1

                                  Chapter Five

 

 

     The Idea of a Binational State in Palestine Post-1948

 

 

 

1-Introduction:

 

     This chapter covers a very important period in our study. The idea of a binational state receded into the background during the second world war and the years leading up to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. The Arabs suffered several setbacks, and the geographic and demographic realities of Palestinian life were over turned. Arab thought retreated into it shell and turned negative. In the period following the disaster of 1948, no ideas for a solution to the Palestinian problem were put forward. Arab authors did little more in this respect than to describe the tragedy of defeat and its legacy of bitterness, chaos and further retreats. The rout of 1967 and the occupation by Israel of further Arab territory was a rude awakening that gave birth to a revolutionary consciousness among the Palestinians in particular. As the idea of a political settlement became discredited, the Palestine Liberation Organization stepped in to fill the leadership vacuum.

     We shall examine below some of the views put forward by Jewish and Israeli intellectuals concerning the viability of the binational idea in the wake of the wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973, up to the present.

 

2. The Fate of the Ichud (Union) after the Partition Resolution:

 

     With the death of Kalvaryski and Magnes, the two most prominent advocates of a binational state, in 1948, the influence of the Ichud began to dissipate. The remaining supporters of the binational idea, particularly members of the Ichud, had no choice but to accept facts and to pursue their work within the state of Israel in defense of Arab rights, whether pertaining to the minority that remained in what became Israel, or the refugees that fled to surrounding countries.

     In 1950 Rabi Benjamin [?] reactivated the Ichud, and began publishing The Candle as its organ. It continued to be published after his death in 1958, until 1964, when it stooped appearing. Some intellectuals remained members of the Ichud, and its objective became transformed after the sixties into a quest for mutual understanding and a peace settlement between Israel and the Arab states as well as the defense of the rights of the Arab minority in Israel.[1]

 

3. Buber's Views on a Binational State in Palestine after 1948:

 

     After the birth of the state of Israel in 1948, Martin Buber continued his pioneering role in advocating the establishment of a binational state in Palestine. This is not surprising as Buber had a firm position which rested on two pillars: one political and the other philosophical. At the political level, Buber was convinced that Zionism would find a path to real peace and justice for the Arabs of Palestine. At the philosophical level, Buber's idealism was in the same vein as the ethical idealism of the neo-Kantians; he believed that peace was possible because it was a categorical imperative.[2] The conciliatory solution which Buber propagated in his books and lectures had an effect at the Jewish and the international levels, which lingered for several years after the establishment of the state of Israel. In his essay "The Binational Approach to Zionism," published in 1947, Buber wrote:

 

           We describe our program as that of a bi-national state -- that is, we aim at a social structure based on the reality of two peoples living together. The foundations of this structure cannot be the traditional ones of majority and minority, but must be different. We do not mean just any bi-national state, but this particular one, with its particular conditions, i.e., a bi-national state which embodies in its basic principles a Magna Carta Reservatorium, the indispensable postulate of the rescue of the Jewish people. This is what we need and not a "Jewish state"... [3]

 

     In a meeting between David Ben Gurion and Israel's most prominent authors, poets and academicians, shortly after the latter had been installed as Israel's first prime minister in March 1949, Buber said in reply to Ben Gurion's opening remarks:

 

     States generally act according to what is known as "raison d'etat" whenever they must do something or solve a problem. They choose the path in which the good of the state seems to lie at that moment, no less and no more...

           One could well ask what can be done beyond "raison d'etat."...

     .......

     ...it is just those "unnecessary" acts, acts with no apparent "explanation," that serve the good of the state, the true good of the nation and of all nations.

           For example, take the question of the Arab refugees. The possibility existed for the government, and perhaps it still does now, of doing a great moral act, which could bring about the moral awakening of the public... The government could have taken the initiative of calling an international, interfaith congress, with the cooperation of our people and the neighboring peoples -- a congress which would have been unprecedented. I do not speak of concessions of one sort or another. The main point is that something be done on our own initiative. Were we not refugees in the diaspora? [4]

 

     Buber's emphasis on reconciliation with the Arabs through compromise gave rise to what came to be known as the 'Buberian personality', characterized by the conviction that Judaism embodies high moral values; that an injustice had been done to the Arabs; and that Israel should reexamine its actions from a moral perspective. This trend within Zionism is characteristic of the pristine traditional Israeli political line elites [5]

     What distinguishes Buber from other Zionist thinkers is his conviction that the so-called Arab question in Palestine was "an innermost Jewish question."[6] The fact was that Palestine, which the Jews regarded as their ancestral home, was the home of a Palestinian Arab people who had inhabited the land for centuries, and who had their own national aspirations. He fully believed the verse from Isaiah: "Zion shall be redeemed in Justice."

 

     Instead of economic cooperation with the Arabs, we have an economy in which the Arabs are unemployed. We have just missed a great opportunity, and perhaps we have lost even more, something basic, which our economy will yet feel. There is nothing sillier than to be overjoyed because the Arab population has left. One day we will realize that the fellah is the caryatid that holds up the edifice of Eretz Israel.[7]

 

 

     In the Spring of 1949, Buber addressed a meeting of the Ichud on the topic of "Should the Ichud Accept the Decree of History?" He was grappling with the question of whether the creation of the state of Israel meant the defeat of the binational idea. He pointed out that the claim that Ichud's brand of Zionism had failed is based on a misconception. There was a misunderstanding of what actually had been achieved.  The true ideal of Zionism is not satisfied simply by bringing masses of Jews to Palestine, nor was it satisfied through the attainment of independence, he said. The true ideal of Zionism, he believed, was national rehabilitation and regeneration.

 

     the cry of victory does not have the power of preventing the clear-eyed from seeing that the soul of the Zionist enterprise has evaporated. We stand at the threshold of the most bitter recognition of all.

           We are told that the goal has been reached. Yes, a goal has been reached, but it is not called Zion. Not for that goal did Israel, yearning for Redemption, set its path. What sober and honest man, looking about himself in today's reality, could say that we are engaged in a process of regeneration?[8]

 

     Buber refused to acknowledge that the cause of Ichud had been defeated, he stressed that it remained a valid cause: to bring about Jewish-Arab fraternal cooperation.

 

           No, I wouldn't say that all this adds up to the defeat of our cause. Our cause has lost its footing, its face has been sullied, but it has not been overcome. It would be overcome if the goal of Zionism had been achieved by taking the direction that has been taken. This was not achieved, and by taking that path, it cannot be achieved.[9]

 

     Buber added that the Ichud would have to persevere in the struggle for cooperation between the Jewish and Arab nations, modifying its program in the light of the new reality.[10]

     In addition to his many lectures, Buber wrote a number of essays and articles, stressing his ethical position vis-a-vis the state and his condemnation of turning the Palestinian Arabs into refugees. He demanded that [a certain number of Palestinian refugees in the Arab countries]  be allowed to return to their homeland [and that the others be resettled in Arab host countries in cooperation with the Arab states and the United Nations]. He criticized the oppression of those Arabs who remained in Palestine by the Israeli government, and urged that rehabilitation programs be undertaken to make them productive members of society. These articles include: "A Fundamental Error Which Must Be Corrected" (April 1948); "Zionism and 'Zionism'" (May 1948); "On the Assassination of Count Bernadotte" (September 1948); "Let Us Make an End of Falsities" (October 1948); "A Protest Against Expropriation of Arab Lands" (March 1953); "We Need the Arabs, They Need Us" (January 1954); "Letter to Ben-Gurion on the Arab Refugees" (October 1961); "We must Grant the Arabs Truly Equal Rights" (January 1962); and an exchange between Buber and Levi Eshkol: "On the Development of the Galilee" (October 1964).

     After Buber's death in 1965, Jewish voices raised in Israel in criticism of the actions or inactions of the Israeli authorities grew faint, nor did they have the moral authority that Buber had, both locally and internationally.

 

4. The Resurrection of the Binational Concept after the 1967 War:

 

     The Arabs were defeated in the 1967 war. Israel, although victorious in the war, faced a major practical challenge in maintaining administrative control and an army of occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The demographic and political consequences of the war became the focus of attention of Israeli authors and researchers and international observers. In view of the difficulties the new situation presented, the idea of a binational state in Palestine was resurrected, as applied to Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

     One of the outstanding studies conducted after the 1967 war was the dissertation written by the Israeli scholar Susan Lee Hattis at the University of Geneva in 1970. In the introduction to her published dissertation, Hattis remarked that the 1967 war had prompted her to study the topic of a binational state.[11]

     In view of the dense Arab population of the occupied territories, Israel hesitated to annex the areas. The reawakened interest in the binational idea, and in the thought of Arthur Ruppin, who symbolized binationalism. In September 1968, Moshe Dayan, who was serving as defense minister, seized the occasion of the publication of Ruppin's memoirs to comment on the binational idea in a lecture before the General Staff College. Dayan's lecture amounted to a rebuttal of the binational idea. He compared Israel's situation after the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza with the state of affairs when Ruppin wrote his memoirs. Dayan made five main points:

1. The elements of the equation in what used to be Palestine had changed,

2. Consequently, demographic rations had changed. Ruppin viewed the Arabs as the inhabitants of Palestine, whereas the Israelis regard them as inhabitants of the Arab countries,

3. Ruppin believed that creating a fait accompli [?] would decrease tensions between Arabs and Jews, but the Jews had become the majority and a regional power. This did not decrease tensions, it increased them. Dayan explained that [what did he explain?] by saying that Ruppin was being rational while the Arabs were emotional. [Point no. 3 is totally confusing.]

4. The deal that the Arabs are offering does not satisfy Israel's needs in 1967 as it might have in the thirties. the Arabs are demanding the implementation of the 1947 partition plan; but it is too late for that.

5. Dayan concluded that war with the Arabs, with its attendant loss of Israeli lives, was inevitable if Israel wanted to implement their agenda in spite of the Arabs.[12] Israel Galilee, who was minister of information at the time, made a statement to the effect that the Palestinians did not constitute an ethnic group or a national community. Golda Meir, who was prime minister, said there was no such thing as Palestinians or a Palestinian people.[13]

     In contrast to this, Don Peters [?] and a number of other authors, adopted a less negative approach. Peters explored the possibilities for a binational solution according to which self government would be applied to the united city of Jerusalem at first and then extended to the other areas.[14]

 

5. The Position of Mapam on the Binational Idea after 1967:

 

     The position of Mapam, the United Socialist Party, regarding the binational idea was characterized by reluctance to extend the position it had adopted in 1948 to the different demographic and political realities of the territories occupied in 1967. The leaders of Mapam and party intellectuals adopted middle of the road solutions which tried to reconcile between Mapam's ideas on binationalism, the right of Palestinians to self-determination, and recognition of the peculiarities of local Palestinian society.

     Among the contributions of Mapam's leaders in Modern Times, [1] Maeyer Yari[15] [Ya'ari?] described Mapam's vision of a solution as dividing the entire territory of Palestine between two states, and demanding full equality in civil and cultural rights for the Arab minority in Israel. Yari believed that cooperation with Jordan was the starting point for securing peace and cooperation between Israel and other states in the region.[16] Another Mapam intellectual, Moshe Amitai [?], also expressed the view in Modern Times that Palestinian Arabs should exercise the right of self-determination in their places of residence: the Arab minority in Israel, Palestinian refugees in the neighboring countries, and residents of the West Bank [in the West Bank].[17] Dov Barner[18] proposed the establishment of a Jewish-Arab confederation and the settlement of Palestinian refugees in the neighboring Arab countries.[19] Mordechai Bentoff [?], a former cabinet minister, wrote an article entitled "The Palestinians, Israel and the Left" in which he proposed a final settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute by establishing two states, a Palestinian state and a Jewish state, on the territory of what he terms the 'historic homeland', which includes the territory from the Iraqi border to the Mediterranean Sea. Bentoff was of the opinion that each of the Arab and Jewish peoples had the right to establish an independent state as an expression of self-determination. Absorption of Jews would take place in the Jewish state, and Palestinian refugees would be absorbed into the Palestinian state.[20]

     The views expressed by Mapam leaders and party intellectuals were indicative of the party's coming to terms with the new circumstances in the wake of the Israeli occupation, while retaining [modified] positions which had been characteristic of Mapam since before 1948. Articles which appeared in Mapam publications, such as Al Ha-Mishmar and New Outlook, showed a concern for the Arabs in Israel and in the occupied territories as well as for Palestinian refugees in neighboring countries, in addition to the possibility of applying a binational formula or dual nationality, all of which feature in Mapam literature, in contrast to other Israeli parties.  Although for Mapam these concerns must cede priority to Zionist principles and self-determination for the Jews, as well as maintaining numerical and qualitative superiority for the Jews in the so-called historic homeland, from time to time the idea of a binational state gets an airing. The analysis by Mapam authors ends up with a pessimistic assessment of the prospects for realizing the idea of a binational state as it had been proposed before 1948.  In an article published in New Outlook in September 1972, Samuel Yari [?] concluded that future relations between Arabs and Israel would be defined by the state of the future [?], perhaps a federation which will represent an evolution for that emergent state and its achievements.[21][?]

In another article, published in a supplement to Al Ha-Mishmar [date?] under the title "A Binational House," Avishlom Ginat [?] discusses a conflict that arose between Jewish immigrants and the Arab minority in Galilee. The author casts doubt on the success of government efforts to attract settlers to Upper Galilee by building a new city for them in Upper Nazareth, which was to serve as a center for the Judaification of the Galilee. In fact, the project had solved a housing problem from which the Arabs of Nazareth had been suffering. The Arab inhabitants found that the abundance of apartments in Upper Nazareth was a way of defusing the pressure of the housing crisis in their city. The author pointed out that the Arabs' moving into apartments meant for Jewish settlers has given rise to fears and anxieties about the future on the part of the settlers. This situation was like a simmering volcano of ethnic fears and hatreds between the Arabs and Jews, she said.[22]

 

 

 

6. Leftist, non-Zionist Views of the Arab  Presence in Palestine after June 1967:

 

     Discussion of a binational state for Arabs and Jews no longer enjoys the significance it did before 1948. The Communist Party of Israel showed concern for the Arab minority in Israel and benefited from the hospitable atmosphere this created among the ranks of that minority. It demanded the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people and the right of Palestinian refugees in the Arab countries to return to their land.

     The perspective of the Communist Party of Israel is that the Palestinians should not be made to pay for the wars which Arab states waged on their behalf against Israel, and that a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem should constitute an integral part of any solution to the Palestinian problem. Such a solution should be based on reciprocal recognition of the national rights of each of the two peoples, and on the right of the refugees to return or to receive compensation, and their right to self-determination.[23]

     Among the non-Zionist leftist organizations which were established in Israel after June 1967 are the Socialist Organization of Israel (Matzpen). Matzpen's program called for abrogating all laws that grant Jews concessions at the expense of the Arabs, including the law of return [?], and granting the Palestinians the right to live in Israel, or to receive compensation instead if they so chose. It also calls for breaking the ties linking Israel to American imperialism. Matzpen referred to laws that discriminate against Arabs and Israel's links to imperialism as a dual contradiction.[24]

     Non-Zionist leftist Israelis tend to rely on the standard of international legitimacy. They stress the political consequences of the solutions adopted by the Israeli authorities, the continuation of the Israeli occupation, and Israel's discrimination against Palestinians both inside Israel and in the occupied territories.

    

7. Diverse Perspectives on the Binational Idea:

 

     When a number of Israeli authors discussed the concept of a binational state, particularly in the wake of the 1967 and 1973 wars, they were troubled by the specter of the demographic issue, not only in the occupied territories but inside Israel as well. Most simply ruled out the binational idea. Michael Walker, who wrote an article on the applicability of binationalism to Israel, after tracing the history of the concept, concluded that both Arabs and Israelis would experience difficulties if the idea were to be implemented. Among the most important difficulties Israel would face, according to Walker, would be the abrogation of the law of return, in view of the moral responsibility Israel bears to the Jews of the Diaspora. Walker points out that the Palestinians would bear no comparable moral responsibility to other Arabs in such a state. Walker concludes that a national state, rather than a binational state, is the only viable solution under current international circumstances.[25]

     Another Israeli scholar, Ellie Rikhase [could it be Eli?] argued that the binational idea was impossible to realize in practice due to the Arab-Israeli imbalance between a minority and a majority, which is the same reason that was operative in 1948 [but with the roles of the two communities reversed]. A political seminar was held in the city of Nazareth on March 14, 1986 and attended by Rikhase from the Shulwah Institute and the Palestinian poet Salem Jubran.  Rikhase argued that one had to acknowledge the fact that Israel was not a binational state, and the Arabs constituted only a minority. Jubran replied that "the Arabs cannot accept any solution that does not guarantee their right to remain in their homeland with equality and dignity. This is our homeland, and we have no other alternative."[26]

     Some analysts have been more flexible on the topic of the binational state. Irene Gendzier, in an article entitled "Palestine, Israel and Binationalism" traced the evolution of the binational concept, which largely worked to the advantage of the Zionist movement as it manipulated the idea to serve its ends [?] When the Jews constituted a minority in Palestine, they raised the slogans of equality and non-hegemony. But it is impossible to return to the pre-1948 situation. The reason for that is the crystallization of new forces [?] after the wars of 1967 and 1973. These forces have not contributed to finding a formula for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.

     Gendzier maintains that certain facts have to be taken into account in formulating principles for negotiations, foremost among which are that the Palestinians and the Israelis have a right to life, neither of which will relinquish this right at any price. She proposes that there be a reciprocal recognition of Palestinian and Israeli rights: that Israel recognize the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, because there is no way of getting around that,  and the Palestinians recognize the legitimacy of Israel as a state in the region. This recognition should emanate from the Palestinians and Israelis themselves, at a remove from foreign influences.[27]

    

8. A Binational State Emerges under Israeli Occupation:

 

     The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip took on an elementary from of a state in which two national communities coexist. This was embodied in a set of political, econmic and social attitudes and institutions which establishe the principle of discriminatory treatment of the two national groups.  The Jewish community exercised hogemony over the Palestinian community; as an occupying power, it enjoyed privileges across the spectrum of demographic activities. This situation, which lasted a quarter of a century, gave rise to a series of questions and answers which evoked the the interests of scholars and researchers.

     In 1989 a book was published in the United States with the title The Emergence of a Binational Israel: The Second Republic in The Making edited by Ofira Seliktar and Ian Bialik. [28] Seliktar and Bialik contributed two chapters, the other nine chapters were written by ten Israeli and American scholars. The book examines the various aspects of the formation of binationalism in Israel as an unintended and chance occurrence following the Likud's coming to power.

     Seliktar focuses on the theoretical dimension of  binationalism; she inqurieswhether binationalism is a de factor political reality or a jure state of affaris. She replies that the de jure political reality will occur as the culmination of a long-tirm process in which a uni-national state is transformed into a multinational state.  In this sense, Scliktar beleives that Israel has been a binational state since 1968.  The fact that over one million Palestinians inhabit the territories occupied since 1967 contains within it the psychological ingredients for binationalism. Seliktar also believes that although it is not clear what shape rights will take in such a state, it can be presupposed that such rights will be embodied within the framework of self-rule. The Camp David agreements contain certain references and signposts pointing to permanent self-rule which could lead to arrangements for a binational state. In this context, there is need for an agreement or legal charter that draws a distinction between full independence and self-rule or self-government. The inhabitants of the territories may be granted the political freedom to choose the legal procedures that are most consistent with their final status. Seliktar concludes with projections concerning what may happen in the twenty first century.  She argues that any extraordinary departure from the unusual pluralist binational model, such as the annexation of the territories or the expulsion of the Palestinians and the creation of a uni-national state will lead to violence.[29]

     Seliktar in her precise conclusions, puts her finger on what may be the most important indicator of future relations between the Jewish and Arab communities. She identifies the pitfalls surrounding the state of Israel: the cycle of violence will escalate if Israel persists in its attempts to achieve its expansionist ideological aims.

      The focus of the stud is to compare the concept of a binational state as it was understood prior to the establishment of the state of Israel with the binational idea today. This comparison is of contral importance in answring some of the questions that are relevant today.  The Israeli scholar Susan Hattis Rolef, compares the concept of a binational state in Palestine under the Mandate with its status at present from the perspective of a personal evaluation, as she puts it.  She points out that under the Mandate, a binational state was a viable option, and she asks if that option is still available. In evaluating the latter possibility, she points out that the harsh measures adopted by Israel to quell the intifadah which broke out in 1987 have exacerbated hatred and resentment between the Arab and Jewish communities, which has made cooperation on a footing of equality unlikely.  Hattis adds that on the face of it, one would expect the demand for the application of the binational concept to come from the weaker side, which happens to be the Palestinian community, since a binational solution is preferable to ending up with nothing.  Hattis concludes, however, that despite such expectations, the Palestinians are deeply attached to self-determination and have bargaining power through the PLO.[30] In her opinion, the binational solution will not be on the agenda of negotiations since neither side is keen on the idea, much as was the case before 1948.

     In her re-examination of the binational concept, Lilly Weissbrod contrasts continuity and change in the binational idea. She points out that the Camp David agreements had made the Egyptian-Israeli agreement independent of the plan for autonomy, which amounts to little more than allowing the Palestinian Arab population to run its own civil affairs. Weissbrod remarks that the new generation of Zionists is vacillating between adherence to fundamentalism and the binational solution as a fait accompli.[31]

     The focus on tracking developments from the Israeli perspective Ideas to the exploration of certian dimensions of Israeli policies and the neglect of others. The explorations of the binational idea from the Israeli perspective gives the analyst only one side of the picture.  The problem with this is that it creates the illusion that ther is a realistic measure of binationalism in Israel, which is burried under the facade of the state and not openly acknowledged.

     The contributors to the book include Shlomo Aronson, who is of the opinion that the political system in Israel has led to the impasse; this in turn is responsible -- by accident, not design -- for the emergence of a binational Israel.[32] Ian Lustik analyses Israeli policies towards the Arabs. He maintains that ideologically and in the legal sense, Israel may be a Jewish state. However, empirically, it may be more accurate to view Israel to a certain extent as a binational (rather than a multinational) state [?] The continued absorption of the West Bank and Gaza Strip into Israel will speed up the onset of the transitional phase leading to a binational state. Both Arabs and Jews will watch the development of relations between Arabs and Jews within Israel Proper (i.e. within the 1948 borders of the state) very closely.[33] 

     Although public opinion may serve as an indication of social trends at a particular time, it also changes with time.  Tracking public opinion over the long term demostrates the importance of taking into consideration all trends amog the parties. 

     Michael Inbar and Ephram Yuchtman-yaar conducted a sample survay of Israelis and Arabs both inside Israel proper and in the occupied territories. Their main findings were:

1. Israeli Arabs and Arabs in the occupied territories have the same image of what constitutes a desirable and acceptable solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict;

2. The Arabs draw a distinction between ideal solutions based on ideologically motivated expectations and the goals that are attinable in practice as a result of participation in political power.  Israeli Arabs are better than Israeli Jews at differentiating between ideal expectations and practical goals.

3. Religious sentiment is the dominant trend among radical Israeli Arabs, whereas religious trends among Palestinian Arabs in the occupied territories are tied to traditional concepts.  Religion remains an important factor in the radical solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.[34]

     The above mentioned study compares trends among Arabs and Israelis, dealing with the concerns of both parties to the conflicts.  This positive aspect is not to be found in the articales by the other contributors.

     The economy is of central importance to a binational state, nevertheless, concern with the economy of the occupied territories has taken second place to concern with the Israeli economy.  What may have been thought of as a binational economy under the Likud governments is a form of dependent economy that is subservient to the will of the Israeli occupation authorities. 

     Simcha Bahiri maintains that each of the national groups in a binational state has a relatively independent economy, but that the two economies are complementary. In his treatment of the de facto binational society in Israel and the occupied territories, he points out that there is an imbalance between the developed Israeli economy and the underdeveloped economy of the occupied territories. He remarks that the character of the binational economy is based on several factors: the state of affairs that existed before 1948, when a dual Arab and Jewish economy existed under the Mandate; the growth of independent economies in each of Israel and the West Bank and Gaza during 1948-67; and the economic complementarity which developed gradually between Israel and the occupied territories under the Likud government. Bahiri compares the benefits which Israel derives from the occupied territories, namely water resources and cheap materials, to the benefit which the occupied territories derive from the relationship, which is income from labor [by Palestinians from the occupied territories working in Israel.] He argues that the benefits to Israel from this arrangement are not of major significance, considering that the benefit to Israel of disengaging its economy from those of the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be greater still. The gains that would accrue to Israel from a complementary economy throughout "greater Israel" are much smaller than would be the case if it kept the economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip separate from its own; these gains are also much smaller than the benefits to Israel of regional economic cooperation with the Arab countries.[35]

     A considration of the temporary political balance within Israeli and regardless of the different perspectives brought to beae on the study of the state in Israel, any in depth study will lead to the conclusion that there are clear dangers.  The assumption that Israel is already a de facto binational state does not ease those dangers.

     The last contibution , by Ian Bialik, concerns the future of a binational Israel. Bialik is of the opinion that the Camp David agreements represented a turning point in the nature of the conflict, but that the intifadah had placeT d the Israeli dream in great jeopardy. He also believes that the "Palestinization" of Israeli Arabs poses a serious threat to Israel in its capacity as a democratic and an organized Jewish society. Bialik avoids the ticklish problem of defining what constitutes a binational Israel by affirming that Israel is a de facto binational state  and that binationalism is the dominant political situation. The presence of a large Arab demographic minority is a distinctive ethnic feature which does not necessarily qualify Israel and the occupied territories for the de jure title of a binational state. The dilemma here resides in two aspects of the situation: one consideration is that a true binational arrangement presupposes an increase in the proportion of the Arab minority and a decrease in the proportion of the Jewish majority; another consideration is that power is unevenly distributed between Arabs and Jews. This unjust distribution of power entails a discrepancy between the legal status of each of the two communities on the one hand and the demographic reality on the other. Participation in government was not an issue following the establishment of Israel as an organized Jewish society after 1948 or even 1967, but it is an issue today. The Arab minority in Israel was not large enough to have much weight. The question of participation in the responsibilities of government has changed radically in the last two decades -- the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip had the legal and actual status of a population under occupation after 1967. Bialik reiterates that the intifadah is the challenge which Israel faces from within as an organized society in Palestine, whereas the threat in 1948 and 1967 came from without, and was not as serious a challenge as the intifadah. This is a crucial point: in 1987 the threat arose from within Israel and the occupied territories. The intifadah is a form of violent struggle between two groups living within the same political entity. Bialik believes that the situation in the occupied territories is most likely to resemble the pattern in Northern Ireland ; i.e., a situation in which violence will be countered with violence in the course of the struggle between the two communities. He expects Arab Israelis to demonstrate greater solidarity, particularly in the elections, driven by a Palestinian consciousness which has been awakened by the intifadah.[36]

     The assumption is that Israel constitutes a de facto binational state under the hogomony of one national group.  This assumption is refuted by the dangers identifieed by Bialik.  It is important to take into considration the following points: the rate at which the Arab population is increasing, the need to give the Arabs a share in power, and that the vicious cycle of countering violence with violence is understanding Israel as a state and a society.

 

9. Palestinian Views on a Binational State in Palestine:

 

     Arab politicians and scholars never embarked on a serious debate on a binational state in Palestine either before or after 1948. One finds scattered references here and there to the idea over the years, but none of them proposed a serious plan of implementation, even as one option or scenario among others.

     However, there are one or two exceptions worth considering. Sari Nusseibeh, [is one of the new generation of Palestinian leaders, a member of a notable Jerusalem family, holds a Ph.D. in Islamic philosophy from Harvard, and has taught at Hebrew and Birzeit universities. He believes in coexistence with Israel, and has helped establish technical committees to prepare for the day when Palestinians may be able to replace the Israeli administration in the occupied territories]. Nusseibeh spoke to an Israeli newspaper in 1987 about implementing the concept of a binational state grouping Israelis and Palestinians. He entertained a scenario in which Israel would refuse to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories, and the Palestinians would be forced to demand that Israel annex the occupied territories. Such an annexation would place the Palestinians under an apartheid system. The Palestinians would have to struggle to gain equal rights with Jewish citizens of the Israeli state. By the year 2020 Nusseibeh expects that the Arabs living in the territory of former Palestine would constitute a majority of the population west of the Jordan river. This will enable them to gain control of the Knesset and other governmental institutions, and they will have the power to pass a law allowing Palestinian refugees who wish to return to their homes to do so. At that stage, Palestine-Israel would be transformed into a binational state in the full sense of the term.[37]

     In 1988, Yasser Arafat, the chairman of Executive Committee of the PLO, announced that he was prepared to discuss the idea of a confederation with Israel, on condition that the Palestinians first be allowed to establish their own independent and sovereign state.[38]

 

     Another Palestinian view of various aspects of binationalism was offered by Muhammad Rabi' in a book entitled The New World Order, published in 1992. He devotes one chapter to his idea of a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which he deals with the political, economic and security measures that are necessary for a settlement as he sees it. At the political level, he proposes dividing the territory within the former borders of Palestine into two states: one Palestinian and the other Israeli. Geographic Palestine as a whole would constitute a homeland for both peoples in the sense of having a unified economy and being a common place of residence; in this sense, a binational state would come about.  The author is eager to allow both peoples to satisfy their national aspirations. The Israelis would realize their aspirations and exercise their freedom of political choice in their state, but they will enjoy economic rights and the right to reside in all of the territory of geographic Palestine. The same would apply to the Palestinians. Rabi' also believes that despite this freedom to reside where one wants, restrictions may be placed on this right so as always to maintain a Jewish majority in the Jewish state an Arab majority in the Palestinian state. In this way, both peoples may realize their national aspirations over all the territory of Palestine. Keeping Jerusalem united will symbolize the building of bridges of trust and security between the two peoples, the author maintains; he therefore suggests that Jerusalem be the capital of both states. The borders of 1967 will serve as the line of demarcation between the two states, as far as the expression of political rights is concerned. However, the municipal council of Jerusalem, which will be responsible for non-political matters, will be elected by both Arabs and Jews. Jerusalem will thus become the symbol of the participation of both peoples in one nation. Rabi' shows concern for the political and security measures which must precede putting his ideas to the test in a practical fashion. He also emphasizes the benefits that will accrue to both sides from the realization of this objective.[39]

 

Conclusions:

 

     Once Israel became an established fact in 1948, interest waned in a binational state in Palestine. Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 served to resuscitate the idea; the difference being that [the Arabs] had to concede the need to guarantee the security of Israel and not to tamper with the Jewish majority within Israel. During this period [since 48 ?] the basic position of Israeli political parties and groups regarding binationalism underwent a change, particularly in the case of those groups which had made the realization of a binational state their priority. Putting aside the remnants of the Ichud and Buber himself, we find that the other groups tended to avoid a resubmission of the idea. Studies conducted after 1967 made no secret of assigning priority to safeguarding the Jewish character of the state and maintaining a certain ethnic balance.

     After the establishment of Israel in 1948, several trends emerged among the advocates of binationalism in Palestine, but in general the tide turned against binationalism, and binationalist groups ceased to have any significant impact. On the contrary, a trend of intolerance towards the idea emerged in Israel, giving priority to the tenets of a Jewish state instead. But following Israel's occupation of the remaining Palestinian territories in 1967, the idea was re-examined in the light of the new situation in a number of studies, all of which were pessimistic, however, regarding the possibility of implementing a binational solution.

     As Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip became prolonged, a trend emerged in Israel which advocated a solution based on the annexation of the occupied territories while safeguarding the Jewish character of the state and the Jewish demographic majority. This trend became quite powerful when the Likud came to power in 1977. The idea was to absorb the occupied territories into Israel gradually, and to turn the occupation into a permanent reality by speeding up the construction of Jewish settlements and the displacement of the Palestinian population of the occupied territories.

     The intifadah, which broke out in 1987, posed a threat from within and challenged the existing notion of Israel's stability and it put in question Israel's ability to blame the threat to its security and stability on external forces. As the intifadah escalated, political, social and security concerns grew to the extent that they brought Israel to the brink of a precipice. When attempts were made to analyze the situation in Israel and the occupied territories in the light of these factors, the binationalist solution was resuscitated in the form of a "binational Israel."

     Based on the de facto situation, this analysis led to the conclusion that the two national communities, Israel and the Palestinians, constitute a form of binationalism within the borders of the territory of Palestine as defined under the British Mandate. This lent some legitimacy to the idea of annexing the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, this form of analysis raises a number of important questions.

     Probably such studies will awaken Israeli political leaders to the probably that some day a single state will be established within which the Palestinians will constitute a distinct national    group. The Declarations of Principles signed by the PLO and the government of Israel in part constitutes an indirect attempt to forestall the escalation of social and demographic conditions which could constitute a threat to the ideological and juridical coherence of the state of Israel. A binational state in Palestine remains a feasible option in the long run, despite all the pretexts and justifications put forward to delay its realization. The success of South Africa in transcending apartheid and transforming itself into a form of multinational state is a shining example and cause for hope in the long run.

 

                                  

                                Notes