On the Israeli Arab conflict:

A Binational State in Palestine;

A Cultural Perspective

 

 

 

                                  

 

                        by Dr. Kamal Khaldi

 

          with an introduction by Dr. Sadeq Jalal al-Azim

 

           Translated into English by Dr. Jinab Tutunji

 

 

 

 

-----------------------------------------------------------------

 

                              Preface \

 

 

 

 

     The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed by the Palestine Liberation Organization and the government of Israel in September 1993 raises a number of questions concerning level of disparities between the two national groups, Palestinian Arabs and Israelies. Although the agreement only covers an interim arrangement leading to limited self-rule in the occupied territories, the final stages of the settlement remain in deep shadow. The prevalent instability and unequal economic, social and cultural conditions of the two national groups mandates fundamental changes in order to build bridges of rapprochement, understanding and agreement between them. A binational state in the entire geographic area of Palestine remains one of the options that could provide a strategic remedy for the instability and the inequalities among the Arabs and Jews.

 

     The problem of national minorities was a favorite topic for  researchers at the end of the nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth centuries, particularly after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The concept of a bi- or multinational state was one of the ideas put forward by advocates of minority rights in order to safeguard the political and cultural autonomy of such minorities. The successful examples set by Switzerland and Belgium prompted the idea of copying the political arrangement they represented in other countries troubled by national and ethnic minority issues.

 

     Binationalism embodies the political concept of a system of government, under which two national groups share a common view of the basic way in which the state should be constituted. Each national group has its own separate national identity, its own language, culture and religious tradition. Neither of the two national groups exercises hegemony over the other; they share power and allegiance to the same state. It may be assumed that such a 2hypothetical state of affairs coulb be preceded by a state in which instability and socio-economic disparities, ethnic divisions and recourse to violence prevailed.

 

     The idea of a binational state in Palestine originated fairly early with the Israelis, sometime between 1925 and 1948. However, the idea lay dormant for twenty years until interest in it was Tresuscitated by the so-called question of the Arabs of the [occupied] territories. The exacerbation of the Arab demographic problem after the 1967 war was the reason why Israeli and Western authors resuscitated the idea of a binational state. Susan Lee Hattis, the Israeli author of a 1970 doctoral dissertation prepared at the Institute of Postgraduate International Studies in Geneva, entitled The Bi-national Idea in Palestine during Mandatory Times, Shikmona   Publishing Co and Geneva Institut des Haute Etudes Internationales,1970, offered the first comprehensive review of the history of the bi-national idea and Zionist reaction to it.

 

     As the methods of Palestinian resistance activities evolved and such activities came to be carried out from within the territories under Israeli government control, there was renewed interest in a binational state, as well as in the ways to achieve a practical balance between protecting Israel's interests and finding a way to deal with the intifadah. A number of Israeli and American scholars examined various aspects of the question under the assumption that a binational state had become an imperative for Israel as a polity Those articles were published in a book entitled The Emergence of a Binational Israel; The Second Republic In The Making,  edited by Ian Peleg and Ofira Seliktar, West View Press, Colorado, 1989.

 

     The interest of Arab authors in exploring the idea of a binational state in Palestine has been weak. There has been no discussion among the Arabs, as a whole, and the Palestinians, in perticular, on the idea of a binational state as a viable option. On the other hand, the Arab approach to coexistence with the Jews in Palestine was realistic and conciliatory.  The questions of Jewish immigration and the establishment of a Jewish homeland posed very difficult dilemmas for the Arabs; they opposed them because they saw in them a threat to their own national existence. The Arab position and Arab willingness to coexist with Jews have been misunderstood. Repeated Arab initiatives and proposals aimed at arriving at a rational agreement through peaceful means have been burried by the sands of time. For this reason, chapter 1 has been devoted to this very subject.

    

     Although Cultural Zionism was not a roaring success historically, it nevertheless influenced Zionist policy. It has been unfairly neglected  because researchers have approached it as an ideology for state formation, and have not given it its due in view of the creation of the state of Israel. The most significant figures in the cultural Zionist movement were illustrious personalities such Albert Einstein, the philosopher Martin Buber, and the historian Hans Kohn. The idea of a binational state in Palestine is to a large extent credited to the cultural Zionist awareness of the Arab presence. This relationship will therefore be dealt with in a chapter of its own.

    

     This study will examine four dimensions of the idea of a Binational state in Palestine:

     I. The Idea and the Accord of principles.

     II. The Idea from the Arab Perspective.

     III. The Idea from the Jewish Perspective.

     IV. The Historical Record of the Idea.

     V. The Idea and The Author Perspective.

 

     Accordingly the work is divided into Seven chapters:

--chapter one: Beyond Violence: A Search for A Binational State.   --Chapter Two offers an analysis of the history of Arab approaches to coexistence with the Jews in Palestine.

-- Chapter Three deals with the trend of Cultural Zionism and its approach to a binational state in Palestine.

-- Chapter Four takes up the issue of Zionist policies regarding the Arab population of Palestine from 1917 to 1939.

-- Chapter Five examines the idea of a binational state in Palestine between 1925 -- the year in which preparations were completed for the formation of the first society of adherents to the binational idea -- and 1948, the year in which activities in furtherance of the binational idea waned.

-- Chapter Six deals with post-1948 trends in binationalist thought, including a review of the views of proponents and opponents of the idea, with emphasis on the period between Israel's occupation of Arab territories in 1967 and the beginning of the intifada in 1987. This chapter tries to capture all the different trends, including dispersed Palestinian opinion on the subject.

-- Chapter Seven contains an academic and cultural discussion of the option of a binational state in Palestine. 

    

     Three chapters of this book formed part of a doctoral dissertation in Sociology of Knowledge submitted by the author at the University of Damascus, Syria in 1987.

 

 

Washington; July 1994.

 

 

 

                    Table of Contents

 

Acknowledgment.

 

Introduction.

By Prof. Sadiq Jalal Al-'Azim.

 

Preface.

 

Table of contents

                                PART I

 

                     THE ARAB PERSPECTIVE      

 

Chapter One.

 

The Attitudes of Arabs towards Jews in Palestine: A Historical

Analysis:

 

     1- Introduction.

     2- Arab-Jewish Coexistence prior to the Balfour Declaration.

     3- Exacerbation of Arabs Fears in the wake of the Balfour       Declaration.

     4- Jewish-Arab contacts 1918-1949.

     5- Arab initiatives and proposals to Reach an Understanding

            with the Jews pre 1948.

    6- The effect of the Creation of the State of Israel on          the Attitudes of Arabs     towards the Jews.

     7- Palestinian Literature and the Jews after 1948 .

     8- The Concept of a Democratic Secular State in Palestine.

     9- The Transition to Mutual Recognition.

     10- Conclusion.

 

                               PART II

                    

                    THE JEWISH PERSPECTIVE

 

Chapter Two

 

Cultural Zionism and A Binational State in Palestine:

 

     1. Introduction.

     2. Language and Nationalism in the Thought of Ben Yehuda.

     3. Gordon, Labor and the Return to Palestine.

     4. Ahad Ha'm:A State of Jews or A Jewish State?

     5. Ahad Ha'am and The Binational state .

     6. Magnes and his Book"Like All the Nations".

     7. Einstein and Cultural Zionism.

     8. Buber on Nationalism and Zionism.

 

      

Chapter Three:

 

Zionist Policies Towards the Arabs in Palestine (1917-1939):

 

     1. Introduction.

     2. The Zionist Reaction to the Arab Presence in Palestine.

     3. Zionist Treatment of the Arabs of Palestine between 1917     and 1925.

     4. The Position of the Histadrut on Organizing the Arab Labor.

     5. Zionist Policy Towards the Arabs of Palestine after the

           Violence of 1929.   

     6. Zionist-Arab Contacts and Initiatives.

 

 

 

                               PART III

 

                     THE HISTORICAL RECORD

 

Chapter Four:

 

The Idea of a Binational State in Palestine Between 1925 and 1948.

    

     1. Introduction.

     2. The Background of the Concept of a Binational     State.

     3. Democracy in the Binational State between the Majoritarian   and and Consensual Models.

     4. Brit Shalom (The Covenant of Peace Society) 'Faces Challenges.

     5. The Advocates of Binationalism Shaken by the Violence of     1929.

     6. The Jewish Agency Discourages the Activity of the Binationalists.

     7. Proposed Cantonal Arrangements for the state of Palestine.

     8. Arab - Jewish Relations take Precedence over the Binational Idea.

     9. Binationalists Rally to the Banner of Kidma Mizraha (Eastward to the Orient Society).

     10. The 1937 Partition Plan Threatens Hopes for a United Palestine.

     11. A Surge of Interest in the Idea of a Binational State :     1939-42.

     12. Interest in the Binational Idea Shrinks: 1942-45.

     13. Interest in the Binational Idea Dissipates:

           1945-48.

     14. The Attitude of the Palestinian  Communist Party to a Binational State.

     15. conclusion.

 

Chapter Five:

 

The Idea of A Binational State in Palestine after 1948:

 

     1. Introduction.

     2. The Fate of Ichud the (Union) after the Partition Resolution.

     3. Buber's Views on a Binational State in Palestine after 1948.

     4. The Resurrection of The Binational Idea after the 1967 War.

     5. The Position of Mapam on Binationalism.

     6. Leftists, non-Zionist views on the Presence of Arabs in      Palestine after June 1967.

     7. Diverse Perspectives on the Binational Idea.

     8. A Binational State Emerges under Israeli Occupation.

     9. Palestinian Views on a Binational State in Palestine.

     10.Conclusion.

 

                               PART IV

                                  

                       THE AUTHOR'S PERSPECTIVE

                                    

Chapter Six

 

     A Cultural Perspective on a Binational State in Palestine:

 

     1. Introduction:

           I. Schools of Thought on Binationism Prior to the    Creation of Israel.

           II.Trends Following the Establishment of Israel.

     2. The Gradual Transition to A Binational State in Palestine.

     3. Two Nationalisms.

     4. Two Communities in One State.

     5. Palestine or Israel; What's in the Name?

     6. The Question of Violence.

     7. A Secular versus A Binational State.

     8. Majority and Minority in a Binational State.

     9. Jewish and Palestinian Immigration.

     10. A Question of Democracy.

     11. Stations on the Road to a  Binational State in Palestine.

     12. Conclusion.

 

                              END NOTES

 

Bibliography

 

     A- English Resources.

    

B- Arabic Resources.

                                            

 

Index

 

Appendices:

    

     A. Alist of Arab-Jewish contactcs (1918-1946).

    

     B. "A Talk about Palestine Cantonization between Jews and       Arabs", Falestin Newspaper, No 2521/256, December 27th. 1933. (Arabic)

 

 

                           Part I

 

                                     The Arab Perspective

 

                             CHAPTER ONE

 

           The Attitude of Arabs towards Jews in Palestine

                        A Historical Analysis

 

1. Introduction:

 

     Before we examine the idea of a binational state in Palestine from the historical and cultural perspectives, we shall consider Arab attitudes towards the Jews in successive stages of the evolution of the Palestine problem. Arabs and Jews were coexisting before the Balfour declaration of 1917. Relations between the Arab majority and the local Jewish community in Palestine were characterized by tolerance which up to that time had not been marred, except rarely, by violence. The Arabs did not harbor hostility towards or prejudice against the Jews.

    

     In this chapter we shall review expressions of the Arab desire to get along with the Jews despite the negative positions adopted by the Zionist Organization and the British Mandate authorities towards the Arabs. Understanding towards the local Jewish community, which characterized the once dominant Palestinian attitude, is reflected in the positions adopted by a number of Palestinian Arab leaders and intellectuals before 1948. We shall examine some of their ideas and proposals. This chapter will also deal briefly with the friction and occasional violent conflict between the two communities before 1948, the undermining of Arab-Jewish relations after the establishment of Israeli in 1948, which the Palestinian Arabs regarded as a disaster, and the new animosity created after the Israeli occupation of the rest of Palestine in 1967 and the outbreak of the intifadah in the occupied territories in 1987.

 

2. Positions Advocating Tolerance Prior to the Balfour Declaration:

 

     During most periods within the Islamic era, the local Jewish community in Pales  tine enjoyed good relations with Arabs. The governing Islamic authorities granted the Jews the rights pertaining to "People of the Book," (Christians and Jews as well as Muslims), which included the right to practice their religion and observe their cultural traditions, and to enjoy autonomy in matters relating to personal status.

     This created an opportunity for Jewish scholars and men of science to attain positions of prominence in Islamic society down the ages. When the Jews were persecuted in Spain, they sought refuge in the Arab kingdoms in Andalusia (southern Spain) and they immigrated to the Arab principalities in the Maghreb (north west Africa) and to the Arab east in search of protection. Some settled in Palestine under Ottoman rule, beginning with the fifteenth century. They settled in certain quarters of important cities, such as Jerusalem and Safad in Palestine, and in Baghdad and other centers of government.

     Up to 1917, under the millet system, the Ottomans pursued a policy of tolerance towards accredited religious minorities, which extended to Palestine.[1]  This encouraged certain Jewish leaders to petition for special rights as Ottoman nationalists. The small Jewish minority enjoyed a favorable status among other communities in the Ottoman Empire. After the reformist Young Turks seized power, the Jews were treated as individuals who enjoyed equality with other subjects of the empire, rather than as a community.[2]

     At the local level in Palestine, disaffection between Arabs and Jewish immigrants began to appear in the late nineteenth century. The seeds of conflict took root in the difference between the status of the local Jewish community, and the rights that traditionally pertained to that status under Ottoman rule on the one hand, and the status of Jewish immigrants who fled to the Ottoman Empire after the 1882 pogroms in Czarist Russia, on the other. The emergence of the organized Zionist movement in 1897 sharply intensified that conflict.

 

     The position of the Mayor of Jerusalem, Youssuf Zia [Diya`] al-Khalidi[3], exemplifies that inherent contradiction. This is evident from the testimonial in the letter of Theodore Herzl to al-Khalidi of March 19, 1899. The letter contained recognition of the debt that the Jews owed the Muslims and the Arabs for opening the doors of Palestine to them, and for providing them with a safe haven when the Jews were fleeing Spanish persecution in the fifteenth century. The position of the Ottoman Sultan, Selim III, was a landmark of tolerance and coexistence between Muslims and Jews, Herzl noted.

     Herzl attempted to convince Khalidi (as he had been attempting to convince the Ottoman authorities) that large-scale Jewish immigration to Palestine would be in the best interest of the Arabs and the Turks due to the prosperity that the Jews would bring with them, according to Herzl. Khalidi, while expressing sympathy and friendship to the Jews, had written in a letter to the Chief Rabbi of France, Zadok Kahn[4], that Palestine could not absorb massive waves of immigration, and advised the Jews to look elsewhere for a suitable homeland.  Herzl refered to al-Khalidi's letter saying:

 

           I owe to Mr. Zadok Kahn's kindness the pleasure of having read the letter which you addressed to him. Let me tell you first of all that the feelings of friendship which you express for the Jewish people inspire in me the deepest appreciation. The Jews have been, and are, and will be the best friends of Turkey since the day when Sultan Selim opened his Empire to the persecuted Jews of Spain.                                                

Herzl continues, however:

 

     You tell Mr. Zadok Kahn that the Jews would do better to go somewhere else. This may well happen the day we realize that Turkey does not understand the enormous advantages which our movement offers it.[5]

 

 

     The Palestinian scholar Ruhi al-Khalidi (1864-1913) dealt with the relationship between Arabs and Jews in a pioneering study of Zionism.[6] The manuscript, which was found among Khalidi's papers, portrays a clear idea of the attitude of Arabs towards Jews in various parts of the world down the ages.[7] The author of the manuscript makes a clear distinction between Arab attitudes towards Jews who are fellow citizens of various Islamic empires and towards Zionist Jews perceived as representatives of a colonizing movement. Khalidi reports that some Jews were critical of the Zionists and denounced their objectives, seeing their activities as harmful to Jews as a whole, and asked the Ottoman authorities not to be lenient with the Zionists. He authenticates a telegram from the senior rabbis of the Ottoman empire to the speaker of the Ottoman parliament (Majlis al-Mab'uthan)  dated February 8, 1908, on which he comments:

 

 

     They made no secret of the fact that they thought opposition to Zionism was the right course of action. The Ottoman State, after promulgating a constitution and raising the banner of freedom, equality and fraternity, did not expect Ottoman Jews to subscribe to Zionism which is a divisive factor, and to institute a new form of nationalism which had not existed before.[8]

 

     The Ottoman authorities and local leaders were adamantly opposed to Zionist ambitions from early on. This finds clear expression in the firm response by Sultan Abdel Hamid to Herzl's plan to turn Palestine into a homeland for Jews throughout the world. Ruhi al-Khalidi commented on the meeting between Herzl and Sultan Abdel Hamid:

 

     Herzl brought to bear all his eloquence in an attempt to convince the naive advisors of the Sultan ... He would have succeeded had it not been for the intervention of 'Izzat Pasha al-Abed, known to the Turks as Arab 'Izzat, who aroused fears in the Sultan's mind of the consequences of granting concessions to the Zionists. The Sultan refrained out of this fear.[9]

 

     This did not undermine the existing good relation between the Arabs and the Jewish minority in Palestine. The problem was exacerbated during the First World War as a result of the exploitation of the issue by certain Western nations for their own purposes. The noted Arab author Mikha`il Nu'aimah (1889-1990) referred to this fact in an article published in Mir`at al-Gharb in 1915:

 

           Certain powers of this earth saw that it was in their interest to turn Palestine into a Jewish kingdom. [....] as though Palestine were a deserted land, a wilderness devoid of habitation or inhabitants, and as though all one had to do to transform it into an independent kingdom was to plant a few thousand Jews there, set up a king over them, and tell them to till the soil and enjoy the fruits of the land and multiply as the sand of the sea. And yet there are a million human beings who were born and grew up in Palestine, which has been the burial ground for their grandfathers and great grandfathers, which they call their homeland. They have no other place in the world to lay down their heads except that spot on God's earth.[10]

 

     It was after the Balfour Declaration that tensions arose and tempers flared. That declaration was the explosive that demolished the atmosphere of tolerance and caused the Arabs, who were laboring under the repressive yolk of British occupation, and feared further encroachments on their homeland, to translate their fears into hostile words and deeds. Through the Balfour Declaration, the Zionist Organization in effect achieved its ambition to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine, not through understanding and peaceful means, but through violence.

 

3. The Exacerbation of Arab Fears in the Wake of the Balfour Declaration:

 

     Expectations of a Zionist threat to Palestine gave way to a sense of real danger. The Arabs felt deeply disappointed and betrayed because of the duplicity on Britain's part. The Balfour Declaration was a severe shock to the Arabs, particularly the nationalistic forces which had been longing for independence from the Ottoman empire. Consequently, the Balfour Declaration was seen as a blow to the most sacred aspirations of the Arab nation to unity and independence. Arab resentment, therefore, was specifically directed at the forces of British occupation and the British government ; relations between Arabs and Jews were not affected  by it until the British military authorities sided with the Jewish minority and opened the door for them to enter the government and the Mandate administration.

     Discontent among the Arab majority grew, and tensions increased until bloody clashes broke out between the Arab inhabitants and some Zionist extremists. There was a general explosion in 1920 which included such events as the battle of Tal Hanina in the Galilee near the town of Mutillah in northern Palestine in which five Jews were killed. Rising tensions exploded in the Nabi Musa rebellion near Jerusalem in April 1920; the Muslims had been accustomed to celebrating the occasion with religious rites and a public procession from the Aqsa Mosque to the Nabi Musa shrine on the Jerusalem-Jericho road. It happened that the observance that year coincided with Christian celebrations of Easter. Clashes broke out between Arab celebrants on the one hand and extremist Jews on the other during the week of April 4-10.

     The following year there were more serious clashes on the occasion of International Labor Day on May 1, 1921 in the city of Jaffa. The spark for the disturbances was, paradoxically, a clash between two Jewish groups: the Socialist Revolutionary Party (Mopsi) and Ahdot ha Avodah, a social democratic party. Unexpectedly, tensions rose between Arabs and Jews and lasted for a week, spreading to the neighboring rural areas. Arab Stevedores in Jaffa had been boycotting the unloading of ships carrying very large numbers of Jews as a protest against the effects of large-scale immigration. The changing of the name of the city of Jaffa to Tel Aviv contributed indirectly to the tension. The Arabs were appalled by attempts by Mopsi -- whose members they saw as foreigners invading their country -- to convert them, by the importation of Communist literature, an utterly alien, European creed. As the violence spread, almost 200 Jews and 120 Arabs were killed.

     The British formed the Haycraft committee of inquiry to investigate the causes and consequences of the disturbances. The committee issued a number of important findings, including the fact that the Arabs saw the European Jews as foreign invaders who wanted to change the culture and the social constitution of Palestine. The Arabs were alarmed by labor demonstrations and industrial strife. The also found the foreigners arrogant and aggressive and disrespectful of local customs. Although the Jews claimed they had come to develop Palestine for the benefit of all its inhabitants, the Arabs saw the immigrants not as wealthy developers but as outcasts congregating in Palestine from all over the world. Most significantly, the Arabs felt that the Zionists wanted to impose their culture on the country and to displace Arab culture. Beyond that, they wanted to dominate Palestine politically, economically and demographically as well. The Arabs believed that the Mandate authority was under the influence of the Zionists, and was favoring the Jewish minority over the preponderant Arab majority. This explains why an immigrants' hostel was attacked in the port city on which waves of immigrants, many of whom were perceived as vagabonfs, descended to swell the Jewish minority.[11]

     The Wailing Wall riots were the other most significant  and bloody clashes during the twenties. The events of August 15-30, 1929 had dire consequences for tolerance between the two communities. The spark was a demonstration at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem on August 15 by Jews, chiefly Haluzim, militant youth from the agricultural settlements, many brought in from Tel Aviv, on the occasion of the commemoration of the destruction of the Temple. Arab agitators in the countryside also prepared the fellahin or  peasants for a confrontation. Following sporadic incidents, bloody clashes took place on Friday, August 23 in Jerusalem and continued for a week. There were particularly ugly incidents in Hebron, Safad and Haifa. According to official British casualty figures, 87 Arabs and 120 Jews were killed, 181 Arabs and 198 Jews wounded. Lengthy trials led to 26 death sentences, passed on 25 Arabs and one Jew. Three of the Arabs were in fact executed on June 17, 1930.

     A commission of inquiry was formed under Sir Walter Shaw, which found that the immediate cause for the disturbances was the Jewish demonstration at the Wailing Wall which was a provocation to the Arabs. According to the commission, deeper causes related to the socio-economic hardships suffered by the Arabs as a result of large-scale Jewish immigration and land purchases, and particularly the dispossession of the peasants of the lands they had tilled for generations. The Zionists were outraged at these findings, so the Hope-Simpson commission was formed six months later. Its recommendations backed up the Shaw commission; they were even more far reaching, including the curtailment of Jewish immigration and land settlement and the establishment of a legislative council for Palestine. It even suggested a fund to aid Arab peasants. These findings elicited even stronger opposition from the Zionists.[12]

     On the Arab side, the consequences of these events, known as intifadat al-Buraq, were spontaneous and broke out at the grass roots level. They escaped the control of the Arab politicians and urban leaders, the effendis. Rural gatherings were held throughout the country, crystallizing in two positions: the first, and stronger position, was that an Arab offensive should be directed at the Zionists; the second, weaker position, amounted to a call for resistance against the British, not the Jews. In fact, Palestinian Arab leaders shirked responsibility for the events in view of the strength of the British reaction, leaving the fellahin and the bedouins, disorganized and unarmed, to face attacks by British airplanes and armored cars.[13]

     It is clear that the Balfour Declaration exacerbated the fears of Palestinian Arabs, causing disillusionment, fueling discontent and leading to violence. Violence bred violence. For more than a decade these upheavals occurred, symptoms that the atmosphere of tolerance which had governed relations between the Arab majority and the Jewish minority was evaporating. The Arabs, who were disillusioned, were subjected to repression, and the embers of discontent continued to simmer under the ashes as the Arabs watched and waited. The acts of violence in the thirties were a protest against British discrimination against the Arabs and bias towards the Jews. This was the underpinning of the Arab revolt during 1936-1939. These causes were reinforced by the deep social unrest resulting from the destabilization of rural life and the undermining of the stability of the peasants, many of whom lost their lands as a result of the purchase of agricultural land by the Jews, who employed Jewish labor, while the influx of Jewish immigrants closed off alternative economic opportunities for the uprooted Arab peasants.

 

     The testimony of 'Awni Abdel Hadi[14] before the Palestine Royal Commission (Peel Commission) in 1937 captures Arab disappointment in British policy during that period very eloquently. 'Abdel Hadi said:

    

     As Chaim Weizmann said, the Jews tried to win the affections of the Arabs in the Near East, and they still hope to succeed in this. I want to stress one fact: all our Arab brothers in Syria, Iraq and the other Arab countries agree with me that it is not possible for any friendship or affection to come about between Arabs and Jews as long as there is a Zionist policy; a policy to establish a national home. I regret to say that the Jews, [many of whom] had lived in peace with the Arabs, have caused this unfortunate state of affairs: they have created racial hostility which had not existed before. The Arabs and Jews will not live in peace. If they claim the contrary, they shall be wrong, as long as Zionist policies are there. This is how the Arab and Islamic worlds feel.[15]

 

4. Arab-Jewish Contacts: 1918-1948

 

     Not much is known about Palestinian-Arab contacts with the representatives of the Zionist movement and the leaders of the local Jewish community in Palestine. Most such contacts are shrouded in secrecy, particularly on the Arab side. Although some of these contacts have come to light, not enough is known about the circumstances in which they occurred or the results that they achieved. Whatever information has become available about these contacts has emanated from Jewish sources only. There are two principal factors responsible for this situation: it would appear that Arab politicians have been careful to maintain a veil of secrecy, due to the highly controversial aspect in the Arab mind of attempts to legitimize Zionist settlement or to "Judaify" Palestine; in addition, archival resources and means of documentation on the Arab side are deficient, compared to the Zionist Archives and the libraries of Jewish leaders and writers.

     One characteristic of these contacts was that they were motivated by the desire of the Jewish Agency unofficially to survey the opinion of the Arab elite and to gauge Arab reaction to specific ideas and proposals. Among the most notable contacts that took place were those between Ben Gurion, Moshe Sharett (Shertok) and Musa al-'Alami.[16] Al-'Alami met with the two Jewish leaders in 1933, while tensions between Arabs and Jews in Palestine were on the rise. Ben Gurion and Sharett put before Al-'Alami certain proposals concerning Jewish immigration and the ability of Palestine to absorb it.  The two Jewish leaders wanted to sound out Arab receptivity to the idea of the establishment of a Jewish state that would include both Palestine and Transjordan; in return, the Jews would support the creation of a union of Arab states, which might have helped alleviate the sense of defeat by Palestinian Arabs who were in danger of becoming a minority in the proposed Jewish state. Al-'Alami emerged from the meeting with the impression that the Zionists were not content merely to establish a homeland for the Jews, they wanted total control.[17]

 

     These meetings constitute a clear indication of the presence of a desire on the part of Arabs in Palestine and some neighboring countries to reach an understanding with the Jews that would have allowed for the continuation of good relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. On the other hand, there was a negative attitude on the part of Zionist Organization not to commit itself to an official position with the Arabs on the basis that the Jews were a minority dealing with a majority (as was the case at the time), or even on the basis of parity, and to put off an serious steps until the Jews came to constitute the majority of the population in Palestine.

     This explains the outcome of the meeting between Judah Magnes, president of Hebrew University and one of the foremost advocates of binationalism, and Izzat Tannous[18] in Jerusalem. The meeting was arranged by the Anglican bishop of the city in 1937. Magnes was carrying a draft agreement given him by the Jewish Agency to pass on to Arab leaders in Beirut. The objective was to reach a form of Arab-Jewish understanding. Tannous made several visits to Beirut, once in the company of Magnes and the Anglican bishop of Jerusalem. Negotiations were halted before they reached the stage of agreement because the Jewish Agency denied it had given Magnes the draft agreement he had passed on to Tannous. Magnes was to say later that the Jewish Agency had made "a big liar" out of him.[19]

     Many meetings an contacts took place between Arab leaders and intellectuals and representatives of the Jewish Agency and other Jewish leaders and intellectuals in and outside Palestine during 1918-1948. The most significant ones will be mentioned in subsequent chapters of this book.

    

 

 5. Arab Initiatives and Proposals to Reach an Understanding with the Jews pre-1948:

 

     Despite Arab displeasure with the Zionist bid to impose a Jewish national home on Palestine, the Arabs did launch initiatives for coexistence and put forward practical proposals to the Zionists. These proposals were put forward informally by Arab politicians and intellectuals to the Zionist Organization. In most cases, negotiations were conducted with known figures who had connections with the Jewish Agency. The Zionist Organization never adopted a definite position on any of the plans or proposals from the Arab side. In most cases, the agency simply did not respond or kept its opinion to itself, even when negotiations were conducted with prominent Zionist figures with significant standing with the Zionist Organization, such as Moshe Sharett or Ben Gurion.

 

     Notable Arab initiatives were:

 

 I. The proposal submitted by Jamal al-Husseini[20] to H.M. Kalvaryski (the director of the 'Joint Bureau' set up by the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Council in Palestine to deal with Arab affairs)  at the end of 1924, which involved reaching an Arab-Jewish agreement to create a bi-national and bicameral legislative assembly. Seats in the lower chamber would be allocated as a result of elections and on the basis of the demographic ratio of the Arab and Jewish communities. The upper chamber would consist of ten Arab and two Jewish members, and would be headed by the British High Commissioner, who would have the power of endorsing legislation. In fact, Husseini was willing to allow the High Commissioner the right of veto over legislation. A committee in charge of immigration would be set up with one Muslim, one Christian and two Jewish members, and would be headed by a Britisher. The response of the Zionist Organization to this proposal was cool, which the Organization said was due to fears of a clash between the upper and lower chambers.[21]

 

II.  Arab proposals to divide Palestine into cantons:

 

     Following the Wailing Wall disturbances of 1929 and their consequences, there was talk of applying a cantonal arrangement to Palestine. Between 1932 and 1935, a number of Jewish, Arab and British civil servants and researchers put forward proposals for dividing Palestine into Arab and Jewish cantons. In this section we will discuss the Arab proposals; the Jewish and British proposals will be discussed in Chapter 4.

     The problem with the Arab proposals is that they did not have an official capacity, and were neither the subject of commentary nor criticism by Arab sources. Despite the significance of these proposals and their far reaching import, they never became a subject of public debate or even debate within closed political circles.

     The most important of these proposals were the plan of Ahmad al-Khalidi and the proposals of Musa al-'Alami to implement some form of division into districts as an approach to the solution of the dilemma of Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine.

 

1. There are four sources for the Ahmad Khalidi plan: the Zionist Archives, the Public Record in London, the Judah Magnes Archives and Falastin newspaper. It is mentioned in the Zionist Archives that the Jewish Agency received a proposal from Ahmad Khalidi[22] to apply a cantonal arrangement in Palestine.

     The proposal provides for the creation of two cantons:

-- A Jewish canton, extending from north of Jaffa to Haifa and further on to Beisan, so as to include the Jewish areas west of the Hijaz railroad, and then on to Tiberias and Hula.

-- An Arab canton which would have included the districts and qadas of Gaza, al-Majdel, Bi`r as-Sab'(Beer Sheba), Jerusalem, Ramleh, Jenin, Toulkarm, 'Akka, Beisan, the Jordan Valley, Haifa and Nablus. This would have covered a geographic area that could have been called Southern Syria.

     The cities of Nazareth, Jerusalem, Hebron, Bethlehem, Safad and the port of Haifa would have remained outside either of these two cantons.

     The plan was also mentioned in a letter from Ahmad Khalidi to Judah Magnes, dated July 23, 1934.     In his proposal the area of the Jewish canton would have amounted to two and a half million  dunums (a dunum is roughly 900 square meters) of the best land, and the Jews could have settled in Jerusalem and Hebron. Arrangements could have been made to link the Arab canton to Trans-Jordan under Emir Abdullah, which would have made up for some of the land the Arabs would have relinquished to the Jews. Each canton would have been independent and self-governing. Arabs and Jews would have governed themselves with limited oversight by the Mandate authorities. A central council, consisting of Arabs, Jews and Britishers, with its seat in Jerusalem, was to be in charge of religious affairs, courts of appeal and the supreme court, defense, the postal service and telegraphic communications, customs, and the currency. The government of each canton was to be in charge of courts of the first instance, the police, education and public works. Both Arabic and Hebrew were to have been declared official languages in each canton. Emir Abdullah was to have headed the administrative council of both cantons, but the legislative assemblies were to have remained separate and independent.[23] The way in which Khalidi's plan is formulated indicates that it was meant as a final, rather than a temporary, solution.

 

     Britain was to provide the link between these two cantons. Disputes between the two cantons were to be resolved by the League of Nations or the International Court of Justice or a Privy Council in Britain.[24]

 

     In his letter to Judah Magnes, Khalidi said:

 

           I do not regard the Cantonization as an ideal solution, but perhaps it is as practicable as any other solution which has ever been proposed. I should like to mention some points which i confidently regard as cardinal: First, that no proposal could possibly be accepted if Palestine is to be regarded as n immediate solution of Jewish difficulties and complications caused by intricate political situations in Europe, Asia and Africa, and bound to happen at moment. Secondly, until the Jews realize that there must be some sort of reasonable limit to the practical application at the National Home both in land and population, it is difficult to see how the Arabs could be conceived to attempt to create a 'reapprochment'. [Thirdly], the friendship of the Arab should be in the long run more precious to jews than obtaining millions of dunams or introducing thousands of immigrants.[Fourthly], a drastic change in the Jewish policy towards the Arab is essential.[25]

 

     Falastin published Ahmad Khalidi's plan on December 27, 1933 without attributing it to him.[1] The paper also carried Mapai's rejection of the plan in the same issue.[26]

 

2.  The other Arab proposal for a cantonal arrangement in Palestine came from Musa al-'Alami, who was secretary to the British High Commissioner. In September 1933, Musa al-'Alami sent a report to the Colonial Office in London proposing the creation of a Jewish canton. He said in this report that the Arabs entertained no hopes of achieving better understanding with the Jews because they believed that all Jewish organizations and parties in Palestine had the same objective of creating a Jewish state in Palestine. 'Alami proposed creating an independent Jewish district which would extend from Tel Aviv to 'Atlit and have sufficient depth to absorb the Jewish settlements in that region. The Jews would be able to legislate for themselves and to absorb as many immigrants as they chose in that district. The rest of Palestine would constitute an Arab district. A national government would be established for the whole of Palestine, and both the Arab part of Palestine and the Jewish district would remain under the British Mandate.[27]

 

III. A proposal submitted by George Antonius[28] to Ben Gurion in April 1936: Antonius put forward his proposal after hearing Ben Gurion say that Arab national aspirations did not contradict Jewish aspirations. Antonius suggested that Jewish-Arab understanding could not take place unless restrictions were placed on Jewish immigration to Palestine; he proposed that Jewish immigration should be spread out through greater Syria rather than be confined to Palestine where the Zionists hoped to establish a Jewish national home. He proposed giving the Jews an area on the coastal plain where they would constitute a majority. This entity could form part of a Greater Syria federation. Ben Gurion admitted that this proposal reflected a conflict between Arab and Jewish aspirations in Palestine.[29]

     Antonius was ahead of his time in proposing such a solution to the Palestine problem at that historic juncture: limiting Jewish immigration but opening opportunities for the Jews to give expression to their spiritual and cultural values. Antonius' final opinion on the nature of the problem, which he set out in his book The Arab Awakening, was that the problem lay in the attempt to establish a Jewish state in Palestine; this could not be done without forcibly uprooting the rural population from the land. This was responsible for the turmoil and destruction that was becoming widespread in the country. This state of affairs was not due to hatred of the Jews handed down from generation to generation or the to inability of Arabs to sympathize with the difficult circumstances besetting the Jews, but to the fact that the uprooted peasants were ready to face death rather than to relinquish their land. Antonius' analysis led him to say that for these reasons, putting politics aside, the Zionist dream could not be realized. The first step towards a solution lay in facing up to this fact objectively and drawing inferences concerning the repercussions that were to be expected: the policy of creating a Jewish state or establishing a national homeland for the Jews that would enjoy territorial sovereignty could not be achieved without displacing the Arabs by force.[30]

 

     In his proposed solution, Antonius tried to strike a balance between satisfying the natural rights of the Palestinians and the cultural rights of the Jewish community.

    

           A solution on those lines would be both fair and practical.  It would protect the natural rights of the Arabs in Palestine and satisfy their legitimate national aspirations. It would enable the Jews to have a national home in the spiritual and cultural sense, in which Jewish values could flourish and the Jewish genius have the freest play to seek inspiration in the land of its ancient connection.[31]

 

     Antonius' plan constituted a bold initiative, coming as it did in the midst of the Palestinian Arab rebellion (1936-39). He stressed the crucial importance of a non-violent solution, trying to reconcile the just demands of each group at that time. He warns of the dangers that would arise and the destruction that would follow the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

 

 

IV. The Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini[32] and the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri as-Sa'id,[33] put forward draft plans on January 12, 1938 and February 6, 1938 respectively, along the lines of the Hyamson-Newcome plan[2], which had resulted from British, Arab and Jewish contacts between Jerusalem, London and New York on October 9, 1937. That plan called for the establishment of an independent state in Palestine in which Arabs and Jews would enjoy equal rights as two self-governing communities. The plan stipulated that the ratio of Jewish immigrants to Palestine and Trans-Jordan would not exceed 50 per cent of the population.

     The most distinctive features of the draft plans put forward by Husseini and as-Sa'id were: emphasis was placed on the fact that Palestine would be an independent, sovereign state in which all Palestinian citizens would enjoy equitable civil rights; Britain would be in charge of the government of Palestine and would gradually grant the Arab and Jewish inhabitants an increasing share of administrative responsibility; and the inhabitants would be granted jurisdiction over local issues concerning each of the communities and autonomy at the municipal level. The only difference between the two draft proposals was in the ceiling placed on the ratio of Jews to the total population of Palestine; the Husseini plan stipulated that the existing ratio would not be exceeded, while Nuri as-Sa'id's plan put that ratio at 10 per cent of the population until such time as the two communities reached an agreement to alter the ratio. The Jewish Agency rejected the Hyamson-Newcome plan and all derivative plans, and asked that contacts with the Arabs on this point should cease.[34]

 

V. 'Umar Saleh al-Barghouti[35]offered to act as a go-between for the Istiqlal party with the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation[3]. On June 12, 1944 Kalvarisky and Cohen informed the Jewish Agency through Sharett that five or six well known members of the Istiqlal Party had expressed their willingness to accept a plan providing for full equality between the Arab and Jewish communities in legislative and administrative institutions, demographic ratios and the right to own property, within a binational state which would be federated with neighboring countries. The plan also provided for Jewish immigration to neighboring countries. Sharett kept his silence and did not reject the plan, but promised to present it to the executive committee of the Jewish Agency. The executive committee decided not to reply to the plan.[36]

 

VI. Fawzi Darwish al-Husseini[37] advocated reaching an understanding with the Jews in Palestine. On August 16, 1946 he announced that the Arabs were not behind the policies of the Higher Arab Committee in Palestine. On November 11, 1946 he, along with four other members of Filastin an-Jadidah (the New Palestine Organization)[4], signed a document jointly with the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation. The document constituted an endorsement by Filastin al-Jadidah of the League and pledged support by Filastin al-Jadidah for the League's activities. The League defined the goal of cooperation between Arabs and Jews as the formulation of an understanding between the two communities based on political equality which would serve as the foundation for independence; Jewish immigration was to proceed according to the absorptive capacity of the country, and ties were to be established in the future between the independent Palestine and neighboring Arab countries.[38]

 

     Many meetings were held between prominent Arab and Jewish figures. It is not possible to list the ideas and proposals that were aired during such meetings, the main reason being that those proposals were not put forward officially.

 

     In the following section we will analyze Arab, particularly Palestinian, positions towards the Jews after what the Arabs came to regard as the disaster of 1948.

 

 

6. The Effect of the Creation of Israel on Arab Attitudes towards the Jews:

 

     The staggering dimension of the disaster that befell the Palestinians in 1948 produced a psychological reaction. The image of the Jew became part of a nightmare with which one could have no dealings. Arab public opinion shrank from a confrontation with anything that had to do with war and defeat. The Palestinian refugees outside Israel came to feel that great distances separated them from their cities, towns and villages. Everything was shrouded in uncertainty. The Arab mind could no longer bear to contemplate a meeting with anyone from Israel, from which the Arabs were separated by a great chasm, as though Israel were part of some other continent thousands of miles away. The defeat was internalized, one no longer trusted others, opinions that were offered came to be seen as part of the fabric of some conspiracy. It even became difficult for Palestinians living on the outside to meet with Palestinians from Israel. Arabs and Palestinians retreated into themselves. The defeat of 1967 brought Palestinians in the occupied territories face to face with a new reality, which bore the face of an Israeli soldier.

     The occupation by Israel of the remaining Palestinian territory as well as Syrian and Egyptian territory in the Golan Heights and Sinai gave rise to questions in the Arab mind about the nature of Israeli society. That led to further questions: how could one weigh life under occupation against life in exile? Hypothetically, how should one deal with Israeli society. What is to be the shape of the state to come?

     Palestinian politicians, men of letters and intellectuals gave free rein to their imaginations in dealing with these issues. The wealth of subjects bore fruit in works of literature, politics and sociology. The defeat of 1967 gave the revolutionary, the author, the researcher, the politician and the citizen at large a fertile subject and a concrete state of affairs to which he could apply his intellect; it melted the ice and broke the circle of isolation that had confined thought and stood in the way of dealings with the other side, which now simply became a matter of fact. We shall examine below how this found expression in literature and the idea of a secular democratic state and the issue of dealing with Jews under Israeli hegemony.

 

7. Palestinian Literature and the Jews after 1948:

 

     A wall of isolation separated Palestinians in Israel from those outside it in the wake of the 1948 war. The Palestinians who remained in Israel and became subject to Israeli rule felt like strangers in their own country and on their own soil. The only outlet for expression that these Palestinians had  was literature. The task of intellectuals in this period was a search for identity in the midst of the melange of peoples and unfamiliar systems which now constituted their environment. There emerged a group of poets and novelists in search of personal and social identity. Among those poets were Mahmoud Darwish, Tawfiq Ziyad, Samih al-Qasem, Salem Jubran, Hanna Abu Hanna, Jamal Qa'war and Fawzi al-Asmar. They wrote about the tribulations of the Arab community in Israel, now that Palestinians living in Israel had become Israeli citizens who had restrictions placed on their liberties and who could not enjoy the same civil rights as Jewish citizens of Israel. The themes of bitterness and of distinctively Palestinian alienation ran through this poetry.

     Arab Palestinian poetry in Israel laid the foundation for the appearance of political groups that tried to give an organized voice to that alienation, such as Jama'at al-Ard (Partisans of the Land ?) and Abna` al-Balad (Sons of the Country).[5] Others found an outlet for their alienation by joining the Israel Communist Party (Rakah), which recognized the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

     The activities of these groups provided a manifestation of the Palestinian identity of the Arabs in Israel, which in turn found expression in the work of authors such as Emil Habibi who wrote stories and novels, notably Al-Mutasha`el, Sabri Jiryis, author of a study entitled The Arabs in Israel, and Fawzi al-Asmar who wrote To Be an Arab in Israel. Many other writers belonged to this trend, such as Emil Tuma and Tawfiq 'Abbas.

     Other Palestinians wrote about the impact of the disaster of 1948 on the lives of Palestinians in exile. Some expressed the opinion that return to their homeland and coexistence with the Jews was impossible. Ghassan Kanafani's novel 'A`ed ila Haifa (Return to Haifa) is considered to be one of the most significant literary works of this genre, depicting the life of a Palestinian outside Israel who is consumed by the desire to return to his city, but who can find no other path except armed struggle.

     Palestinian poetry and prose produced inside Israel reflected the sentiments of a community that was rebelling against discrimination and the repression of its identity by Israel. The response to the question of whether coexistence with Jews was possible was to underline the distinctiveness of the Arab identity and its differences from the Jewish identity. The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip also underlined the difference between the Palestinians who were considered Israeli citizens and those who were a people under occupation. The literary output of Palestinians such as Fadwa Tuqan and Sahar Khalifa reflects the concerns and aspirations of a people laboring under the hegemony and repression of an occupying power.

 

8. The Concept of a Secular Democratic State in Palestine:

 

     Following the Israeli occupation of Arab territories in 1967, the Palestinian identity became even more distinctive and separate: the distinction was between the Israeli occupiers and the Palestinians living under occupation; there was no doubt about who was the victor and master of the situation and who had been defeated and was the underdog. The Palestinians had to find a way to express their rebellion against the occupation of their land by Israel. It was natural that the expression in this case should have taken the form of resistance, most notably the actions of the fida`i (guerrilla) organizations inside the occupied territories.

     The political program of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) expressed the desired relationship with the Jews of Palestine through the slogan of a democratic secular state. This was the position of the PLO on the type of coexistence that was possible in the future between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. The political program of the PLO, which was adopted at the Palestine National Council meeting in Cairo in January 1973, stated that the objective of the Palestinian struggle was to establish a democratic society in all of Palestine (meaning within the borders of the Mandate territory). The political program defined the guiding principle of this democratic society as safeguarding the rights of all citizens to work and a dignified life so that they could enjoy justice, equality and fraternity.[39]

     The position of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine was better defined and more elaborate concerning the idea of a secular democratic state. In 1974, the central committee of the DFLP adopted a political program which defined its position on this issue. The program stated that armed struggle was not a racist, aggressive and chauvinistic movement aimed at the Jews; it was instead a national democratic struggle directed at Zionist economic, political, cultural and ideological institutions which were themselves aggressive and racist organizations. It endorsed the return of the Palestinian Arab people to their land by liberating the occupied territories and achieving independence and national sovereignty and establishing a secular democratic state where all citizens (both Arabs and Jews), regardless of their religious beliefs, would enjoy the rights of citizenship and would no longer be subject to Zionist expansionist tendencies or aggressive leanings.[40]

     Yasser Arafat announced the slogan of a secular democratic state in Palestine during the speech he delivered from the pulpit of the U.N. General Assembly in the Fall of 1974. That was the first public announcement of the slogan by the PLO in an international setting.

     The slogan reflected ideal aspirations and a position in principle. It was not a practical plan for action. Most Israeli parties and organizations rejected it because it conflicted with the principle of a Jewish state. The slogan of a secular democratic state was not embraced by the Palestinians at a grass roots level, either, whether in the occupied territories or the countries of the Palestinian diaspora. Nor was there much enthusiasm for the idea at the international level, as it was considered to be impractical.

Nevertheless, it was embraced by a number of educated Palestinians as an intellectual and moral position. In those circles, it was viewed as a theoretical approach to a peaceful and democratic solution to the problem.

 

     The idea of a democratic secular state in Palestine was unrealistic.  In view of the weak support it elicited, a number of Palestinian intellectuals and politicians began to look for a workable formula that could serve as a basis for a political settlement to the Palestinian problem, seeking to capitalize on security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which gave international legitimacy to certain limited Palestinian apparitions.  This approach was exemplified in the debate that took place among leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization and in the varied proposals put forward concerning the establishment of a Palestinian state on any part of the occupied territories which could be liberated.  The PLO's 1071 political program was the outcome of those discussions.  The adoption of that program, however, could not conceal the deep differences that existed both among the leaders of the different organization within the PLO and among Palestinian intellectuals as a whole.

     Among the most notable proposals put forward in this regard was that by Prof. Walid Khalidi in the July 1978 issue of Foreign Affairs under the title "thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State.  "Khalidi, one of the best regarded Palestinian academicians, wrote:

"The corner Stone is the concept of Palestinian Sovereignty Not half Sovereignty of quasi Sovereignty, ersatz Sovereignty;  but A Sovereignty Independent Palestinian State.  Only such State within the endorsement of the PLO.  Only such a State is likely to affect a psychological breakthrough of the Palestinians in the occupation and the Diaspora.  It will lead them out of the political limbo, in which they have lingered since 1948.  It would end there anonymous ghost like flight existence as a none people.  It would terminate their dependency on the mercy, charity or tolerance of other parties,  weather Arab, Israeli or international.  It would be a point of reference, a national anchorage, a center of hope and achievement.

     Of all people, the Jewish People are historically qualified to understand this.  Only such a state with PLO endorsement would win the support of the Arab Opinion and majority of Arab States."[41]

     Prof. Khalidi's proposal gave rise to a storm of controversy, particularly among the radical wing of the PLO, whose members took this to be an attempt to float an idea which enjoyed the support of a member of top leaders of the PLO, who were willing to compromise the principle of liberating the entire territory of Palestine which extends from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean, and who sought a political settlement with Israel under the pretext of facing up to reality.  The publication of Khalidi's article in the American journal was taken as a signal of a willingness for further concessions and for making deals on the side.  Suspicions were voiced that further concessions could entail such notions as administrative self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip following a transitional phase, as well as negotiations between Israel and Jordan, precisely the sort of things that emerged in the Camp David agreements.  The timing of the publication of the article, shortly before the Camp David agreements which signed in September of that year, gave rise to suspicions of a political deal that was being hatched in secret by prominent American and Palestinian figures.  However, the article had the positive effect of fostering the emergence of a pragmatic trend among Palestinians who were willing to accept mutual recognition between Arabs and Israelis, and who wanted to seize opportunities that had arisen before it was too late.  Although Khalidi was only expressing his personal opinion, still his article served as advocacy for the establishment of a fully sovereign Palestinian state on that part of the territory of Palestinian which could be mutually agreed on among the Israelis and Palestinians.  He Said:

"A different generation of Arab Palestinian Leaders in different circumstances Today are prepare to say that they accept it with all the implications of such acceptance for Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab reciprocal recognition and coexistence."[42] 

     The chain of events have since led to the signature and the commencement of the implementation of the Camp David accords in 1978 and 1979, the invasion of Lebanon by Israel and the expulsion of the PLO from that country in 1982, after which the organization in effect lost the use of Lebanon as a base of operations against Israel.  This narrowing down of options led to the escalation of resistance activities by Palestinians within the occupied territories and the outbreak of the intifada   in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in the Autumn of 1987.  The PLO, which had moved its headquarters to Tunis, was left with hardly any practical option except tp pursue the course of politics and diplomacy and to capitalize on resistance activities to further its political objectives.  The leadership of the PLO  investigated all avenues which could lead to a peaceful settlement.  At the extraordinary PNC session in Algiers in 1989, the PLO  in effect announced for the establishment of a palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with Jerusalem as its capital.

 

 

9. The Transition to Mutual Recognition:

 

     After Palestinian iterature had embraced the task of identifying who was a Palestinian and defining a Palestinian identity, and once a number of intellectuals and politicians had put forward their conceptions of what would constitute an ideal solution in the future, discussion turned to methods of establishing contact and exchanging views between Palestinians and Israelis.

     Initial contacts were reserved and secretive. Later, the voices addressing the other side grew more audible, to the effect: "We want to reach an understanding, we want to arrive at a shared vision." Once the Palestinians had come to know who they were, they said, "now we want to know what the other side wants of us."  The Palestinians started to debate among themselves "Who do we mean when we say 'the other side'? Is it the non-Zionist Israeli, or the non-religious Jew? Who should we reach an understanding with? Is it the educated Israelis, the moderate politicians, the advocates of human rights, or the peace movements?" Questions also arose as to the level at which contacts should take place.

     Contacts took place at many venues. Unofficial contacts took place, and doors that had been closed were opened. When the Palestinians grew audacious enough to establish public contacts with a number of noted Israeli figures, it was the Israelis' turn to ban contacts. They intensified the surveillance of prominent Israelis who were in contact with Palestinians. They investigated them more thoroughly than before. Any Israeli who met with a Palestinian , even if the latter was a literary figure or a delegate to a peace conference, was considered to be meeting with a terrorist. The ball was now in the Israeli court.[6] Palestinian intellectuals found fertile material to write about. When the contacts grew more extensive, the Palestine Liberation Organization began to flaunt them, and to make public any contact between it and prominent Israeli figures. The PLO now saw that it was  in its interest to publicize contacts with Israeli politicians and personalities.

     After the 1982 Arab League Summit in Fez, the idea of mutual recognition became a strategic facet of PLO policy. PLO leaders tried to reach that goal by tactics such as the proclamation of the creation of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories, with Jerusalem as its capital. The PLO was eager for secret, back channel contacts with the Israeli government, even if it had to sacrifice its declared political goals. Publicly, the PLO tried to be as flexible as possible. When the National Council met in Algiers in 1988, it declared that it would recognize Israel in exchange for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with Jerusalem as its capital. This flexibility yielded no more than the inclusion of the PLO as part of the Jordanian delegation in the Madrid Conference in 1991, and several rounds of talks in Washington in 1992 and 1993.

     The PLO was able to secure its strategic goal of winning Israeli recognition through a series of secret meetings on a bilateral Israeli-Palestinian level in Oslo during 1992-93. The Declaration of Principles signed in Washington on September 13, 1993 was an expression of mutual recognition. The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arragements constituted a new approach to the Palestinian problem, namely, submitting all aspects of the problem to negotiations during a five-year interim period. The transitional period is further divided into parts which are of an experimental nature and subject to review. These various parts come under the general heading of limited self-government, which spans a period beginning with the negotiations over the so-called Gaza and Jericho First agreement, and going on to negotiations over the rest of the West Bank and other critical issues, such as the fate of Jerusalem, the return of the refugees, water resources, regional security, Jewish settlements and the final shape of government in those areas.

     What the PLO had to do in order to secure a recognition from the government of Israel of its status as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people was to enter a long tunnel that will take five years to traverse. Any progress towards reaching the end of the tunnel depends on the successful passing of a test in each section. Still, the agreement which the tunnel represents is a concrete reality, not some abstraction suspended in the ether. Entry into the tunnel represents a practical and direct approach to a solution of the problem of the Palestinian people at this point in time. One cannot deny the concrete  results that this approach will bring and the real change that is expected to take place in the interim period.

     No doubt the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements which was signed by the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization will translate into changes on the ground. This approach to the solution of the Palestinian problem will also have repercussions for relations between Arabs and Jews both inside and outside Palestine. The most important feature of Palestinian-Israeli relations will be to make it possible for the establishment of an independent Palestinian polity which the Palestinians have so long aspired to. But it will be difficult to achieve this by relying on politics alone; economic, social and cultural factors will have to bring about a gradual change in Palestinian-Israeli relations. Such a change could effect a compromise between the Palestinian's political demands and their urgent daily needs. One of the most significant indicators of this change will be whether elections are held and a representative body emerges, composed of Palestinians from the occupied territories, which is perceived to be legitimate. However, it will be very difficult for such a body to represent all Palestinians or to enjoy sovereignty.

     The PLO's insistence on securing recognition from Israel led the organization to play all the cards in its hand and to use up all the A leverage it had. It will have to begin to accumulate leverage anew from resources within the occupied territories and arising from the unequal relationship resulting from the agreement. This agreement could be a death trap for the PLO unless it can enhance its effectiveness and ward off dissolution. That danger remains and threatens to undermine the possibility of an actual transition to sovereignty over a part of the land of Palestine.

     Sovereignty is only a symbolic expression of the fact that all Palestinians will be able to express their aspirations and their political identity. Realizing the aspirations of one group within the Palestinian people cannot be at the expense of Palestinian communities throughout the diaspora. The situation of Palestine and the neighboring countries makes possible various formulas for overcoming the small size of the countries in the region and the difficulty of reliance on outside aid or loans for survival. One viable formula would be to set up federations or confederations which could help secure the political aspirations and the economic interests of each of their members. Of course, reaching such understandings requires many sacrifices and changes. Changing incompatible psychological and cultural attitudes will provide the basis for public opinion on both sides to accept the idea of the coexistence of two nationalities side by side.

 

10. Conclusion:

 

     Arab attitudes towards Jews in Palestine assume two contradictory manifestations. The first is based on good relations, characterized by tolerance and recognition of the place of a Jewish minority in Palestinian Arab society. Tolerance meant that, according to tradition, each community or sect had its rights and its values, and the freedom to practice its traditions and religious rites. The second manifestation relates to the changes brought about by waves of Jewish immigration from various parts of the world to Palestine and the impact this had on socio-economic conditions of the Arab inhabitants, particularly the rural population. These social and demographic changes had political consequences that upset the stable world of the Palestinian Arabs. Palestinian peasants and workers were displaced by Jews. This created anxieties among the Arabs, particularly those who found themselves with no land to work and who lost the means to earn a living, having been excluded from job opportunities in their region. Their agricultural regions were transformed into agricultural colonies on which Jewish settlements and farming villages were established. Workers, peasants and small farmers were driven to seek employment in the services sectors in the cities and to relocate with their families to those cities.

     The conditions of Arab workers and of the Arab urban and rural poor deteriorated until they reached a crisis, giving rise to acts of violence and bloody clashes. This was particularly apparent between the two world wars, in the twenties and thirties. The most significant of these were the clashes in Jaffa, the Wailing Wall riots, and the Palestinian rebellion of 1936-39. Much later, after the creation of the state of Israel and the occupation of new Arab territories, came the intifadah, which began in 1987 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A prominent characteristic of the intifadah was the fact that in most cases it caught Palestinian leaders by surprise. Politicians did not control its outbreak, nor could they guide its course. These spontaneous outbreaks highlighted the wide gap between the grass roots level and the leadership.  Palestinians leaders took decisions without recourse to democratic procedures under the pretext that the Palestinian cause was going through extra-ordinary circumstances; it was the same under the British Mandate, in the countries to which the Palestinian refugees migrated, and under Israeli rule.

     Successive groups of Palestinian leaders suffered from a structural weakness, which was reflected in the strategies and  political positions they adopted. Those leaders failed to keep pace with the changes sweeping through Palestinian society and the aspirations of the Palestinian people; they confined themselves to acting as watchdogs over positions dictated by principle. They could have capitalized on the atmosphere created by the popular intifadahs, whether in the distant or recent past, to secure results in negotiations with Jewish leaders, particularly in the days of the Mandate, when the demographic balance favored the Arabs. Nor did those leaders have a clear idea of the attitudes of the local Jewish community or of the Mandate authority, which exercised moral and material trusteeship over the execution of the policy of creating a Jewish national home.

     Perhaps the gravest error into which some of those leaders fell was to focus their efforts on building a power base for themselves among the public and on silencing the opposition. Most of those leaders bolstered their popular base of support by inciting the masses to rally behind slogans and surrounding themselves with sycophants. The dealings such political leaders had with Jewish institutions were shrouded in secrecy and had an illicit feel about them, because they had declared this sphere of action taboo, and it was better not to talk about it. Although some Arab intellectuals did come forward with ideas and proposals, the political leaders avoided the mention of any contacts established, and denied any leaked information about proposals they may have advanced; a case in point was the denial in Falastin newspaper of the existence a draft plan put forward by Hajj Amin al-Husseini as a counter proposal to the Hyamson-Newcome plan. This at a time when the interest of Palestinian leaders dictated flexibility in political dealings with some Jewish organizations, particularly as the Jewish side was in a position of relative weakness.

     The principal concern of the Palestinian leaders seems to have been to win the approval of the British authorities, who were seen as both mediators and governors. The PLO appears to have gone too far in applying the lesson to be learnt from the experience of Palestinian leaders under the Mandate; namely that intransigence is counter productive, and went so far as to make all the concessions it could in return for conditional recognition by the government of Israel. There are many complicated questions that need to be answered , including questions about the future of the agreement which the PLO took it upon itself to conclude.

     The issue of how to deal with Israel on a realistic basis is still being debated in academic circles and some political circles, despite the unpromising beginning for the implementation of the Declaration of Principles agreement. The understanding between the PLO and the government of Israel has not filtered down  to the popular level among either Arabs or Jews. There is still a long way to go for true reconciliation and mutual understanding to become a reality. There are many obstacles in the path of both Arabs and Jews due to the declared ideological positions of each side, political difficulties and the conflict between the networks of relations in which each side is enmeshed. It will be no easy matter to extricate each party from these positions in the short run; their positions will have to evolve, stage by stage, before the two sides are convinced that a true understanding is viable. Conflicting world views cannot simply jump over the chasm between them. Conditions must be created that will help the two sides bridge the gap. As the gap shrinks, it will become clear that neither side can get along without the other; the Israelis cannot proceed without an understanding with the Palestinians, and the Palestinians cannot achieve their objectives in their homeland, Palestine, without an understanding with the Israelis.

     In order for coexistence among Israelis and Palestinians to feel natural, there needs to be a conviction that each side needs the other to make a whole. Coexistence is the fate of these two national communities. Waiting for opportunities to come along will not relieve the suffering of those who are in pain. the important thing is that there should be justice, a balance and equality between the two sides. What Awni Abdel Hadi said in his testimony before the Peal Commission in 1937 still holds true today, even if circumstances have changed:

 

           Don't believe that we shall willingly give up part of Palestine. However, if we are asked to give assurances to guarantee the interests of the entire population, so that they should have all the same rights equally with the Arabs, then we are prepared to do so.[43]

 

 

     It is worth pointing out that for Arabs and Jews to arrive at a mutual understanding and recognition of the interests of the other community in Palestine is a long-term undertaking. During this time, both sides will have time for some deep reflection about the form of coexistence they would prefer. There are many alternatives to consider: for instance, there could be two independent states side by side, this would allow each community to exercise the right of self-determination and to hold on to its identity. Of course, they could also be guided by the experience of socially pluralist, multiethnic or multisectarian states: there are many state structures which would allow each community self-determination and the preservation of its identity within a democratic structure which would permit reconciliation between them. One such possibility would be a binational arrangement in which the Palestinian-Arab and Jewish-Israeli national communities could live together in one state occupying the entire territory of present.

    

 

2

                                NOTES