no longer be able to discriminate against the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in access to water resources and agricultural land. An equitable division of these resources between the Palestinians in the occupied territories and Jewish settlers is not likely to result from a political settlement in view of the disparity in power between the two sides. In the long term, in the democratic society, the Israeli government will have to share resources more equitably.

     Israel will have to calibrate its macroeconomic, trade and investment policies so as not to discriminate against the Palestinian areas. Bilateral agreements can achieve a great deal, but ultimately domestic Israeli concerns will determine economic policy in preference to agreements with an independent Palestinian state.

     The Palestinian economy will have to undergo a significant transformation to fit in with the Israeli economy in a healthier and more compatible way, but Palestinians will not be left on their own to realize an economic miracle.

     Palestinians will be able to speak their language, practice their religions and their customs and traditions and celebrate their own culture within the context of a binational state. Basically they will be trading in imperfect sovereignty that is hostage to Israeli policies and an economically nonviable state for a binational state.

     Even if the Palestinians in the West Bank are expelled and Gaza is given autonomy, demographics indicate that the Palestinians who are citizens of Israel will augment their numbers so that the day will come in which, if present trends continue, they will be in a position to demand a binational state. A strong argument can be made for the fact that in a highly polarized political system with two principal parties, such as is the situation in Israel today, a national minorities can gain political rights for itself as a national group if it pursues the correct strategy. We know from the results of the last national elections in Israel that society is split right down the middle in relation to support for Labor and Likud. Neither party is likely to be able to pick up votes from the opposing camp. This situation opens a golden opportunity for Israel's Arab citizens to bargain with the Labor alignment for concessions in return for electoral support. Ian Lustick argues that the Arab community in Israel has been pursuing such a strategy since 1981 with significant success.[41]

     The Achilles heel of this strategy is that actions by the Palestinians in the West Bank or Gaza, notably Hamas, might alienate Jewish voters from the party seeking accommodation with the Arabs -- Labor suffered a defeat at the polls in 1996, and Shimon Peres personally saw his popularity plummet as Hamas suicide bombers traumatized the Israeli public in a totally naive and self defeating strategy to repeat the conditions that had been created by the intifada. The Palestinians themselves are vulnerable to traumas intentionally inflicted by hate mongers such as Baruch Goldstein, who massacred over thirty Muslim worshippers while they were engaged in the act of prayer. It is not too difficult to inflame the situation and drown out the moderates in the charged atmosphere that prevails in the West Bank and Gaza.  There is always a strong element of contingency in politics, that cannot be helped. Our argument is not that a binational state is an inevitable outcome in the long run, but that it is the rationally and morally superior outcome, one that enhances the welfare of all parties in the middle East. The alternative, bloodshed and the final and total victimization of the Palestinians people, is irrational and morally reprehensible.

     The success of an experiment in consociational democracy will depend on the ability of the leaders of the two ethnonational communities to recognize the dangers of fragmentation inherent in the system; to undertake a commitment to maintain the system; to transcend ethnic and religious cleavages at the level of the elite; and to cultivate the ability to put together suitable solutions for the demands of the two communities.[42] In order for the system to work, nationalism will have to be moderated; Palestinians should be given reason to cease to fear that the Jewish Israelis will exercise cultural domination over them, and Jews would need to be reassured that changes in demographic ratios will not lead to Palestinian domination.

     The worst danger to a binational state, once formed, will come from the centrifugal forces in society. If there is a strong correlation, as there is bound to be, between socio-economic status and ethnonational origin, then these two major cleavages in society will reinforce each other. That is what happened in the case of Lebanon, leading to civil war. To deal with this problem, one needs social policies designed to break down stereotypes and to alter attitudes and eradicate ethnocentrism, while allowing each community a sense of its identity. One also needs governmental policies to narrow economic disparities in per capita income and standards of living. Per capita income in Israel proper is estimated to be $17,000 in 1996, and to reach $20,000 in the year 2000[43], while the per capita income in the West Bank and Gaza lies between $900 and $1,500. This means that the disparity between Israelis and Palestinians will be huge, but it also means that Israel is in a position to tackle the problem.

     The government's position in this respect will be crucial. Educational and economic programs are needed, which cannot be successful without long-term planning and the allocation of significant resources. Private institutions cannot do this on their own. Israel, Arab countries and Western nations will have to contribute to a development plan for the Palestinians. That is an aspect of the moral obligation that Israel has incurred. If carried out, however, it will be an act of transcendence, a shining example of the triumph of universal human values over particularism, no matter how well it may be sanctioned.

 

     When all is said and done, one has to conclude that the two most viable alternatives in the long run are either an independent Palestinian state or a binational state in all of Palestine. Admittedly, a swing in the attitude of the Israeli public, either preceding of following a victory by Labor at the polls, could rally majority support among Palestinians and Israelis for an independent state; however, militant action by Jewish extremists could abort this possibility.[44]

 

6) An Israeli-Palestinian federation or confederation[45]: The Palestinians are prepared to consider a confederation with Israel following independence, however, the probability of establishing a confederation is not higher than that of establishing an independent Palestinian state, since the former presupposes the latter. A federation is comparable to a binational state. Presumably, a federation or confederation with Israel would be sought following independence to compensate for the lack of economic viability of a separate Palestinian state. But it is easier for the Palestinians to go straight to a binational state, skipping the struggle for independence, because that gets around the problems of dividing Jerusalem. deciding on borders, and finding a solution to Jewish settlements in the West Bank. The struggle for equality, for individual and group rights, will still have to be fought in the case of either an independent state or a federation -- social psychology tells us so. However, to preserve the Jewish character of the state, Israel may prefer to give Palestinians independence, but in that case, Israel is unlikely to reverse itself and accept a federation with the Palestinian state.

     Other scenarios for a confederal solution are possible, such as a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. There is insufficient room to discuss this question adequately, suffice it to say that such an alternative also presupposes the creation of an independent Palestinian state. It would enhance the viability of a truncated Palestinian state to be linked to Jordan but not sufficiently to prevent a significant migration of the Palestinian population to the East Bank. This might make the Likud happy, but it is not the best outcome for the Palestinians. A federation with Jordan has to contend with the Palestinian reluctance to surrender the idea of self-determination. Either a federation or a confederation with Jordan will cut the Palestinians off from the rest of Palestine.

 

A Question of Morality:

 

     Perhaps the chief obstacle to reconciliation and coexistence is that different subgroups within each ethnonational community adhere to different sets of values; there are Jewish fundamentalists and Islamic fundamentalists, Social Zionists and New Zionists, Arab nationalists and Palestinian nationalists. Is it right to displace Palestinians in order to make room for Jews? Is it right to kill in order to attain one's ultimate objectives? Is it right to discriminate in the service of a higher cause? If discrimination against individuals is to be disallowed, is discrimination against culture, language or heritage of a group to be permitted? Is there one value or set of values that supersedes all others?  Are these issue undecidable because of the relativity of values, or can we arrive at a universal set of values?

     Let us start with this premise: that action based on moral values must not be influenced by hatred or resentment or the psychological scars of conflicts that are extraneous to the situation; for example, that Jewish anguish over the actions of the Nazis, while unquestionably justified, must not be transferred to the Palestinians. In turn, Palestinian and general Arab resentment against the colonial experience with European powers must not be transferred to the Jews of Israel, as though they were 'settler colonialists'. In order to pass moral judgement, one must be free of irrelevant bias, regardless of which code of morality one espouses. Scapegoating is not to be permitted. Certain ideologies have been used by both sides to mobilize support for their causes; this sets up walls of misunderstanding and creates stereotypes which must be exposed. Actions by either Arabs or Israelis must be interpreted in terms of their own motives, not in terms of motives erroneously ascribed to them. The actions of governments must not promote categorization.

     We shall assume the following principles as a moral starting

point for our argument:

1) No ethnonational group is inherently superior or inferior to the other.

2) Human rights at the individual level, including equality before the law, freedom and democracy, are to be respected.

3) All peoples have the right to self-determination in a meaningful sense.

4) Ethnonational rights to practice one's religion and observe one's culture and celebrate one's group identity belong to Israelis and Palestinians alike.

5) The celebration of one's identity should not be predicated upon the negation of any other group's identity.

6) Neither ethnonational community is to be denied access to the whole land of Palestine and its natural resources, or the opportunity to visit and worship in its holy shrines.

7) Peace takes precedence over claims to chosenness.

     One must add to these moral considerations the prudential issue of security: Israelis have a right to security, so do the Palestinians.

     In order to reconcile conflicting values and preferences, we must rely on some principle guiding the process of reconciliation. Let us turn to the words of Martin Buber regarding his recommendations for Jewish policy in Palestine following the Arab riots of 1929:

 

It is indeed true that there can be no life without injustice. The fact that there is no living creature which can live and thrive without destroying another existing organism has a symbolic significance as regards our human life. But the human aspect of life begins the moment we say to ourselves: we will do not more injustice to others than we are forced to do in order to exist. Only by saying that do we begin to be responsible for life... the group's responsibility for life is not qualitatively different from that of the individual...[46]

 

     The idea of a binational state grouping Arabs and Israelis in the territory of Palestine is not new; its heritages can be traced back to the school of cultural Zionism, which resisted the idea of the creation of a Jewish state, advocating instead the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Cultural Zionism  traces it origins back to Ahad Ha'am (Asher Ginsberg: 1852-1927). It espoused the philosophy that a Jewish community in Palestine should have a social, cultural and spiritual mission, not a political one, and should serve as an inspiration to Jews throughout the world. Although it has been championed by the bearers of such illustrious names as Martin Buber as well as Yehuda Magnes, the first chancellor of Hebrew University, and Hannah Arendt, it was never part of the mainstream and it never rallied sufficient support to allow it to see the light of day.

     Political Zionism, which is represented by Theodore Herzl, maintained on the contrary that the lack of a state was what set Jews apart and made them an anomaly; this aberration could only be remedied through the establishment of a Jewish state, so that the Jews could become a nation like other nations, goy kekol hagoyim. Magnes, Buber and others feared that the creation of a Jewish state would be a corrupting influence, that nationalism was incompatible with the spiritual message of Judaism. Ahad Ha'am wrote shortly before his death in Tel Aviv in 1927: 'My God is this the end? ... Is this the dream of our return to Zion, that we come to Zion and stain its soil with innocent blood? It has been an axiom in my eyes that the people will sacrifice its money for the sake of a state, but never its prophets.'[47]

 

     Let us recall the words of Alber Einstein:

 

I should much rather see reasonable agreement with the Arabs on the basis of living together in peace than the creation of a Jewish state. Apart from practical consideration, my awareness of the essential nature of Judaism resists the idea of a Jewish state with borders, an army, and a measure of temporal power no matter how modest. I am afraid of the inner damage Judaism will sustain -- especially from the development of a narrow nationalism within our own ranks, against which we have already had to fight strongly, even without a Jewish state. We are no longer the Jews of the Maccabee period. A return to a nation in the political sense of the word would be equivalent to turning away from the spiritualization of our community which we owe to the genius of our prophets.[48]

 

     In 1948 a Jewish state was indeed established.

     The victory of 1967 made apparent the dangers of which Einstein and others had warned. The empowerment of Israel raised the question of the ethics of Jewish power. This was not apparent from the very beginning, as Israel was overcome by the euphoria of the conquest of Jerusalem and of Judea and Samaria. The 1967 war was, in retrospect, the occasion for the emergence of holocaust theology, according to which the holocaust took on new meaning in relation to the 1967 victory, the victimization and suffering of the Jews under the Nazis was paired with the theme of empowerment resulting from the victory of the Jews over their enemies. These themes, and the corollary of the innocence of the Jewish people and the redemptive power of Israel were brought to the attention of the public by Elie Wiesel and others.

     Yet the fully redemptive power of victory remained elusive,[49] and as Israel undertook to invade Lebanon in 1982 and to suppress the Palestinian uprising or intifada which broke out in 1988, some notable Jewish intellectual were repelled by such exercise of power by the Jews. They rejected the notion that the recent victims of unthinkable atrocities should themselves become the victimizers of another people, even reluctantly. It became apparent that the cost of empowerment was for Israel to become a nation like other nations. This process of normalization was at odds with the concept of the specialness of the Jewish people, the particularity of Jewish history and the significance of the return to the land of Israel, and the theme of innocence. Many Israelis continued to think of themselves as victims even as Israeli Jews subjugated or victimized the Palestinians.

     Martin Buber had argued that a Jewish homeland in Palestine should not be a nation like other nations, and that the elevation of nationalism to a supreme principle obviates the principle of accountability to a higher authority, God. Ironically, Jewish fundamentalists in Israel, like Gush Emunim, dismiss the secular Zionism of Herzl for entirely different reasons. They maintain that Israel should not be treated as a nation like all  other nations by the international community. Because the Jewish people have a covenant with God, they are chosen and enjoy an intrinsic superiority over others; 'while God requires other, normal nations to abide by abstract codes of "justice and righteousness," such laws do not apply to the Jews.'[50] The purpose of the creation of Israel, according to Gush emunim, is not to seek refuge, but literally to return to the land of Israel, which becomes an end in itself. If Arabs should oppose this, they are evil, and a merciless war should be declared on Arabs who oppose Jewish sovereignty. Still, Palestinians could continue to live in the land of Israel if they accept to be subordinated to the Jews and Jewish culture. They can enjoy individual rights if they do not interfere with the the aim of the establishment of Jewish sovereignty over all the land of Israel. But they can, under no circumstances, enjoy communal or group rights over the land.[51]

     The heady days of Arab nationalism under Abdel Nasser's leadership are past; the Arabs no longer view Israel as a wedge dividing the Arab world into two, nor do they think of it as the 'cat's paw of imperialism'. The Arab boycott of Israel has ended for all pratical purposes. The PLO, Jordan and Egypt have made peace with Israel.  Arab hostility to Israel is due to the fact that Arab land is occupied, Arab property is being confiscated and Arabs are being stripped of their political and human rights. As long as Israelis cannot admit to themselves that this is the case, Arabs appear as villains, terrorists and Jew-haters -- their actions are judged not in the light of their own motives, but in comparison with signal events in the Jewish past.  'Social-attribution research has made it clear that negative behavior of others is primarily perceived as an expression of inner traits, motives and goals, and not as an effect of situational factors. Negative behavior of self is explained more externally ...Consequently, negative behavior of outgroup members is perceived as an expression of the collective traits or stable characteristics of a group.... this process leads to the formation of stereotypes.'[52]

     The government of Israel must alter its own behavior and set a good example. When Israel refuses to end its occupation of Arab territory, that sends the message that the violation of international law is meaningless when it is undertaken by Israel against Arabs, when Israel confiscates Palestinian property in the name of the 'public interest' to establish settlements, but the Arab property owners are rendered ineligible by their ethnicity and religion from owning or renting a single housing unit in the development built on their land, it means that Arabs have no right to property when it interferes with Israel's purpose -- this public interest that excludes, discriminates against its benefactor sends a message that seeps into the mentality of the Israeli public, a message that says: ethnic discrimination is legitimate if practiced against Arabs.

     Following Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's assassination, Abba Eban, the elder Israeli statesman, said in his eulogy:

 

     Rabin was a stern realist. He understood that the alternative to the 'territories for peace' principle is nothing short of grotesque: the resumption of Israeli rule over a foreign nation two million strong without offering them either equal citizenship in Israel or the chance of separating into their own jurisdiction. The alternative is a certain prescription for a destiny of permanent violence and suppression. It is so discordant with the movement and impulse of the modern age that it is astonishing and sad to see it espoused by important parties in Israel and in some sectors of Jewish communities.[53]

 

     A hard and uncompromising line towards the Palestinians will breed extremism, a humane and accommodating position will invite accommodation.  Except for the extremists in Hamas, Palestinians no longer see the solution to their situation as lying in the liberation of Palestine from a settler-colonial movement whose ideology is Zionism. Contrary to what Netanyahu believes, progress towards peace has given rise to further moderation among the Palestinians 'Palestinian opinion polls showed after the elections [for the Palestinian Council] that support for Hamas, once running at around 40%, had dropped to about 15%. The decline came as Israeli troops began withdrawing from Palestinian cities in the West Bank and national authority head Yasser Arafat appeared close to fulfilling his promise to create a Palestinian state. For a time, suicide bomb attacks on Israeli buses stopped.'[54]

     Yet for Jewish fundamentalists in Gush Emunim, the territorial conflict with the Palestinians is merely a superficial manifestation of a metaphysical struggle in which the Arabs are aligned with the forces of evil. For them, there can be no real peace with the Arabs; in fact, real peace can only reign when the Messiah comes to rule over all of the people of Israel in the land of Israel; given this perspective, wars with the Arabs may be no more than should be anticipated and a natural part of the process of redemption. [55] Yet this is precisely what Martin Buber warned against:

 

... The close-minded attitudes inform the dominant type of nationalism, which has gained so many adherents among us -- the most worthless assimilation -- it teaches that everyone must consider his own nation as an absolute and all other nations as something relative; that one must evaluate one's own nation on the basis of its greatest era, and all other nations on the basis of their lowest points. If this idea continues to gain acceptance it will lead to a worldwide disaster.[56]

 

     Both Arabs and Israelis have been guilty of close-minded attitudes which sustain a narrow nationalism. We do not exonerate the Arabs of all guilt, nor do we lay all the guilt at Israel's door. There are extremist on both sides, and terrorists on both sides. The difference is that the Arabs are the losers and the Israelis the winners in this vicious game. We do not claim that the underdog is intrinsically better than his oppressor, merely that we need to defend the underdog and stay the hand of the oppressor.

     We are all too human, and today's victim may be tomorrow's oppressor -- that is built into human nature. There is a significant number of Israelis who understand this all too well. Since Israel wields almost all the power, and the Palestinians very little, it is Israel that must compromise, otherwise there can be no peace.

     We believe that Martin Buber was right in saying that Palestine is a land of two peoples; it is the promised land for the Jews, the geographic locus of their history and spiritual aspirations, but it is also the homeland of the Palestinian people, and has been so for generations. We do not believe one people is superior to the other, that one people is chosen and has a unique claim to the land and the other people should be cast out of their ancestral land. We believe that Israel/Palestine is the Holy Land, in that it should be the land of reconciliation. We maintain that true redemption lies not in empowerment, but in the reconciliation that follows empowerment. We are fully in agreement with Marc Ellis on that point.[57]

     If Zionism -- in the positive sense -- is defined as the building of a Jewish national home in Palestine, this aim can be achieved under some form of binationalism. Both Orthodox Judaism and Reform Judaism were anti-nationalistic. Jews are not under a religious obligation to establish a state on their own initiative; those who insist on doing so are following a certain interpretation of the teachings of Judaism which even other Jews do not find compelling; why should Muslims and Christians accept that God wishes to give the Jews dominion over the Palestinians? Jewish fundamentalists of the Gush Emunim variety are not unique, in fact they are an example of a trend that is becoming widespread in our century: and can be summarized as 'the purification of culture through authentication...; the universalization of ethnic chosenness through nationalist ideology...; and the territorialization of shared memory, which inspires historical claims to historic homelands and sacred sites.'[58] Narrow Palestinian nationalism is the mirror image of its most bitter antagonist.

     Many Palestinians have learnt to esteem the establishment of a Palestinian state as the highest end of their striving, they have incorporated the fight for a national state into the innermost core of their social identity, so that the renunciation of the goal of a Palestinian state would seem like self-renunciation, and self-annihilation. Hamas's recently evolved theological interpretation of the connection between the people and the land of Palestine is a page from the book of Jewish fundamentalists. However, there is an essential difference between the the average Palestinian seeking a social identity and a zealot in Hamas who would force his views on others; our moral starting point, outlined above, rules out Hamas' ideological approach, because it would deny Jews their ethnonational rights. On the other hand, the ordinary Palestinian yearning for self-identity will find satisfaction within the framework of a binational state. This would involve the same compromise on his part as the one required of Jewish Israelis.

 

 

Conclusion:

 

     The Palestinians are in fact still under occupation, even if they have a measure of autonomy. They are not in a position at this time to demand equality with Israeli citizens. They should therefore pursue a strategy of maximizing the level of autonomy available to them, they should demand the expansion and gradual redefinition of autonomy, but not seek physical separation. The Palestinians now control education and public health and social welfare in the area under the Palestinian Authority. They should gradually seek to expand control over agriculture, land and water resources, building permits and the economy. They should seek the elimination of the whole array of joint Israeli-Palestinian committees set up in Oslo I which allow Israel a power of veto over Palestinian Authority decisions. The Palestinian Authority and Council should demand an end to the forms of collective punishment practiced by Israel, such as the closure of the territories, cutting off Palestinian towns and cities from each other as well as from Israel. The Palestinians should embark on an intensive program of socio-economic development so as to lessen the economic disparity between the occupied territories and Israel. They should seek through all the means at hand to break down ethnic stereotyping and discrimination. Once some greater measure of integration has taken place and confidence building measures have had a chance to take hold, the Palestinians should propose a union with Israel on condition that they be granted Israeli citizenship, and secure a percentage of the seats in the Knesset and the cabinet that reflects their percentage of the population at the time of union. Israel could then adopt a constitution based on a consociational arrangement that guarantees the rights of each ethnonational community. This ratio would naturally favor Israel, and might to some extent allay Israeli fears. Conditions for amending the constitution could be set so as to require a very high percentage of Knesset votes to guard against the impact of future demographic changes. Above all the Palestinians must pursue a peaceful strategy, although they may resort to civil disobedience and nonviolent protest to make their point when necessary.

     A binational state will allow Jews to have a national home and a state, but not an exclusive state. For those Jews who yearn for a national home, a binational state will satisfy their aspiration as well as provide a solution to the powerlessness/empowerment dilemma. Yet a binational state can do this in a way that an exclusive Jewish state cannot. The emergence of a binational state will be a sign that the victim has overcome the moral peril of becoming the victimizer. This would break the hold of the force of ethnocentrism, and end the vicious cycle of human domination/subjugation in this episode of history. It would be a singular example of triumph over predetermination, it would signal the possibility of an end to human bondage to blind social-psychological forces. It would be a testament to human freedom and individual responsibility. Here the Palestinians too have an opportunity to rise above particularism, to celebrate the Palestinian identity alongside the Jewish identity, rather than to remain fixated on Palestinian nationalism. The cycle of despair would have been broken, and transcendence achieved. In that sense, Israel/Palestine may indeed become the carrier of a message of salvation for the rest of mankind.