Part IV

 

                                           The Author's Perspective

 

 

                          CHAPTER Six

 

 

A Cultural Perspective on a Binational State in Palestine

 

 

 

 

1. Introduction:

 

     Perhaps the main difficulty that confronts the researcher into the history of the evolution of the concept of a binational state in Palestine is the very limited popularity of the idea with both Palestinians and Israelis. However, this has not prevented intellectuals, academicians and political researchers, both Israelis and non-Israelis, from studing the idea in its numerous manifestations and diagnosing the prospects and conditions necessary for its implementation since very early in this century.

     The various forms that the binational idea took can be viewed as reflections of political and cultural schools of thought on binationalism, before as well as after the creation of the state of Israel. Interestingly most Zionist and Israeli schools of thought failed to embrace the full dimensions of the binational idea; choosing those aspects of binationalism that were not inconsistent with the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. Palestinian organizations and political figures, for their part, launched certain initiatives and put forward ideas which came to constitute currents of opinion which were harbingers of [an Arab perspective on] the concept of a binational state in Palestine. In the following discussion, we will summarize the schools of thought and currents of opinion which we discussed in earlier chapters of this book.

 

I. Schools of Thought on Binationalism Prior to the Creation of Israel:

 

     Five different trends can be identified:

 

1. The school of thought of Jewish liberals and intellectuals, particularly the adherents of cultural Zionism. Members of this school acknowledged the existence of both a Palestinian Arab nationalism and a Jewish nationalism in Palestine. They believed that members of each national community were entitled to certain historic or natural rights in Palestine. The solution, according to this school, was to establish a single state in which both national communities would enjoy equal rights, without regard to which one constituted the majority or the minority.

 

2. The current of thought represetative of Jewish politicians and thinkers who gave first priority to the establishment of a Jewish national home and second priority to a binational state in Palestine. They were of the opinion that Arabs had first to accept the idea of a Jewish national home in Palestine. They thought that binational organizations were a suitable topic of discussion and test, providing the Jewish Agency with information that would contribute to the creation of an atmosphere favoring good relations with the Arabs until such time as a Jewish demographic majority would come about in Palestine.

 

3.  The school of thought of Zionist socialists who looked forward to the establishment of a socialist Jewish state. They were of the opinion that a binational state should be established in greater Palestine, i.e., on both banks of the Jordan river, grouping Arabs and Jews once a Jewish majority had been attained.

 

4. The non-Zionist leftist school of thought. Adherents of this school thought that advocacy of a binational state would enable Arabs and Jews to establish a single state that would oppose British colonialism and world imperialism. This school of thought was represented by the Palestine Communist Party, including its Arab and Jewish wings.

 

5. The school of thought of Palestinian Arabs who adopted a moderate position favoring coexistence with a Jewish minority but who did not acknowledge that the Jews had the right to establish a national home in Palestine. This school of thought was represented by some members of the Istiqlal party, academicians and writers. They were of the opinion that Jewish immigration should not be restricted to Palestine, but should occur throughout greater Syria, so as not to lead to the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine alone.

 

II. Trends Following the Establishment of Israel:

 

     Six trends can be identified in this period:

 

1. The Cultural Zionist school and the Ichud remained active following the establishment of the state of Israel. Leaders of the Ichud felt that the binational idea was still relevant. However, by the mid-sixties this school was in decline as the publications of the Ichud had ceased to appear, its membership declined and Buber's death deprived it of its most celebrated standard bearer.

 

2. Supporters of the idea of a binational state with a Jewish majority abandoned the idea, which they came to consider to be inconsistent with the Jewish character of the state of Israel. They ceased to regard the Palestinian Arabs as a national community or a separate ethnic group, and viewed them as [part of] the inhabitants of the Arab countries. However, the original idea gained a new lease on life after Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967. Supporters of this trend focused their interest on the Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories, particularly in the city of Jerusalem, which became the unified capital of Israel after the old Arab-inhabited city, which was occupied in 1967, was united with the modern Jewish city.

 

3. The Zionist leftist school of thought on binationalism adopted a middle of the road solution, acknowledging the individual and separate character of the local Palestinian community in a fashion consistent with the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. The most distinctive feature of this school of thought is that it advocated dividing "greater Palestine", i.e., the territory on both sides of the Jordan river, into two states, one Arab and the other Jewish. Palestinians would be allowed to exercise the right of self-determination in different ways, depending on their place of residence: the Arab minority in Israel, the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, East Jordan and Palestinian refugees in neighboring Arab countries would be treated differently. In the future, this could lead to the establishment of a binational state, or a federation may evolve between the two states along the opposite banks of the Jordan river. Mapam, which has expressed pessimism concerning the possibility of establishing a binational state in what it calls the "Land of Israel" at present, is one of the most prominent supporters of this plan.

 

4. The non-Zionist leftist school of thought which has endorsed the resolution to partition Palestine , which are represtented by Communist Party and and some peaceful groups. The Jews would be able to express their right to self-determination in the Jewish state and the Arabs would do so in the Palestinian state. This school of thought no longer deals with the concept of a binational state. It is concerned, however, with the rights of the Arab minority in Israel, and it demands the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people and the right of Palestinian refugees to return. The concept of a binational state has ceded priority to these considerations and is it is thought that it might come about by itself.

 

5. The solution of a democratic secular state as advocated by certain organizations within the PLO may be thought of as a current of opinion that could lead to the establishment of a binational state. A number of Palestinian organizations have been keen to express a desire on the part of the Palestinians to coexist with Israelis in Palestine. They have not abandoned certain basic positions, such as the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or demanding the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people and proclaiming its right to establish its own state on the territory of Palestine , as the issue of the most organizations in PLO. However, these positions have not prevented some Palestinian politicians from expressing a willingness to consider the establishment of relations between Israel and the Palestinian state that may be established in the occupied territories.

 

6. Following Likud's coming to power in 1977, a current of opinion emerged among certain analysts and politicians proposing the establishment of a binational state of Israel. This could come about through the establishment of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the adoption of economic development plans and the provision of services under the umbrella of Palestinian self-government. The prospect of the indefinite perpetuation of self-government may convince the Palestinians to give up on the idea of total independence from Israel. A binational state could result in a de facto fashion.

 

     The following discussion will focus on the characteristics and features of a society or state that are conducive to the coexistence of more than one national community, each of which is able to exercise its full cultural heritage, in Palestine within its known geographic borders. The intention is not to provide a prescription or map out a strategy that will lead to the creation of a binational state, but to provide a bird's eye view of the avenues of peaceful transition in Palestine to a binational state,                   while pursuing the path of non-violence, far removed from the  chain of haphazard action and reaction and from the vicious circle of violence and violent retaliation.

 

 

2. The Gradual Transition to a Binational State in Palestine:

 

     Although political events normally dominate the discourse in a study such as this, I believe that cultural change has the greatest impact on the lives of individuals and groups. Social polarization  gives rise to a chain of ideological conflicts and cultural struggles. Social and cultural interaction leads to unexpected or rather unpredictable change.

 

     We are faced with the situation in Israel and the occupied territories which, it has been argued, could develop into a binational state. The principal difficulty is the existence of two forms of nationalism: a Palestinian-Arab nationalism, and a Israeli- Jewish nationalism. There isn't even agreement concerning the geographic boundaries of the state: are we talking about geographic Palestine, present-day Israel or "greater Israel"? These differences become matters of life or death for the Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jewish.

     Let us suppose that the process of change is natural, but that the change to a binational state in Palestine needs to take place in stages and requires effort from both sides. It will not result, as some Israeli and American analysts think, from blind circumstances, a natural evolution of the Israeli occupation of 1967, as it were. Change may in fact take that direction, but the Israeli occupation is not a sufficient condition for its occurrence. Which laws and legislation are to govern the process of transition to a binational state will be an indication of the willingness of each side to declare its acceptance of the de facto situation.

     A comparison of the above situation with other similar ones will allow us to identify and chart the course of the transition to a binational state, guided by the example of societies that succeeded in making the transition, such as Switzerland and Belgium, and those that failed, such as Northern Ireland and the Basques in Spain. There is no nearby example that could serve as a case comparable to Palestine, that would allow us to predict the course of evolution of cultural, social and political relations between the two national communities in Palestine. This should lead us to expect that this is a distinctive case which has its own specific characteristics and dilemmas. Current political indicators, seen from a realist's perspective, may lead one to believe that there is a probability of a negotiated settlement or compromise between the two national groups. However, the reality on the ground highlights the differences in the objective circumstances of the two groups. The following discussion will examine the most important of those differences, and the circumstances which must arise or be brought about in order for a binational solution to materialize.

 

 

3.Two Nationalisms:

 

 

     Generally speaking, there is a refusal by the Arabs and the Zionist Jews to recognize the legitimacy of the other's claims: the other side denies that the Palestinian Arabs or the Israeli Jews constitute a national group with a distinctive character and an independent destiny. Many studies have been conducted to rebut the other sides' claim that its brand of nationalism has a historical basis or that its community constitutes part of a larger people or ummah : Palestinian Arabs feel that they constitute part of the Arab nationalist movement, which unites Arabs from the Gulf to the Atlantic; and Israeli Jews believe that they are part and parcel of a Jewish nationalism  to which all Jews in the world subscribe.

     The above emotionally charged interpretations represent aspirations fed by political organizations on both sides, but the essence of each nationalism requires a realistic definition, and compromise is called for. Reciprocal rejection of the other's claims cannot lead to acceptance of a de facto emergence of a state that unites the two national groups.

     Who are the Palestinians? In order for them to be a distinct national group, they must satisfy certain essential conditions: such as a common land, language, common interests, cultural values, a common destiny, and a common affiliation with Palestine. These conditions do not all have to be satisfied by every national groups that accepts to form part of a binational state. For instance,in a binational state, a sense of nationalism that unites both national groups through consent and affiliation to one state throughout the united geographic area and loyalty to the values and culture of that state may serve as a substitute for a common sense of destiny and affiliation to a uni-national state.  In order to define the Palestinians as a national group, one can describe them as descendants from a Palestinian lineage, from two Palestinian parents or from a Palestinian father. What makes the Palestinians a distinct national group is their affiliation to the land, history, culture and civilization of Palestine. The role of religion in this affiliation is to evoke the values and cultural factors which bind the national group to its homeland. A sense of common destiny in the case of the Palestinians is embodied in the sense of distinctive identity and the aspiration to independence and self-administration. The Arabic language serves as a melting pot for and a carrier of the cultural values and the historical experiences of the Palestinian  national group. Some of the essential conditions listed above are lacking, the physical presence of the Palestinians on the land of Palestine and their legal status in relation to the land is absent in the case of Palestinians living outside the land of Palestine. Palestinian Arabs who reside in Israel proper are Israeli citizens, whereas those living in the West Bank or Gaza under Israeli occupation are either Jordanian citizens or Palestinians who are refugees in their own land. Palestinian communities outside the land of Palestine have a political and legal status that differs from their brethren who live inside Israel or under Israeli occupation. Expatriate Palestinians have a status of residents that is conditioned by their right to return [to Palestine].

 

     A number of scholars have tried to deal with the origins of the Palestinian identity and the Palestinian national group. Most Zionist literature had treated the Palestinian identity as a transient phenomenon which would disappear with time. Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal conclude as a result of their research that Palestinian nationalism is a fact, and, like other facts in developing countries, had arisen during the last two centuries. Kimmerling and Migdal are of the opinion that the rise of Palestinian nationalism has been greatly influenced by the Zionist movement and the immigration of Jews to Palestine; in fact, they go further and say that the formation of the Palestinian people is as much the result of the political Judaification of Palestine and its settlement by Jews as is the formation of the Jewish people in Palestine. The central point in this analysis is that the effect of the 1948 calamity on the Palestinians has been a powerful force in shaping the Palestinian people. In this respect, the advent of the Jews to Palestine is the key to understanding the forces that helped shape the Palestinian people. "Al-Nakabah", the disaster of 1948 led to the mobilization of a collective Palestinian consciousness. This consciousness arose in the camps under the banner of the return to Palestine. It was later transformed into a national consciousness involving the right of self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian political entity. In view of the fact that the Palestinian national identity  had clashed with the Jewish national agenda, it was more clearly formed and better defined than the national identities of its Arab neighbors. Right after "Al- Nakbah", the disaster, of 1948, the refugees stressed the collective right to return. This fomented the birth of a national culture in the camps which evolved from the slogan of the right to return into a true Palestinian nationalism which contributed to the emergence of social and cultural boundaries defining who the Palestinians were. Kimmerling and Migdal conclude that it is difficult to understand the Palestinian reality or the Zionist reality without knowing their reciprocal influence on each other. As far as the Palestinians are concerned, the whole thing is traceable back to the calamity that created a strong social consciousness, which erased differences and mended fractures, creating a new and potent nationalism fuelled by injustice, bitterness, retreat and the international system itself.[1]

 

     The clash with the Zionist movement has engendered a moral and material strength which has helped shape the Palestinian Arab people. Although the clash with the movement to settle Jews in Palestine was a negative factor and an obstacle to the Palestinian people's expression of its identity and aspirations, yet that clash also had a positive effect, when seen as a formative factor in shaping the Palestinian identity. Yet one should not exaggerate that positive effect, and go to the absurd length of counting the 1948 calamity as a blessing. The Palestinian Revolution and the intifadah helped consolidate the solidarity of the Palestinian national community. The challenge, the clash, the action and reaction, conditioned and amplified the response of the Palestinian people which was largely shaped by the historical, cultural and social heritage of that people which had been formed down the centuries.

 

     The connection drawn by Israeli scholars between the formation of a Palestinian people and the Jewish advent to Palestine bring to mind the idea put forward in certain Jewish writings in the nineteenth century concerning the blessings and the advantages of the Jewish national project in Palestine. Moses Hess (1812-1875) drew a connection between the idea of a Jewish socialist commonwealth project in Palestine and the future needs of the population of the Arab region as a whole. Hess anticipated that nationalist movements would tear the Ottoman empire apart in Asia and Africa. Hess urged the French, in support of France's interests, to help recreate Arab states in Egypt and Syria.[2]

 

     Today more than 140 years after Hess' analysis, it is fitting to see what happened to his idea. Events have shown that Israel has not been able to free itself from the presence of a Palestinian Arab nationalist community, which it is unable to contain. On the contrary, it has brought out the power inherent in the community and incited it to a violent and confrontational response. This confrontation has given birth to a culture that rejects containment and promotes the formation of a national community with distinct features and characteristics.

    

     After discussing Arab nationalism and the Palestinian Arab national community, one naturally asks Jewish nationalism and

the Jewish national community. This debate leads to the question of who should be considered an Israeli Jew?

     Arthur Ruppin's response is that it depends on the religious criterion. In fact, he says, there are three criteria: religion, nationality and race. According to the religious criterion, i.e., Judaic tradition, a person born of parents of the Jewish faith who have not severed their ties with the Jewish community is considered to be a Jew. The second criterion Ruppin puts forward is membership in the Jewish national community: the Jews feel that their culture, traditions and language constitutes a greater bond among them than is the case with any other national community. Judging by this criterion, the number of those who feel they belong to the Jewish people is smaller than the number of adherents of the Jewish faith.[3] Ruppin also draws a connection between consciousness of a Jewish social identity and the Jewish national identity in the national home: Palestine.[4]

 

     The features of the Israelite Jewish national community in Palestine began to take shape following the waves of Jewish immigration to Palestine and the formation of the Yishuv before 1948. Following the creation of the state of Israel, this became the Jewish community in Israel, which, along with the Arab minority, formed Israeli society. However, the concept of an Israeli Jewish community is not sharply crystallized for two reasons: first the law does not define who is a Jew, secondly the additional waves of Jewish immigration, seeing as the law of return grants every Jew who comes to the land of Palestine the right to Israeli nationality.

     From another perspective, it is difficult to define the size and characteristics of the Jewish national community in Israel in connection with the establishment of a binational state in Palestine. In accordance with what has been said about the definition of a binational society, one needs a formula that will reconcile the Palestinian Arab and Jewish Israeli national communities. Still, the Israeli Jewish community in practice constitutes a national community with its own language, culture. religion, values, traditions, interests and a common destiny tied to the land on which it lives. One should respect, or at least avoid embroilment in the controversy over what is different about the Palestinian Arab and Jewish Israeli communities. The debate should focus, instead, on whatever common ground exists and the conditions for coexistence within one state (homeland), it should focus on such issues as power sharing, defining the rights and responsibilities of each community, and finding the democratic means for expressing the political and social will of each community. One should guard against anything that will threaten the security or the values of each community or undermine its identity and national character.

 

 

4.Two Communities in One State:

 

     There is nothing unusual, in the context of a binational state, to have two ethnically and culturally distinct social communities. Relations between them might evolve over time until they become just two local communities within the framework of one society. However, there are several difficult stages to go through even before embarking on such a course.

     Both communities will have to coexist within the same state, and within that state all citizens would enjoy equal opportunity, power sharing rights, and the right to participate in the responsibilities of government. There are a number of conditions that are essential in order to arrive at that state of affairs: developed political awareness in each community, its ability to express itself and choose its own representatives, and to exercise the right of self-determination through recognized and legitimate means. The expression of the right of self-determination and the right of each community to select its own legitimate representatives acquire crucial importance in this case in determining the level which a national community may attain in a binational state. Fear of making use of legitimate means and the repression of a community's national aspirations makes the transition to a binational state difficult. It is of particular importance to rectify the legal status of Palestinian Arabs in the occupied territories and to remove the restrictions on the ability of the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel to express its will and shape its political destiny and choose its representatives. In addition, serious consideration should be given tot he fate of Palestinians living in Arab and foreign countries.

 

5.Palestine - Israel: What's in a Name:

    

     One of the complications that can be expected to arise is the question of the name of the binational state. The name will reflect on the formula of understanding and rapprochement between the Arab and Jewish national communities. Each side will want to have the state named after itself, this being an issue of pride, an expression of its national aspirations, and extension of its history and the symbol of its cultural identity. No matter what arguments each side puts forward to demonstrate the justice of its claim, a compromise solution will have to be found which will include the names of the two communities, such as the Israeli-Palestinian Republic, or the State of Palestine-Israel.

 

 

6.The Question of Violence:

 

     There are two aspects to the question of violence in Palestine. Each side has a point of view that justifies the use of violence on its part.

     On the one hand, there are those who consider violent struggle or jihad to be a right; on the other hand, there are those who consider it to be terrorism, anarchy and a crime. Each national community considers itself to have the right to use violence, either as a from of rebellion against a tyrannical and greedy occupying power, or as retaliation against rebellion and provocation. The desire for revenge is an obstacle on the road to understanding, rapprochement or a settlement. Counter-violence only pours fuel on the flames of dispute and agitates the forces of destruction and nihilism.

     The means of violence at the disposal of governments are more developed and diverse than the possibilities open to resistance movements or individual rebels. Organized violence takes many advanced forms, which epitomize skill, concealment and dissimulation. Israeli sources, both official and unofficial, indicate that such means are being used, for example, planting [Israeli soldiers or security agents] in Arab dress among Palestinians in order to carry out surprise raids on Palestinian homes which spread terror, the blowing up or burning of the houses of relatives and even friends of members of the resistance [in a form of collective punishment.]

     It is often said that pressure can build up to an explosion. This is virtually an explanation for the outbreak of the intifadah in the occupied territories in December 1987. The intifadah is an important case of the use of violence inside Palestine, and is the gravest challenge facing Israel as an organized society. According to Bialik, the intifadah is a threat facing Israel from the inside, as opposed to the wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973, which were external threats not comparable to the intifadah. Bialik reaffirms that the intifadah is a form of violent struggle between two national groups inhabiting the same polity. He thinks it likely that violence in the occupied territories will continue on a pattern of violence and retaliatory violence similar to that in Northern Ireland.[5]  It is instructive that the intifadah arose in the occupied territories after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon succeeded in eliminating bases of the Palestinian resistance there, which only shows that the violence used by Israeli forces during the invasion of Lebanon was a contributing factor to the search for alternative methods of counter-violence, as were the practices of the occupation authorities in the territories.

 

     It is too much to expect that a rapprochement or cooperation can come about in a society grouping two national communities in a situation characterized by violence, injustice and discrimination. Among the most basic features of a binational state is the rule of consent, security and mutual trust between the two communities. Security and respect for human rights are basic to any society. Violence is contrary to human nature. Using people and human lives as stepping stones, resorting to tyranny, intimidation and coercion, so as to subjugate others to the will of the strong, is reprehensible and inhuman, it involves double standards and discrimination, and is inconsistent with self-respect and respect for the other, debasing the other as a human being.

     If one wishes to oppose violence and allow the truth to triumph, one has to uphold moral values and show respect for human beings. Bringing out the truth, as a moral imperative, requires watchfulness and constancy of position in the face of injustice and tyranny. It requires courage and alertness to any deviation from the commitment to truth, whether in the short or the long term,

whether it applies to a fellow citizen or a stranger, to friend or foe. Violence is not an indication of power, it is an indication of failure and despair.

     The path of non-violence poses a challenge to power and tyranny, which are impotent in the face of it. Its power derives from the agenda adopted by a group that is united in its demands and objectives, and that refuses to be caught up in the vicious cycle of action and reaction and the endless quest for revenge. The most alarming aspect of the terrorism practiced by governments is the recourse to the ugliest forms of violence as a consequence of weakness, failure and despair, in the mistaken belief that violence is an indication of strength. No matter how much capacity for violence that individuals or organizations acquire, they can be no match for the capacity of government to use organized violence.

     Judging by the state of affairs in the occupied territories, the occupation itself requires the use of violence to maintain the occupation and to dominate the occupied. Before one begins to discuss political or security  formulas for resolving the dispute between the Palestinian Arab and Israeli Jewish communities, one must first accept in principle that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is indeed a form of violence afflicting the Palestinian Arabs in that section of Palestine. Ofira Seliktar predicts that annexing the occupied territories or expelling the Palestinians will lead to the creation of a uni-national community in Palestine but will lead to involvement in violence.[6]

 

7.A Secular v. a Binational State:

 

     A secular democratic state in Palestine is one of the formulas envisaged by the PLO, and particularly some organizations within the PLO, [such as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,] as a long-term solution for the question of coexistence among Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews. But the parties in power and the majority of the opposition in Israel have rejected  that formula for several reasons, notably the fact that it would mean doing away with the Jewish character of the state; in addition, Israeli public opinion is not responsive to the idea of secularization and a departure from Jewish religious traditions and values.

     On the Palestinian side, the discussion of  the idea of a secular state has been restricted to organizations within the PLO  such as some wings in (Fattah), (Democratic Front), (Popular Front),  and a few interested intellectuals. The idea was often dusted off and brought out on occasion for external consumption. Nevertheless, the slogan of a secular democratic state is still used in official [PLO] declarations, and is to be found in the documents that constitute part of the [PLO] archives, such as the political program for the PLO approved by the Palestine National Council in January 1973; the political program adopted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - , in May 1974; and the political program adopted by the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine in October 1975.

     PLO leaders who support the idea believe it is the path to rectifying an anomalous situation in the Palestine of the future. Yet the establishment of a secular state faces a formidable difficulty in winning wide grass roots support for the idea from the Palestinian national community. A secular state is inconsistent with the values and the cultural norms of the Palestinian Arab community. A study conducted a few years ago in Israel and the occupied territories has shown that religious sentiment is the dominant trend among radical Israeli Arabs, whereas the Palestinian Arabs in the occupied territories are bound to religion in their traditions. Religion therefore remains central to a solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute.[7]

     A secular state may please some intellectuals [and leftists], but it not a strong option as it does not enjoy wide spread support. The problem remains how to find a practical formula that will please the vase majority of both communities.

     There may be some confusion in the minds of some people who think of a secular state in Palestine as a form of binational state. This is not consistent with the accepted notion that a binational state is characterized by the presence of two distinct communities differentiated from each other by language, culture and values, each of which participates in government. A secular democratic state, on the other hand, seeks to liberate individuals from the two national heritages involved.[8]

 

8.Minority and Majority in a Binational State:

 

     Although the establishment of a binational state does not require a specific demographic balance, the question of which national community is in the minority and which in the majority in an organized political society  is a significant issue, as a demographic majority bestows a certain moral and material advantage. This issue is the reason that the Zionist Organization had been reluctant to subscribe to the binational state option prior to 1948. It is also the reason that the majority of Israeli public opinion is afraid of the significance of the Palestinian Arab demographic factor as it would figure in any attempted solution. Israel has to grapple with the dilemma of what to do with the Palestinian population and to find a formula for reconciling this with the maintenance of an Israeli majority in Palestine. The problem is caused by the high Palestinian birthrate, which has caused hesitation on the part of the Israeli government to annex the occupied territories. The Israeli authorities are also faced with the fear of the eventuality that the size of the Arab population inside Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will bring about a de facto binational state as a result of an unplanned and blind process. Two national communities now inhabit the land of Palestine, each with its own language, values, and history and with its own national consciousness. The fact that there are two and a half million Palestinian Arabs living in the occupied territories and inside Israel proper is a fair indication that the demographic factor will remain a negative consideration from the Israeli point of view as far as the establishment of a binational state is concerned.

     There are precious few Israelis who do not insist on a Jewish majority as a condition for a binational state, such as Martin Buber, who made it clear that he does not posit a Jewish majority as a condition for the establishment of a binational state, nor should such a state be based on a majoritarian principle. Buber criticized Ben Gurion for his insistence on securing a Jewish majority in Palestine.[9] This question was debated by advocates of a binational state prior to 1948. Most advocates of the idea entertained reservations about implementing it before the Jews came to constitute a majority in Palestine, because they realized that the principle of binationalism does not stipulate equality among the two national communities. Some favored the idea, with a stay of execution until the Jews attained a numerical majority; such was the position of Mapam, for instance.

    

     The question of minority or majority is again of significance now, in view of the option of establishing a binational state over the whole territory of Palestine. This issue needs a balance that will allow each national communiity to realize its ambitions within a formula that will safeguard the interests of each community regardless of its ratio of the population as a whole or whether it consitututes a minority or a majority. Participation in government and the representation of each national community has to be taken into account. Western systems of government in multinational states should be studied and adapted to the conditions of the Palestinian and Israeli national communities. There are various systems for democratic regimes which can prevent hegemony of one community over the other; such systems can be adopted. In spite of the fact that differences and causes of alienation may be more formidable than similarities and the desire for reconciliation, one can benefit from the experience of multinational states to disarm the divisive forces. The leaders of the two national communities would be charged with the responsibility of reconciling their positions and choosing a form of democracy by which both communities would be governed. Such a quest would not elude men who are determined to find a settlement that will defuse the danger and abate fears of domination by the majority.

 

 

 

9.Jewish and Palestinian Immigration:

 

     One of the most serious objections facing the option of a binational state post-1967 is the law of return, which grants Jews the right to Israeli citizenship as soon as they arrive in Israel. The assumption behind this is that Israel bears a moral responsibility to the Jews of the world to keep the door open to immigration on a constant basis, seeing as Israel, since its creation, has stood for a Jewish state. This commitment on Israel's part constitutes an obstacle in the way of the adoption of the binational option.[1]

     A comparable moral obligation applies to the absorption in a binational state of Palestinian refugees who had left or been forced out in 1948, 1967 or under Israeli occupation. The United Nations resolution calling for the right of the Palestinian refugees to return or to receive compensation represents the will of the international community, and serves as a counterpart to the law of return. The issue of the return of the Palestinian refugees is one of the central questions in the transition to a binational state in Palestine.

 

10.A Question of Democracy:

 

     Israel claims to be the only Western-style democracy in the Middle East. This may be true as applied to the Jewish citizens of the state, and the Arab minority in Israel is able to exercise some rights, but the Palestinian Arabs in the occupied territories are denied the exercise of democratic rights and liberties in so far as they do not come under the province of Israeli law. Furthermore, many of the laws of Israel are heavily colored with a Jewish character. Palestinians, whether in the occupied territories or in Israel, live under political, social and legal circumstances which deprive them of aspects of democratic government which Jewish citizens enjoy.

 

     Palestinians, in Israel are allowed the exercise of certain rights within the context of the special measures applied by the Israeli authorities. However, the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza have been under military administration, or civil administration run by the military, and, as an occupied population, denied the protection of Israeli law. One of the characteristics of a binational state in Palestine in which there will be equality among all citizens is that the Palestinians will be able to enjoy [civil] rights. 

 

     The other central issue is participation in government. Israeli Arabs occupy very few posts in government, which helps to marginalize the Palestinian minority. It has become routine for the Israeli government since 1948 to deny Israeli Arabs any significant role in government. The participation of the Palestinians of the occupied territories in the responsibilities of power is a principal dilemma for the Israeli occupation authorities. They sought a formula to make such participation possible, for example, through the election of mayors. When this method failed, they put forward a formula for the election of non-legislative local councils which would be responsible for local affairs in the occupied territories . They are still experimenting with similar formulas so as to avoid granting such councils a representative status that would entail legislative powers. However, the Israeli authorities are not bound to these formulas as a hard and fixed rule; at times they permit elections to take place, at other times they ban them for what they term security considerations. Some American analysts attribute the manifestation of identification between Israeli Palestinians and Palestinians in the occupied territories to the discrimination by the Israeli authorities against Arabs in general, which is responsible for the emergence of the Palestinian phenomenon in the Israeli elections. This state of affairs will lead to insistent demands for power-sharing and participation in the responsibilities of government, whether in Israel or the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This has become all the more relevant since the exacerbation of the spirit of opposition to the Israeli authorities since the outbreak of the intifadah and its adoption of violent means and the insistent challenges to the political state of affairs, which is a portent of a coming explosion if the situation does not change.[10] Under such exceptional circumstances, those laboring for the transition to a binational state in Palestine will have to control the causes of violence. In a democratic atmosphere, given equal opportunity and equal rights, the transition to a binational state will gather momentum.

 

 

11.Stations on the Road to a Binational State in Palestine:

 

 

     No doubt the option of a binational state is a difficult one for both the Palestinian Arab and Israeli Jewish communities. The difficulty lies in the fact, as we said at the beginning of this chapter, in the fact that binational states come about as a result of an evolutionary process of social and cultural transition. They are not born full blown in one bold stroke. In such a state, neither national community exercises hegemony over the other, it certainly does not impose its control over the other by force, even if there are strong economic, ethnic and cultural differentials between the two communities.

 

     It is clear that the option of a binational state cannot be attained through political negotiations and tactical maneuvers, it comes about through gradual and evolutionary change. According to some Israeli analysts, one of the most important factors that is making it a viable option is the Israeli political system, which has brought things to an impasse, and which has in turn led to the situation of a de facto binational state.[11] Speeding up the absorption of the West Bank and Gaza Strip will speed up the creation of a binational state, despite the fact that from an ideological perspective Israel is a Jewish state, at least to a certain extent from a legal point of view.[12]

 

     One must examine the option of a binational state in Palestine from both the Palestinian Arab and Israeli-Jewish perspectives. From the Israeli perspective, it appears clear that the problem lies in the Palestinian Arab population, whether in Israel or in the West Bank. This perspective draws a line of separation between the above-mentioned Palestinians and their fellow Palestinians outside the geographic territory of Palestine; in other words, it uses place of residence as the principle of demarcation. It does not deal with the situation of the Palestinian Arab community as a whole or the Palestinian Arab national existence as a totality.

 

     A well rounded view of the binational option requires an examination of the positions and practices that are an obstacle to its realization. These may be defined as follows:

 

1. The moderate positions within each national community, beginning with striking a balance between the national aspirations of each and the acceptance of each as a distinct and separate entity with a right to life. It is crucial to emphasize the human aspect of relations between he two communities and to give prominence to how such relations can contribute to a rapprochement between them. There has to be mutual adjustment between their ideas and  points of departure regarding their ideas of coming together, and of cultural independence, self-rule, the right of self-determination within the framework of a binational state.

 

     Dealings between the two sides must be based on the acceptance of the fact that each community is a natural phenomenon, neither of them is an utterly unique and incomprehensible phenomenon or an aberration as a community, as each side may interpret the conduct of the other. Jewish public opinion will have to accept the aspirations and characteristics of the Palestinian Arab community as a social phenomenon that is not a deviation, and to acknowledge that it is useless to set up isolating barriers between them. In return, the Palestinian Arab community will have to understand the factors that brought the Jewish problem to a crisis and understand the formation of national consciousness among the Jewish community in Palestine following the establishment of the state of Israel. The upshot is that the claim that a solution to the 'Arab problem' or the 'Jewish problem,' in Palestine is not the issue. If the Arabs are a minority in Israel they are a majority in the occupied territories. The return to hackneyed positions put forward by Zionist Jews  when they used to constitute a  minority and that were prevalent before  the establishment of the state of Israel is pointless. Different circumstances have created new forces. But the principles will remain constant, such as safeguarding the right of each national community to exist, to equality, and to self-determination. Mutual understanding between the two communities is required, as  is recognition of the right of the other side to be different and independent within the context of the binational state. When mutual relations between the two national groups mature, the claims of extremists and ideologues among the Zionists, such as the call for Greater Israel, the historic homeland, will become a thing of the past. Similarly, calls for the elimination of the Zionist colonial entity will vanish when the Jewish community relinquishes the settler ideology and the desire to invade territory, and the waves of immigration stop. More frankly, this will happen when Israel makes the transition to a Middle Eastern state, becoming a part of the regional system, ceasing to be an extension of the old Western drive to conquer the East, and its identity and interests take shape accordingly. Needless to say the transition described is not a set condition nor is it a demand for the impossible or to make more difficult solid historical and gradual progress towards the choice of the binational option.

 

2. Practical steps towards the realization of the binational option must come from both communities on a reciprocal basis, despite the lack of popularity for such an option. The clear weakness of organizations favoring this option that were set up by Jewish politicians and intellectuals was that they were for the most part restricted to Jewish members and did not include Palestinian Arab personalities, with the exception of the New Palestine Organization of 1946, and which did not last long, as we mentioned in chapter four. The concept of a binational state was not well defined in the programs of Jewish organizations prior to 1948, and constituted a form of internal dialogue among the Jewish personalities themselves within the narrow circles set up for this purpose.

 

     The natural course of action in such a situation is to issue a call for a conference, the preparation for which will take shape after a series of preparatory meetings among intellectuals, academicians and advocates of human rights among Arabs and Jews in general and Palestinians and Israelis in particular from among the champions of the binational idea. The conference will lead to the creation of an organizing body which will follow up and coordinate efforts so as to ensure the success of the binational option and to support it with activities throughout the geographic area of Palestine. It would be useful for such an organizing body to include advocates of human rights on both sides.  Time should be spent in the study of the political, legal and social dimensions of discrimination, and in particular on the effect of legislation on the measures and developments leading to the transition from a uni-national Jewish state to a binational state, so that legal amendments and measures may open the path to a binational state.

 

     Such developments in bilateral relations between the two national groups differ from the topics that can be covered in political agreements resulting from political negotiations or from the results of such agreements. Naturally, the transition to a binational state should stay clear of such political arrangements, because they belong to a different channel, a slow moving one with an outlet on the far horizon. At the end, these deliberations will be moved from academic circles to the popular level and help shape a common public opinion supportive of the binational idea on both sides.

 

12. Conclusion:

 

     This study needs to be followed up and developed further. The opportunity is open to researchers, particularly from among the Palestinian Arabs. This chapter has delineated some of those areas. The important thing is to achieve a cultural understanding  in order to achieve a permanent strategic position. Studies of non-violence are particularly important in building a strong current of public opinion in favor of  the realization of justice and  creating the opportunity for each side to enjoy the right to life and to equality without discrimination. Such studies should take up more effective ways to create the influence and momentum favoring such an outcome, so as to support the efforts of organizations and centers advocating non-violence on the Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab sides.[2]

 

 

     The transition to a binational state is an indication of the elevation of relations between the two national communities to cultural, conceptual and tolerance of opinions and the cultural heritage of the other side far from preformed ideologies. It would be mistake to delude ourselves into thinking that the Palestinian Arab or Israeli Jewish communities are working in a vacuum. Kimmerling and Migdal arrived at the conclusion that each of the Palestinian Arab and Jewish Israeli communities will have a prominent role in deciding each other's future. "History has linked the two peoples as two national movments, they can not make the other disappear and they can not achieve peace without fulfilling some of the most deep aspirations of the other."[13]

 

     It is clear that in order to arrive at such a situation, the dominant attitudes of both sides will have to change, and their national aspirations realized. That long-term objective can only be achieved through careful and deep study, and by avoiding the never ending stalemate. The quest goes on for an option that can reconcile those moderate aspirations and attitudes; this is an urgent task for researchers and analysts and activists in the human rights movement and advocates of non-violence among the two national communities.

 

 

 

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