Part III

                                  The Historical Record

 

                         CHAPTER Four

 

          The Idea of a Binational State in Palestine

1                    between 1925 and 1948

 

1. Introduction:

 

     During the Mandate period, the concept of a binational state in Palestine was the expression of a Zionist policy towards the Arab population of Palestine. There was no single coherent policy throughout concerning a binational state; the idea was advocated by various trends in Zionist thought, but only cultural Zionists remained committed to it. Although the idea of a binational state arose among the Jewish community in Palestine on an unrealistic basis, it neverhtless most probably helped define Arab-Jewish relations. Zionist approaches to this issue may be classified into five types:

 

1. The cultural Zionist approach. This is represented by the viewpoint that the conflict between Arabs and Jews was a conflict between two people, each of which had national rights in an undivided [unpartitioned?] Palestine. The solution lay in neither people extending its hegemony over the other. Arms ought not to be used by side against the other. This was the approach of Jewish liberals who advocated human rights, and Jewish academicians in Palestine. Neither group enjoyed wide-spread popularity among the Yishuv.

    

2. The approach of the Zionist socialists. The Zionist socialists felt that a binational state should join Arabs and Jews in a socialist state on both banks of the Jordan.

 

3. The approach of Arab Jews. Arab Jews who had lived for a long time in an Arab milieu, shared in Arab customs and spoke Arabic fluently, were in favor of good and cooperative relations with the other Arabs.

 

4. The pragmatic Zionist approach. This was the position of those Zionists who were pessimistic about the possibility of establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine, and who believed that a binational state in Palestine was the best possible alternative in the foreseable future.

 

5. The tactical Zionist approach. Some Zionists put forward the idea of a binational state as a tactical measure, confident that the Arabs would reject it.[1]

 

     We will explore the concept of a binational or multinational state below and review of the history of proposals that were submitted and the organizations that were formed by different groups in order to bring about a binational state in Palestine in the period from 1925 until the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.

 

2.The Background of the Concept of a Binational or Multinational    State:

 

     When Jewish immigrants ran up against what came to be called "the Arab problem" in Palestine, some of them resorted to Western solutions to the nationalist problem in European societies. Their objective was to find a justification for the existence of a Jewish immigrant community alongside the Arabs in Palestine that was consistent with the Zionist idea. There have been many European experiments in binationalism or multinationalism, the foremost of which is the case of Switzerland, which represents the paradigm case of a successful and balanced solution to the problem of several different national groups living within a single country. The Swiss are divided by language : there are four official languages; seventy per cent speak German, just under twenty per cent speak French, ten per cent Italian, and about one per cent speak Romansch. They are also divided by religion into Roman Catholics and Protestants. Switzerland represents a federal solution to the problem of multinationality; the country is divided into self-governing cantons, and the consitution guarantees the right of any canton to withdraw from the federation.

     The kingdom of Belgium is another prominent example of a multiethnic and multilinguistic nation where a binational solution proved to be the logical solution. The population of Belgium is divided into two groups, the Flemish and the Walloons. The Flemish language belongs to the Low German branch of Germanic languages and is rather similar to Dutch, Walloon is a dialect of French. Both tongues are considered official languages in Brussels. Belgium is a constitutional monarchy which is administratively and functionally divided into provinces so as to resolve the linguistic problem. Belgian political parties have adapted to these divisions, and have branches for Walloons, Flemish and people from Brussels[2]

 

     The reform movement within the Ottoman Empire spearheaded by the Young Turks was one of the factors which  influenced Zionist thinkers to demand equality for the Jews, in their capacity as Ottoman citizens, with other national groups and sects in the Ottoman Empire. The justification of equality was the common tie of being nationals of the empire, so that everyone had to be treated as citizens first and foremmost, not as members of sects or ethnic groups within the empire.[3]

     The previous examples provided the background for a number of Zionist politicians and thinkers seeking to come to terms with the Arab presence in Palestine. Despite the fact that the nationality issue had been settled peacefully and through consent in Switzerland and Belgium, most Zionist thinkers were not serious about modeling their ideas on those examples; they had trepidations about coexistence with the Arabs in the framework of a binational state, because they were aware that the Jews constituted a minority and there were cultural, linguistic and social discrepancies among them besides, whereas the Arabs appeared to be better off: they constituted the majority, and were culturally and linguistically more cohesive than the Jews, not to mention their enduring attachment to the land.

     The position of the Zionists appears rather strange. If they did not want a binational state in Palestine, why did they propose the idea to begin with? The positions embraced by most Zionists made it clear that the purpose behind their proposals for a binational state was to test the waters or to hedge their bets in case it proved impossible to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine. In addition, they sought moral justification before that segment of world public opinion which was aware that Palestine had an Arab population. That is not to deny, however, that a minority of liberal Zionists were sincere and serious in the quest for a balanced and peaceful solution in the form of a binational state.

 

3. Democracy in a Binational State: Between the Majoritarian and Consensus Models:

 

     A binational state is a system of government in which two national groups are the primary components of the state. Two peoples share the same faith in the pillars of the state. The two groups share in the administration of state institutions as a basic principle of government. The share of each group in government need not be proportional to its demographic ratio in the general population, but is based on good will and tolerance, a basic principle of the system. Each national group retains its separate identity, its own language, national culture and religious heritage, yet both groups owe allegiance to the state. In such a system of goverment, language, culture and religion enjoy a special status.

     The mere fact that there are two national groups in one state does not necessarily mean that the state is a binational or multinational one; it may be a democratic state, for instance, in which the majority rules and the minority is protected by guarantees of minority rights; or the system of government may be a form of apartied, and one of the national or ethnic or linguistic groups may be discriminated against, and society might actually be segregated.[4]

     The difficulty in forming a binational state lies in choosing a regime with the consent of the two national groups. If this regime manages to avoid the tyranny of the majority and its control over the minority, it can be said that democracy has done its job in that society. This result cannot be attained through good will alone, but must be based on principles such as the seperation of powers, a multi-party system, a written constitution and minority veto, executive power-sharing or grand coalitions, balanced bicameralism and minority representation, a multidimensional party system, proportional representation, territorial and nonterritorial federalism and decentralization.[5]

     No doubt a consensual model of democracy is more appropriate for a  binational state than a majoritarian model. In the spirit of consensus between the two national groups, both groups will have an opportunity to share in decision making  regardless of the relative size of each group. The majority will not be allowed to impose its will. A consensual model avoids the tyranny of the majority and makes it possible for the minority to participate in decision-making and to exercise a veto. Arend Lijphart has studied various forms of consensual and majoritarian democracy; he notes that the consensual model is in use in small countries with pluralist democratic systems, such as Belgium, Switzerland, Holland, etc, which he calls consociational democracies.[6]

     Susan Hattis Rolef lists characteristics and general observations concerning binational states. While she acknowledges that binational states constitute arrangements that are voluntarily entered into, and that neither national group will be in a position to exercise hegemony over the other, she believes that having one national group in the clear majority is a factor of stability. Counterexamples can be found to challenge this. She also  says that socio-economic disparities are a cause for instability. I believe she unduly emphasizes the element of stability resulting from the numerical superiority of one group. However, she is right in identifying economic and social disparities between the two groups as a destabilizing factor.

     Hattis observes that "Chauvinism and national liberation movements are the greatest enemies of bi- and multinational states".[7] She overemphasizes the potentially negative impact of the process of national liberation on the transition to binationalism. It appears that she may have been influenced by considerations relationg to Israel, the Palestinians and neighboring Arab countries. It is difficult to provide the proper atmosphere for a binational state in a sea of conflicts and contradictions

     These brief observations about binational states aquire special importance in differentiating between the ideas advocated by the so-called binationalist activists among the Jewish leaders and cultural Zionists. This explains the reservations entertained by leaders of the Jewish community concerning the implementation of a binational solution while the Jewish community was still a minority in Palestine.

     In the following sections we shall examine the proposals and organizations formed by advocates of a binational state in Palestine during 1925-48.

 

4. Brit Shalom ( the Covenant of Peace Society) faces challenges:

 

     The Covenant of Peace Society, or Brit Shalom in Hebrew, was founded in 1925, due to the efforts of two prominent personalities: the German-Jewish orientalist, Joseph Horowitz [8] and the sociologist Arthur Ruppin.[9] Ruppin mentions in his diary that on April 26, 1925 some Jewish intellectuals, including Horowitz, discussed the "Arab dilemma" in Palestine. Horowitz was of the opinion that Arabs and Jews had to work together.

     Three groups took shape within Brit Shalom. The first group was composed of pre-First World War immigrants to Palestine. This group directed the activities of the society from the time of its foundation until the 1929 disturbances, and was composed of academically trained World Zionists of East European origins, except for Ruppin, who was of German origin. The second group, which became active after the 1929 disturbances, consisted of Jewish intellectuals who had immigrated from central Europe, and had a liberal background, most notably Prof. Hugo Bergmann[10],

 Hans Kohn[11] and Robert Welsh[12] ,

  which is sometimes dubbed the "Prague Group." This group thought the solution lay in the direction of national revival instead of a merger. In addition, there were some German intellectuals such as Ernest Simon[13]. In addition there was a third group, consisting of advocates of a peaceful solution, and a number of British personalities who served during the mandate, although they did became official members of the society until 1929. The most prominent of these were Norman Bentwitch[14],  and Edwin Samuel.[15]

     Brit Shalom was criticized from its inception by other Zionist groups for allegedly being defeatist, but the society defended the idea of a binational state on the grounds that it reflected the status quo and was not as an ideology divorced from reality. The society maintained that if Zionism failed to appreciate the circumstances in which it found itself, it would fail, and that the Arabs were right to be fearful of a form of Zionism that sought to bring about a Jewish majority and a Jewish state. Brit Shalom felt that it was vital to recognize the rights of each of the two national groups in Palestine. It was not anti-British, although it regretted that Zionism depended on the good will of an imperialist power. At the same time, Brit Shalom asked the Zionist Organization to understand that the Jewish community in Palestine, or the Yishuv, was part of the East. Most members of the Prague Group were prepared to go as far as to accept the abrogation of the Balfour Declaration in return for an agreement with the Arabs. But Ruppin, Kalvarisky and some others were opposed to any such measure.

     It is clear from the positions adopted by Brit Shalom that it had no specific political affiliation, although liberalism was the dominant trend. Ahad Ha-'Am, Gordon and Buber had an influence on the thinking of members of the society's.[16]

 

5.   The Advocates of Binationalism shaken by violence in 1929:

 

     It was only natural that the 1929 disturbances should have an impact on the activities of Brit Shalom, as Arab-Jewish relations entered a crisis and the British authorities intervened openly on the side of the Zionist movement. There were clear differences among the positions of members of Brit Shalom regarding the disturbances; some adopted a firm position towards Zionism, as Arthur Ruppin,  while others took the opposite position, retaining their commitment to Zionism and giving up on the idea of reaching an understanding between Arabs and Jews. Hans Kohn was among those who forsook Zionism. On November 12, 1929 he wrote:

 

     "We have been in Palestine for twelve years [i.e., since the establishment of the British Mandate and Jewish National Home in Palestine] without having even once made a serious attempt at seeking through negotiations the consent of the indigenous people. We have relying  exclusively upon Great Britain's military  might. ... I believe that it will be posssible for us to hold Palestine and continue to grow for a long time. This will be done first with British aid and then later with the help of our own bayonets-shamefully called Haganah [i.e., defence]- clearly because we have no faith in our own policy. But by that time we will not be able to do without the bayonets. The means will have determined the goal. Jewish Palestine will no longer have anything of that Zion for which I once put myself on the line."[17]     

    

     Ruppin, on the other hand, adopted the opposite position, as he preferred to sacrifice the idea of a binational state in Palestine for the sake of Zionism. He expressed this position in a letter dated December 3, 1931 in which he said:

 

     "... The situation is paradoxial: what we can get (from the Arabs) is of no use to us, and what we need we cannot get from them. At most, the Arabs would agree to grant national rights to the Jews in an Arab state, on the pattern of the national rights in Eastern Europe.  But we know only too will from conditions in Eastern Europe how little a majority with executive powercan be moved to grant real and complete national equality to a minority. The fate of the Jewish minority in Palestine would always be depended upon the good-will of the Arab majority, which would steer the state."[18]

          

     Brit Shalom prepared several memoranda on the bloody events of 1929. [1]

  In 1933, Brit Shalom ceased to exist due to the shortage of funds and the dwindling away of its members.

 

6. The Jewish Agency discourages the activities of the Binationalists:

 

     Zionists had different attitudes towards Brit Shalom. Initially, Jewish attitudes were encouraging, and Weizmann contributed 100 pounds to the society in June 1927. Col. F.H. Kisch, the head of the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency, did not pay much attention to the society at the beginning, but he began to be irritated by its activities because he felt it was competing with him in his capacity as director of the Jewish Agency's political bureau. He felt it was monopolizing the sphere of Jewish-Arab relations.

     The attitude of leftist Hashomer Ha-Tza'ir (The Young Guard) was consistent with its commitment to the idea of a binational state, which it embraced between 1929 and 1948. Differences concerning the implementation of the idea related to the fact that Hashomer Ha`Tza'ir, which was Marxist, supported the establishment of a socialist binational state with a Jewish majority on both banks of the Jordan River. Maeyer Yari, leader of the "Regional Kibbutz"[2] at the time had this to say:

 

     Why doesn't one speak of a Jewish state? Because Marxism views the state as a transient stage only. We want a national majority, but we prefer to bargain with the two national groups which inhabit the country now and in the future.[19]

 

     Ha-Poyel Ha-Tza'ir (The Young Worker) was moderate in its attitude towards Brit Shalom because of the influence of Gordon's ideas. Many members of Ha-Poyel Ha-Tza'ir joined Brit Shalom, and those who did not join did not oppose the society. Among the members of Ha-Poyel Ha-Tza'ir who joined Brit Shalom were Dr. Ya'acov Thon[3], Cohen, Buber and Bergmann, and these were its most prominent members.

     The position of the British authorities regarding Brit Shalom was not clear, nor do sources indicate that there was a clear Arab position towards the society either. However, two Arab newspapers, Miraat ash-Sharq (Mirror of the East), and the English language Palestine published trnaslations of many articles by prominent menbers of Brit Shalom, such as Cohen and Bergmann. The dominant characteristic of what these two newspapers published concerning relations between Arabs and Jews was that they were relations between a majority and a minority, which flustered advocates of a binational state, who were demanding that relations should be established on a footing of equality. It is noteworthy that both newspapers were positively disposed towards the Jewish community and the British authorities. Advocates of a binational state could not find one solid Palestinian who was willing to accept their theses during the British mandate.[20]

 

7. Proposed Cantonal Arrengements for the State of Palestine:

 

     One of the ideas that was floated during the period in which Brit Shalom was active was the idea of dividing Palestine into provinces (cantons). Perhaps the most prominent individual to propose it at the time was Ittamar Ben-Avi[21] , who wrote several booklets on the subject of the division of Palestine according to the religion of the inhabitants: into Jewish, Christian and Islamic provinces. Ben-Avi began advocating the idea in 1920, and in 1929 he published two booklets, the first contained a proposal to set up self-governing provinces in Palestine, and the other, entitled Palestinianism, proposed joint nationality in a common country, in which Jews and Arabs would live under the protection of an enlightened power. In 1932, he wrote an article in the Doar Ha-Yom newspaper on a proposed constitution for Palestine on the Swiss model, based on the existence of three religious groups, i.e., dividing Palestine into cantons.

     On the Arab side, corresponding to Ben-Avi's proposal, there emerged the Ahmad Khalidi plan, which proposed the establishment of two provinces: a Jewish province lying within an area bordered by a line extending from Jaffa north to Haifa and on to Beisan, so that the Jewish areas would lie to the west of the Hijaz railway, and from Beisan to Tiberias and Hula. The Arab province would consist of the districts of Gaza, al-Majdel, Bi`r al-Sabe', Jerusalem, Haifa and Nablus. That left Nazereth, Jerusalem, Hebron, Bethlehem, Safad and Haifa outside the two provinces. Britain would serve as the link between the two provinces. Each province would have a legislative assembly.[4] The Labor Party (Mapai) rejected the Khalidi plan.[22]

     In this connection, some British officials put forward other plans for the division of Palestine into provinces, such as the Castle plan, named after the Nazareth district officer, and the plan put forward by the High Commissioner, Sir A. Wauchope, for dividing Palestine into three provinces: one Arab, another Jewish, and the third mixed, while leaving the cities of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Haifa outside this division. None of these plans was adopted, because of the differences between the two sides. [23]

 

8. Arab-Jewish Relations Take Precedence over the binational Idea: 

     The Eastwards to the Orient Association (Kedma Mizraha) Association was founded in 1936 in the heyday of the Arab revolt in Palestine. Many took it to be an extension of the Brit Shalom society, but there was an important difference in terms of its membership in particular. Kedma Mizraha absorbed most of the former members of Brit Shalom, except for Arthur Ruppin, who clearly stated his new position on a binational state in his diary:

 

     "I have adopted the theory that under the circumstances it is natural that the antagonism of the Arabs to Jewish immigration should find release in periokic outbreaks; that we are living in a sort of latent state of war with the Arabs which makes loss of life inevitable."[24]

 

     It is interesting that Kedma Mizraha managed to attract a number of Sephardic (Eastern) Jews, and long-time settlers in Palestine. It declared its goal to be to get to know the East  and to establish cultural, social and economic relations with the peoples of the East, and to publish accurate information about the activities of the Jewish people in Palestine.

 

     From the time it was established, Kedma Mizraha made it clear that it was acting in total coordination with the Jewish Agency, and with Va'ad Leumi (the National Council of the Jews of Palestine). Among the most important acts of Kedma Mizrahi was its call for the formation of a political body to deal with the "Arab problem" on which the Jewish Agency and Va'ad Leumi would have equal representation. Both the Jewish Agency and Va'ad Leumi had a positive attitude towards Kedma Mizraha from the beginning, and they both accepted to establish a political body to deal with the Arab problem.

    

     Kedma Mizraha's publications did not bear specific dates or signatures, but it was generally known that most of its publications were edited by two of its founders, Kalvaryski and Isaac Raphael Molko[25]  Among the most noteworthy activities of the association was the publication of a series of articles by literary figures and journalists on the Arab problem in Palestine.

 

     With time, the activities of Kedma Mizrahi shrank and eventually only Kalvaryski remained active. Kalvaryski unertook a trip to Syria and Lebanon in the summer of 1937 to meet Arab personalities as a representative of the association. In 1938 he aormulated an agenda which he said he had discussed with members of the Instiqlal (Independence) Party.

 

     Kedma Mizrahi is not known to have openly embraced the idea of a binational state in Palestine; however, Kalvaryski himself was convinced of the idea. In a letter to Kalvaryski dated August 18, 1938, M. Shertok expressed his consternation at Kalvaryski's having established contacts and conducted negotiations with the Arabs which he had not been authorized to do. Not much was heard of Kedma Mizrahi after that.[26]

 

9. The binationalists Regroup under the banner of Kedma Mizraha (Eastward to the Orient Society):

 

     In the same period that Kedma Mizrahi was searching for a formula of understanding with the Arabs, and as the Arab rebellion of 1936 was escalating, another group, known as the  Group of Five, appeared on the scene. The name is due to the fact that  no organization was involved, just five Zionist individuals who were concerned with Arab-Jewish relations. The five were: Gad Frumkin[27], Moshe Smilansky [28], Pinhas Rutenberg [29], Moshe Novomeysky [30] and Judah Leon Magnes.

 

     The group met for the first time on May 24, 1936 after Frumkin had informed Shertok, the head of the political department of the Jewish Agency, of the meeting. During the meeting between Frumkin and Shertok, it was agreed that Frumkin should draft the text of a possible agreement with the Arabs. In another meeting between the Group of Five and  representatives of the Jewish Agency, in which Shertok took part, the question of immigration was discussed, but no agreement was possible because of the differences of opinion between the Group of Five and the Jewish Agency. At the same meeting, Shertok said he was willing to accept a ceiling of 50,000 a year on immigration for a period of five years, and he fiercely attacked Magnes for being willing to halt immigration temporarily during his talks with some Arab leaders. Shertok reiterated that any negotiations that could lead to agreements in principle with the Arabs, whether of an official nature or not, should take place through the Jewish Agency or with the Agency's full consent. Even so, the Agency rejected even what Shertok had proposed, and insisted on the immigration of 62,000 Jews a year.

 

     At the same time, the Agency instructed Shertok to meet himself with Musa al-'Alami, in order to cut off the Group of Five, who were offering concessions to the Arabs which the Agency found unacceptable. In the end, Frumkin concluded that the Jewish Agency had little desire to continue the negotiations with the Arabs, and wanted to blame the Arabs for the failure of the negotiations at the same time; it therefore asked the Group of Five to negotiate on the basis of 62,000 Jewish immigrants a year as the minimum, a figure the Agency knew the Arabs would reject.[31]

 

10.1937 Partition Plan Threatens Hopes for the United Palestine: 

 

     The Hyamson[32]-Newcome[33] plan was considered to be one of the most significant alternatives to the partition plan of 1937. The Hyamson-Newcome plan, which was revealed on October 9, 1937 contained nine points, the most important of which were:

The establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state at some date in which all Palestinians would enjoy equal political and civil rights regardless of race, national origin or creed. Both Arabs and Jews would be granted the status of a community and allowed the exercise of self-determination, freedom of action in their own affairs, and neither would have any special authority over the other. In this fashion, a Jewish national home would be established, but not a Jewish state. As to Jewish immigration and the ratio of Jews in the total population, the plan stipulated that the Jewish population of Palestine and Transjordan  would not in the future exceeed a figure to be agreed upon, which figure was not to exceed 50 per cent of the total population.

 

     The Hyamson-Newcome plan gave rise to a storm of debate and controversy among Zionist circles which went on for months concerning the origins of the initiative the led to  the plan and the behind the scenes negotiations among several parties in New York, London and Geneva during the summer of 1937, in which Arab, Jewish and British personalities took part. Debate raged over the fact that the official Jewish Agency had not been a direct party to the negotiations, that it had learnt of the details second hand, through Magnes and the branch of the "Jewish Agency" in London. The Jewish Agency therefore adopted the position that contacts with the Arabs had to stop. At the same time, Magnes came under fierce criticism from Zionist leaders for establishing contacts with Arabs and laying the ground for negotiations on the basis of the Hyamson-Newcome plan.[34]

 

     Ben-Gurion sent him two letters: the first on February 24, 1938 and the second on March 3, 1938, asking him to desist from his activities in this field, and warning him against persisting in such activities which could undermine the Zionist position. Ben-Gurion said that Magnes had only succeeded in widening the gap between Arabs and Jews.[35]

 

     The Arab position on the Hyamson-Newcome plan became apparent from the statement released by the Higher Arab Committee on December 24, 1937 denying any connection between the head of the committee and certain negotiations for a solution to the Palestine problem. The statement dismissed what was being said about such contacts as unfounded rumor.[36]

 

 

     Neverthless, despite this declaration, it is known that Arab-Jewish-British contacts had taken place in relation to the plan, and that both Amin al-Husseini and Nuri al-Sa'id had formulated a plan parralel to the Hyamson-Newcome plan on January 12, 1938 and February 6, 1938 respectively.[37]

 

     The British reaction was to report to the cabinet on the plan and the contacts that had been made in relation to it. Newcome wrote a letter to the British prime minister in May 1938 informing him that the plan had been accepted by all the Arabs and a large percentage of Jews, except for East European Jews, who refused even to discuss the plan because it did not provide for a Jewish state. In the same letter, Newcome asked the prime minister to put pressure on Weizmann.[38] But although the British government allowed some Britishers to put forward political alternatives to partition. the cabinet remained fully committed to partition unless the Palestine Mandate authorities rejected it or unless the situation in Europe changed in such a fashion as to alter the situation in the Middle East.[39]

 

     The activities of Jewish groups advocating the binational idea were impacted by a number of factors on the world political scene, after the White Paper of 1939, most significantly the outbreak of the Second World War, the Biltmore conference of 1942, and the aftermath of the Second World War. At first, as the war began, the influence of the binationalists increased as the position of the Zionist movement grew weaker; but the Biltmore Conference dealt the  binationalists a set back, and in the period after the war, the influence of the binationalists shrank, and became marginal after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.

 

11. A Wave of Interest in the Idea of a Binational State: 1939-42

     

     During this period, Jewish public opinion grew anxious over the prospects for establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine, and the threat posed by the international situation to the Zionist plan. Advocates of binationalism among the Zionists, and Jewish organizations actively involved in the service of the binational idea, echoed this concern.

 

A- Efforts of the Bi-National Groups:

 

 

     The London Conference and the deteriorating international situation were directly resposible for a concerted effort by Jewish groups which supported the idea of a binational state to publish a number of articles and studies on the "Arab-Jewish dilemma." The most prominent of these groups included former members of Brit Shalom and Kedma Mizraha, a number of leaders of Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza'ir and the leftist Zion Workers' Party (Poale Zion Smol), as well as members of the New Immigration party (Aliya Chadasha),[5] and of Mapai, and the General Zionists B, and others.

 

     The first collection of articles appeared in Hebrew under the supervision of Rabbi Binyamin in March 1939 under the title of Al Parashat Darkenu (At the Cross Roads of Our Roads)[40]. This was a collection of articles on Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine, by members of various Jewish groups critical of offical Zionist policy towards the Arabs. The participants and some sympathisers met on April 1, 1939 to discuss "The Arab Dilemma". A second meeting was held on April 15 of the same year. A second collection of articles appeared following the White Paper of August 1939 and before the outbreak of World War II. These were in the same vein as Al Parashat Darkenu.

 

     One of the results of those two meetings was the formation of a broad-based organization grouping supporters of the idea of a binationalist state, called the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation.

 

B- The League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation

 

     The program of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation was divided into two parts: the first concerned the objective, the second dealt with activities of the League. The objective of the establishment of the League was defined as creating a unified position for all those who acknowledged the need for Jewish-Arab understanding, and working for the establishment of cooperation among the Arab and Jewish national groups in Palestine. The League's objective was further defined as creating a unified position for those who believed that the solution to the Palestinian problem lay in economic progress, the freedom of each community to observe its national culture, and social progress for both national communities.[41]

 

     Planned activities of the League included a series of practical steps: lectures, the exchange of information, urging the teaching of Hebrew in Jewish and Arab schools; organizing seminars and tours to acquaint each of the Jewish and Arab peoples with the life-styles and culture and traditions of the other; establishing clubs in population centers in Palestine; soliciting the cooperation of various organizations in promoting the aims of the League; and promoting economic and cultural ties between Palestine and neighboring Arab countries.[42]

 

     On October 25, 1939 a meeting was held between the League and the Jewish Agency. Rabbi Binyamin, Solli Hirsch, Buber, Bentov, Kalvaryski and Peterseil represented the League, while Ben Gurion, Dr. Bernard Joseph, Leo Cohen and Eliahu Sasson represented the Agency. The League proposed setting up a committee of inquiry into the Arab question on the basis of a resolution of the Twenty First Zionist Congress which had been convened in Geneva during August 1939. The League stressed the urgent need for the speedy creation of an independent committee consisting of people with expertise in the dilemma. Ben Gurion took it upon himself to reply to the League. He told the representatives of the League that they did not have the capability of finding a solution to the problem. Ben Gurion expressed the opinion that agreement between the Arabs and Jews would come about by force, and voiced faith in the growing strength of the Zionist movement, which he considered to be the guarantee of an agreement being reached.

 

     Three weeks later the Committee on the Arab Question was formed of seven members was formed, and held its first meeting in January 1940. Four members (Kalvaryski, Kaplansky, Magnes and Thon) supported the idea of a binational state. From the time of its first meeting, Ben Gurion announced that the committee was not empowered to act as a go between or negotiate an agreement between Arabs or Jews, that it had not been delegated the authority to criticize the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency, and that its task was limited to investigating the "Arab question" and formulating proposals for dealing with it. Eliahu Sasson of the Jewish Agency was appointed secretary of the committee; he was regarded by some of the members as a spy on behalf of the Agency.[43]

 

     The League was invited to meet with the Jewish Agency's Committee for Jewish-Arab Relations on May 26, 1940, and three subcommittees were formed in cooperation with Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza'ir to deal with political, economic and cultural relations; the most important of which was the political committee headed by Mordechai Bentov. This importance was due to the report it prepared on Constitutional Developments in Palestine in June 1941, which came to be known as the Bentov report.

 

     Bentov's report consists of three parts: the political background, general principles and the constitution. The report was submitted to the Jewish Agency's Committe of Investigation into the Arab Question on Sep[tember 18, 1941. It was also delivered to known figures in the Yishuv, and the Zionist movement, particularly in the United States. Ben Gurion was surprised to find it in circulation in the United States at the time of one of his visits there.[44]

 

     The members of the Committee on the Arab Question felt that there was no point in going on, however, Ben Gurion asked the committee not to relinquish its task. The committee submitted a minority report and a majority report. The latter, written by Kaplansky and signed by Kaplansky, Kalvaryski, Magnes and Thon in December 1941, defended the idea of a binational state, and was published in August 1942.[45]

 

12. Interest in the Binational Idea Shrinks: 1942-45

 

     In the middle of the Second World War, attention shifted to the United States, which was becoming increasingly active in military operations in the Far East. [This had a very significant impact on the direction of the Second World War politics.] The work of advocates of the binational idea was negatively impacted by developments which had repercussions on Zionist public opinion in Palestine, despite the attempt by prominent representatives of the binationalist approach to act independently of the Jewish Agency which was trying to coerce them. The shrinking appeal of the binationalist idea and resistance to it is reflected in three factors: The Biltmore Conference, the Ichud, and contacts with the Arabs.

 

A)  The Biltmore Conference and its Repercussions on the Idea of a Binational State in Palestine:

 

     A Zionist conference was held at the Biltmore Hotel in New York in may 1942 at the invitation of the Emergency Committee of the American Zionist Organization. [?] Although it was an extra-ordinary conference, it was considered to be a world Zionist congress in view of the participation of delegates of the Zionist movement throughout the world as well as the participation of such Zionist leaders as Ben Gurion, Chaim Weizmann and Nachum Goldman. The conference adopted the Biltmore Program, which was announced to the world on May 11, 1942. The program categorically rejected the 1939 White Paper and called "for the fulfilment of the original purpose of the Balfour Declaration and the the Mandate which 'recognizing the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine' was to afford them the opportunity ... to found a Jewish Commonwealth" or state in Palestine. This program provided the basis for the new Zionist policy during and after the Second World War.[46] This policy amounted to the frank rejection of a binational state, which put the advocates of the idea in a very difficult position.

 

     When Ben Gurion returned to Palestine from the conference, strident discussions took place in the Inner Actions Committee from October 15 to November 10, 1942. These discussions were the last chance for advocates of the binational idea to make their case within the Zionist Organization. Their opposition to the Biltmore Program amounted to a split with the official organization, which sided fully with the program. Ben Gurion expressed the position of the Zionist Organization:

 

           What is usually called the "Arab problem" means in reality the political opposition of the Arabs to Jewish immigration into Palestine. Many people, ignoring this simple, although disagreeable truth, attempt to solve the "Arab problem" where it does not exist. One solution offered is a bi-national state. If "bi-national state" means simply that all the inhabitants of Palestine -- Jews and Arabs alike must enjoy complete equality of rights and not merely as individuals, but also as national entities, which means the right of free development of their language, culture, religion, etc. then certainly no Jew, much less a Zionist, can fail to advocate such a regime, although I am not quite convinced that the Arabs will agree to such equality if they have the power to determine the constitution.[47]

 

     The Inner Actions Committee concluded this debate by adopting the Biltmore Program. Since that committee was empowered to adopt important decisions in the absence of a Zionist Congress during the war, advocates of a binational state were now forced to pursue the fight for their beliefs outside the official Zionist Organization. In the light of the new situation, the left, center and right wings of the forces favoring binationalism were pitted against official Zionist policy. Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza'ir, which had until then cooperated with the League without being part of it, consequently officially joined the League for Rapprochement and Cooperation on June 23, 1942, when leaders of the League signed a document saying that the return of the Jews to Palestine should take place in understanding and agreement between Jews and Arabs, and that non-domination of one national community by the other in a binational regime in Palestine constituted a basis for such an agreement.[48]

 

B) Ichud (The Union):

 

     After Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza'ir joined the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation and the League's program was signed, a bloc of intellectuals within the League formed a new organization called the Union or Ichud, which was associated with the League.

 

     Discussions leading to the formation of the Ichud began in July 1942, and the organization met for the first time on August 11, when an executive committee was formed which included Buber, Magnes, Kalvaryski and Smilansky.   Magnes opposed the idea of a Jewish state for a number of reasons: the expected war with the Arabs could destroy the Yishuv; if it survived, the Jewish state would be an island in a hostile Arab sea; the establishment of such a state would create hatred which would be perpetuated for generations; and the state that will arise will not be a Jewish but a pagan state, "like all the nations." The establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine was not necessary for the survival of the Jews in the Diaspora or of Judaism as a religion.[49]  Judah Magnes was a central figure in the formation of the Ichud; he was motivated by the adoption of the Biltmore Program, the period he served on the Committee on the Arab Question and the insistence of his friends.

 

     The monthly Be'ayot Ha-Yom (Problems of the Day) was adopted as the organ of Ichud, and the name was changed to simply Be'ayot (Problems).

 

C) Contacts with the Arabs:

 

     The fact that Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza'ir had joined the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation and the formation of Ichud gave a boost to the advocates of a binational state. In September 1942, the League's chairman, Kalvaryski, and its secretary, Aharon Cohen (a member of Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza'ir), established pesonal contacts with leading Arab figures in Syria and Lebanon while on a fact  finding mission, one purpose of which was to identify avenues of action for the League. On their return, they reported that doubts and distrust of official Zionist policy  were widespread among the people with whom they had met, who said, however, that the League's program was worthy of discussion and could provide the basis for a solution.[50]

 

           In the course of their contacts with Arab figures in Palestine, Kalvaryski and Cohen established contact with 'Umar Saleh al-Barghuti, a lawyer and a member of teh Istiqlal Party, who was closely connected with 'Awni 'Abdel Hadi. Barghuti indicated that he was prepared to act as a liaison between the League and leaders of the Istiqlal Party.  On JUne 21, 1943, he informed Kalvaryski, Cohen and Moshe Shertok that half a dozen well known Arab figureswere prepared to accept a plan that provides for full equality between the two national groups in legislative and administrative institutions, rights of ownership of land and size of population; the plan also envisaged the establishement of an autonomous binational state in Palestine joined in a federation with neighboring countries; and allowing Jewish immigration to neighboring countries as well.

 

     When Shertok was informed of the plan he was skeptical, but he did not turn it down and promised to put it before the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency. By February 1944 the League had still not received an answer, because the decision of the Jewish Agency had been not to give an answer. Despite the League's insistence on a reply from the Agency, the Agency was determined to ignore the subject totally, so that the plan was finally dropped.[51]

 

     The last two years of the war (1943-45) were difficult years for advocates of a binational state, since it conflicted with the official policy of the Executive Committee of the Zionist movement following the adoption of the Biltmore Program. The binational idea was therefore totally isolated from the official line of the Zionist movement at that stage. Furthermore, there was friction within the League between its left wing and the Ichud; the scope of agreement between them was limited to the Arab question.

 

13. Interest in the Binational Idea Dissipates: 1945-48:

 

     The last years of the British Mandate following the end of the Second World War were rife with developments and disturbances At the beginning of the period, the Zionist movement hoped that the 1939 White Paper would be amended by the British government, regardless of whether Labor or the Conservatives were in power. However, when the British Labor Party formed the new government, British policy in Palestine remained unchanged; although Jewish immigration continued beyond March 1944, the date when it was to have stopped according to the 1939 White Paper. Britain was in the midst of a severe economic crisis, and the government had neither the time nor the inclination to impose a line of policy on both Arabs and Jews in Palestine. The British government entertained hopes that the government of the United States would help shoulder that responsibility, but Washington showed little enthusiasm for this task.

 

     Results achieved by advocates of the binational idea in this period were weak. Prominent figures in the movement did little more than testify before international commissions. Parties which were represented in the Jewish Agency did not dare to present independent testimony, and limited themselves to the submission of written momoranda in conformity with the instructions of the Jewish Agency. Some supporters of the binational idea tried to encourage Palestinian Arabs to form their organization which would be the counterpart of the League of Rapprochement and Cooperation. The dissipation of interest in the idea of a binational state during this period can be seen in three things: the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, the Filastin al-Jadidah association, and the retreat of the binational idea after the U.N. partition resolution.

 

A) The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry:

 

     An Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was formed on November 13, 1945 to look into the status of Jewish displaced persons in Europe, conditions in Palestine and the possibility of the immigration to Palestine of Jews from Axis-occupied occupied territories. The committee, established according to an agreement between President Truman and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, consisted of 12 members, six Britishers and six Americans. The Committee of Inquiry heard testimony and took depositions in the United States, Europe and Palestine as well as a number of Arab countries during the first few months of 1946, and submitted its report in 1 May of that year.

 

     A number of Jewish organizations and indivuals favoring a binational solution gave testimony before the Committee of Inquiry. However, the Zionist Actions Committee prohibited its member organizations from appearing separately to testify before the Committee. Aliya Chadasha complied, as did Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza'ir, which submitted a written memorandum instead of giving testimony. However, Ichud first submitted a written statement on March 5, and later Ichud members testified before the Committee of Inquiry on March 15. The Ichud published a compilation of the testimony by Magnes, Buber and Smilansky and the written statement submitted in evidence in the form of a booklet entitled Jewish-Arab Unity.

 

     The statement submitted by Ichud contained seven points, the most important ones concerned immigration, self-government, a binational state in Palestine which would be united in a regional federation. The statement laid out a plan leading to an independent binational state beginning under the Mandate and continuing under U.N. trusteeship as a transitional phase to a self-governing unit within a Middle Eastern federation.

 

     Ichud also maintained that the three main elements in the existing political problem were immigration, land and self-government.[52] The second part of the booklet contained the text of oral testimony by representatives of Ichud before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, including Buber's statement on the Ichud's concept of Zionism and Magnes' explanation of binationalism as advocated by Ichud and political and numerical parity between the Jewish and Arab national communities.[53]

    

     Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza'ir's memorandum, entitled The Case for a Bi-National Palestine, which consisted of five parts: Elements of the situation, the consitutional solution, the economic solution, the transitional period and complications relating to the proposed solution. The plan reviewed the benefits of a binational state in Palestine to both Jews and Arabs, it argued that there should be parity between Arab and Jewish representatives in the legislative institution that would have the final say in enacting laws as a guarantee to each side against domination by the other, and it proposed the Swiss Confederation as a good model for a binational state in Palestine.[54]

 

     Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza'ir's plan envisaged five phases leading to full independence in Palestine: the creation of an advisory council based on numeric parity between representatives of the two communities, a central advisory council would deal with issues of a general nature and start the process of appointing heads of government departments; this central council would be abolished to be replaced by an elected legislative council also based on numeric parity in the third phase; while a provisional cabinet would be established in the fourth phase also observing the principle of parity, leading to independence as the final step in the process. A permanent supervising commission would exercise some executive powers even after independence until it is disbanded by the United Nations.[55]

 

     The Committee of Inquiry found that most displaced European Jews would have to remain in Europe and could not all be absorbed in Palestine; however, it recommended immediate authorization for issuing 100,000 certificates for admission to Palestine to Jews who had been victims of Nazi or fascist persecution, such certificates to be issued in 1946 if possible. The Committee further recommended

 

     (I) That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine. (II) That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state. (III) That the form of government ultimately to be established, shall, under international guarantees, fully protect and preserve the interests in the Holy Land of Christendom and of the Moslem and Jewish faiths.

           Thus Palestine must ultimately become a state which guards the rights and interests of Moslems, Jews and Christians alike and accords to the inhabitants, as a whole, the fullest measure of self-government consistent with the three paramount principles set forth above.[56] 

 

     The Committee of Inquiry urged that Palestine remain under the mandate until it could be transferred to some kind of United Nations trusteeship, which should seek to promote "Arab economic, educational and political advancement in Palestine," and to raise the Arab standard of living to the Jewish level, and promote cooperation between the two communities.

     The Committee's recommendations were encouraging to advocates of a binational state, specially those who had submitted memoranda to the committee or testified before it.

 

B) Falastin al-Jadidah (New Palestine) Society:

 

     Jews were not the only ones who were active in the binational cause in Palestine. Constant efforts were made to gain Arab support for the idea. The one notable case in which such efforts succeeded  was the agreement between the League of Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation and a group of Arabs known as the Falastin al-Jadidah (New Palestine) Society, established by Fawzi Darwish al-Husseini (1896-1946), who was known for his advocacy of Jewish-Arab understanding and cooperation in Palestine.[In July 1936, at a public gathering in Haifa,  he argued for the establishment of a binational state in Palestine based on political equality and non-domination by either national community over the other, allowing Jewish immigration within the absorptive capacity of the country, and an alliance between Arabs in the binational state and their brethren in neighboring countries as conditions for an agreement between Arabs and Jews which would have to be endorsed by the United Nations.][57]

    

     During a meeting in August of that year at Kalvaryski's home he blamed both Arabs and Jews for not reaching an agreement. He also pointed out that there were Arabs who did not agree with the policy of the Higher Arab Committee. He urged a range of activities, such as establishing a club in Jerusalem and publishing a newspaper which would promote improved relations between Arabs and Jews as means for recruiting Arab supporters for Arab-Jewish rapprochement.

 

     On November 11, 1946 Fawzi Darwish al-Husseini and four other members of Falastin al-Jadidah signed an agreement with the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation in which Falastin al-Jadidah pledged support for the League and the League pledged support for the society's aims as defined in its constitution, voicing support for an Arab-Jewish agreement based on the following principles:

 

     Political equality between the two nations in Palestine as a means to obtaining the independence of the country; Jewish immigration according to the absorptive capacity of the country and the joining of the shared and independent Palestine in an alliance with the neighbouring countries in the future.[58]

 

     However, the agreement was never implemented as Fawzi Darwish Al-Husseini was assassinated on November 23, 1946.

 

C) The Binational Idea retreats before the 1947 Partition Resolution:

 

     Britain placed the entire Palestine problem before the General Assembly of the United Nations, which formed the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) in May 1947.

     Both Ichud and Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza'ir, in its capacity as a member organization in the League of Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation, testified before UNSCOP when the latter visited Palestine. Ichud also submitted a written memorandum to UNSCOP. Magnes once again reiterated at length the ideas he had put before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry concerning the Ichud's mission. He also used the opportunity to reply to criticism of the idea of a binational state based on equality between the two communities. UNSCOP Chairman Sandstrom told Magnes that despite his admiration for the binational scheme he had presented, it may be impractical as it depended on cooperation between Arabs and Jews, without which it would fail. Magnes replied that cooperation would not come about by agreement in advance by Arabs and Jews "to certain abstract principles providing for cooperation" but "through life itself. By life we mean, among other things, government."[59]  Sandstrom was not convinced, and spoke of cultural differences and differentials in standards of living which would pose an obstacle. Magnes replied that these problems could be solved, but "they cannot be faced by trying to put the Arabs in one compartment in an insane house, and the Jews into another compartment of an insane house."[60] Magnes concluded his testimony with a plea to avoid partition because that was inimical to the interests of Arabs and Jews of all persuasions:

 

     I think partition ... is going to create war. The majority of Arabs are against it. Large numbers of Jews, both extremists and moderates, and among the religious groups of the Jews, are against it. It is going to create these irredenta and these outbursts. The bi-national State, however, is here. We are a binational State. We do not have to draw any new boundaries ... it would hardly have to be imposed. It will come into being.[61]

 

     Aharon Cohen and Prof. Ernst Simon appeared before UNSCOP on behalf of the League of Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation. Mr. Cohen read a written statement by the League which said that the "decisive burden of responsibility" for the lack of a constructive policy on Jewish-Arab relations fell squarely on the shoulders of the British Mandate authorities. It added that the British authorities had hindered or acted against Jewish-Arab cooperation, wich did in fact take place despite all the talk about an unbridgeable gap. [62]

    

     Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza'ir was the third organization advocating a binational solution to testify before UNSCOP. It submitted a memorandum entitled The Road to Bi-National Independence.[63]

 

     The Arab Office in London issued a publication entitled The Future of Palestine which had been prepared for UNSCOP, explaining why the Arabs rejected all forms of binationalism. The publication listed three forms that a binational state could take: 1) a federation: which would have a federal government and two state governments, one Arab and the other Jewish, each controlling its internal affairs, including immigration; 2) parity between the two national communities: with Arabs and Jews enjoying equal political status, regardless of the size of each community, and the door to Jewish immigration would remain open. In such a binational state, the Jewish community would enjoy equality in power despite its being the minority, and would eventually become the majority; 3) a trusteeship, or the continuation of the mandate, similar to the plan recommended by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, which would allow animosity between Arabs and Jews to eventually die down while immigration would continue.[64] All these forms of government would deprive the Arab majority of the ability of forming a government of their own choosing, and would allow Jewish immigration to continue until the Jews constituted a majority.

     UNSCOP was not convinced by the binational solution. UNSCOP put forward two alternative plans: the first was a plan for partitioning Palestine within the framework of an economic union, the second was a plan for a federal state.  The majority report, which was issued on September 1, 1947 recommended partition. A minority report, representing the views of Iran, India and Yugoslavia, argued for a binational federal state.

     On September 23, the General Assembly was transformed into a special committee for the sake of debating the two plans, and two committees were formed; the task of the first committee was to study partition proposals, while the second committee was charged with examining alternative solutions.   

     The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, with economic union, and to establish a Special International Regime for the city of Jerusalem on November 29, 1947.[65] 

     After that, advocates of a binational state found themselves at a dead end.

 

14. The Attitude of the Palestinian Communists to a Binational State:

    

     There is a crucial difference between the position of the Communists and the Zionists on idea of a binational state, which is due to the rejection of Zionism by the World Communist movement. Communist Internationalism (al-ummamiyah al-shuyu'iya) has a well defined position on Zionism particularly in its nationalist manifestation, and on the Arab nationalist movement in Palestine.

     Several studies have traced the evolution of the Palestine Communist Party (PCP) from 1919 to 1948.[66]

 Arabs had begun to join the ranks of the party before 1929. In 1930, during the seventh national PCP convention, it became apparent that the membership drive which had been aimed at the Arab population had born fruit, as the convention was attended by as many Arabs as Jews.  At the end of the period of weakness which beset the Arab labor movement in the wake of the Arab rebellion in Palestine (1936-39), clear signs of the revival of activity among labor, the unions and the intelligentsia became apparent in solidarity with the Palestinian communists who left the PCP and established the National Liberation League (NLL) in 1943.

     In a statement issued in November 1945, the National Liberation League opposed the formation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry  on the basis that Palestine could not be the solution to the Jewish refugee problem. The NLL advocated the establishment of an international commission to study the problem. In the same statement, the NLL demanded that Palestine be granted independence and a democratic government. The NLL refused to meet with the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) when it visited Palestine in June 1947. It addressed a letter to the United Nations objecting to the partition of Palestine. It affirmed that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine would put an end to any possibility of reaching an understanding between Arabs and Jews. When the U.N. Partition Resolution was adopted on November 29, 1947, the NLL found itself in a difficult position because it could not endorse the resolution. The NLL finally did endorse the resolution with a majority vote at its convention in Nazareth in February 1948.[67]

     Meir Vilner[68] wrote:

 

     "The Communists, both Arabs and Jews, fought for national independence, demanded the abrogation of the Mandate, the departure of the British army from the country, and the transformation of Palestine into a binational state over the years, a state with two peoples, Arabs and Jews. They urged respect by each of the two peoples for the other's right to self-determination and national independence. [69]

 

 

     Vilner believes that the Second World War speeded up changes which transformed Palestine into a binational state, namely, a Jewish nation emerged side by side with the Palestinian Arab nation, as he puts it. This conclusion is supported by the increase of the Jewish population of Palestine since the First World War. He maintains that in 1931 the ratio of the Jewish population to the total population of Palestine did not exceed 18 per cent. However, the increase in the rate of Jewish immigration to Palestine as a result of Nazi persecution  brought the ratio of Jews up to one third of the population (650,000) in 1948. Because of their background, Jewish immigrants to Palestine constituted a force for capitalist, industrial and bourgeois development. As a result of all these factors, Palestine was transformed from a uninational state to a binational state.[70]

     In commenting on the memorandum by Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza'ir to

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry concerning A Solution for Binational Independence.[6] He points out that the term 'Binational' as used in the memorandum is misleading. It does not acknowledge demographic developments in Palestine, and asks that

implementation of the binational project be postponed for twenty to thirty years, during which time Palestine would be under a special development administration, as they suppose,  which will permit the immigration of two to three million Jews, so that at the end of the period the number of Jews would have reached 3,200,000, as compared to 1,800,000 Arabs. Vilner's chief criticism of Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza'ir is its reliance on a plan to impose a solution by force and to settle such a large number of Jews in Palestine and Trans-Jordan under the patronage of the great powers.[71]

    

The Palestine Communist Party, which had only Jewish members left, had agreed to testify before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, contrary to the position of the National Liberation League, which boycotted the committee. The PCP based its position before the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine on two principles: full independence to be attained by abrogating the Mandate, and recognition of the Arab and Jewish peoples right to independence in a united Palestine in the context of a binational state with equality of rights. The PCP did not hesitate to accept the partition resolution  which it saw as the only viable solution, since the alternatives amounted to the continuation of British colonial rule or its replacement by Anglo-American rule, which were worse than partition. "The Communists concluded that Palestine had been transformed into a binational state, where a Jewish people now existed alongside the Palestinian people. In order for the struggle against imperialism to succeed, and for the sake of national liberation everywhere, the two people have to engage in an unflagging struggle which is inseparable from the struggle against world imperialism."[72]

 

15. Conclusion:

 

     This chapter has dealt with the most important activities on the Jewish side in advocacy of a binational solution for Palestine.  These took the shape of some highly speculative proposals by Jewish groups which believed in cooperation between Arabs and Jews in one form or the other. The proposals of these different groups were not all compatible, as they bore the imprint of widely different cultural heritages of different countries of origin. In addition, these groups represented a minority among educated Jews and a weak trend in Zionist thought. Most of their members belonged to the school of cultural Zionism, which implied adherence to ethical positions which drove them to seek peaceful means for reaching agreement with the Arabs and to use persuasion to arrive at a compromise solution that would lead to the establishment of a binational state. This binational state had to be neither an Arab nor a Jewish state, because they believed that the establishment of such a state would satisfy the Zionist objective of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. Those intellectuals adopted the principle of reconciliation as the ethical foundation for their idea of a binational state: the Arabs were physically present in Palestine, which gave them a natural right to the land; the Jews living outside Palestine had a historic right to return to Palestine. These natural and historical rights to Palestine counterbalanced each other. The strategy used by these intellectuals to reach their goal was the establishment of peaceful contacts between Arabs and Jews and the renunciation of any solution that relies on force or violence.[73]

    

However, the result was the appearance of a contradiction between the historic nation and the nation in the modern sense of the term. When advocates of the binational idea tried to resolve this contradiction, they found themselves before a new impasse: they proposed futuristic visions and formulations of their idea which relied on the establishment of numerical and political equality between Arabs and Jews in Palestine under the guise of keeping the door open for Jewish immigration, which did not suit the circumstances which prevailed at the time. Those intellectuals therefore found themselves outside the mainstream of the Zionist movement; their ideas and proposals therefore remained out of touch with reality and were not implemented.

 

                                Notes